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This thesis explores the relationship between the colour-blind public philosophy of 
republicanism and the French state’s policies targeting the Roma. It addresses one 
core research question: how did political actors use neo-republican ideas to 
communicate and justify policies targeting the Roma? To do this, it examines the 
discourse of French and European Union (EU) actors involved in the formulation and 
implementation of polices targeting the Roma from 2010 to 2016. This discourse 
comprised political speeches, policy reports, memos, media clippings and 50 in-
depth interviews with French and EU actors. Building on Christina Boswell and 
James’ Hampshire’s theory of discursive strategies, this thesis focuses on the 
strategic deployment of republican ideas, notably the ways in which political actors 
were able to exploit their polyvalence.  
 
This thesis argues that political actors used four key republican ideas to communicate 
and justify policies targeting the Roma in France. First, a commitment to 
universalism allowed political actors to deny accusations of ethnic targeting while 
pursuing policies that disproportionally targeted Roma migrants. Second, political 
actors deployed the idea of a ‘neutral’ public sphere to justify the eviction and 
deportation of residents living in so-called Roma camps. Third, political actors used 
a logic of administrative selection to predetermine which evicted ‘Roma’ migrants 
were worthy of state support. Fourth, recipients of this support were subject to a 
state-led process of assimilation akin to a modern ‘civilising mission’, which 
political actors defended as a necessary step towards integration.  
 
This thesis concludes that it was precisely the polyvalence of republican ideas that 
allowed actors to deploy them to communicate and justify discriminatory policies. In 
doing so, it builds upon a growing literature on the role of republicanism in 
contemporary French politics and provides a rich empirical study that captures the 
influence of a general public philosophy on specific policy decisions. Additionally, it 
extends recent scholarship on the treatment of the Roma in Europe and contributes to 
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INTRODUCTION: REPUBLICANISM AND THE ROMA IN FRANCE 
 
 
La France avant ne connaissait pas de “problème Rom”. La notion de minorité en France 
n'existe pas.1 
Pierre Lellouche (5 November 2010) 
	
In the summer of 2010 President Nicolas Sarkozy launched a campaign to ‘mettre un 
terme aux implantations sauvages de campements de Roms’.2 He deplored these camps as 
‘zones de non-droit qu'on ne peut pas tolérer en France’ and stressed that collective 
evictions were imperative for restoring France’s ‘l’ordre républicain’.3 Speaking in 
Grenoble after an episode of localised riots that had little to do with the Roma, Sarkozy 
framed the illegal camps of Romanian and Bulgarian migrants on the fringes of French 
cities as a ‘Roma’ problem. In itself, the French state’s dismantling of illegal camps was 
not new but, from the moment Sarkozy framed the policy in explicitly ethnic terms, the 
Roma were thrust into the centre of heated public debate.  
 
It was not long before there was a backlash against Sarkozy’s policies, especially after a 
leaked circular dated 5 July 2010 surfaced, instructing Prefects to implement ‘une 
démarche systématique de démantèlement des camps illicites, en priorité ceux de Roms’.4 
The criticism of Sarkozy’s campaign was not confined to his political opponents. 
Members of Sarkozy’s own Union Pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP) party 
condemned the government’s targeting of the Roma for betraying universalist republican 
principles. Nevertheless, few critics disputed the need to clear illegal camps, citing the 
safety of camp residents as the principal concern. Sarkozy’s pronouncements also came 
under scrutiny outside France. The anti-Roma rhetoric sparked an international feud, not 
least with European Commissioner Viviane Reding, leading to a formal investigation of 
France’s adherence to the 2004/38/EC Directive on the free movement of European 
Citizens.5 Submitting its paperwork to the Commission at the eleventh hour, France 
																																																								
1 Pierre Lellouche, Secrétaire d'Etat aux affaires européennes, Conférence de presse sur les relations 
franco-slovaques, la consolidation de la Zone euro, la question des droits de l'homme en Iran, l'accord 
militaire francobritannique et sur la situation des Roms au sein de l'Union européenne, Bratislava (5 
November 2010). 
2 Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, Déclaration sur la lutte contre la criminalité, la délinquance 
et l'immigration illégale, Grenoble (30 July 2010).  
3 Ibid.  
4 Ministère de l’intérieur, Circulaire sur l’evacuation des campements illicites (5 August 2010), 
IOC/K/1017881/J. 
5 2004/38/EC.   
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escaped a legal battle by a hairline and consequently removed the word Roma from 
official policy documents.  
  
Following a May 2012 change of government in France, Sarkozy’s successor, François 
Hollande and his cabinet sought to rebrand state-led evictions of illegal camps by 
replacing references to the Roma with the euphemisms campements illicites and 
bidonvilles. Yet an unofficial link between the Roma and illegal camps remained and 
camp evictions more than doubled under Hollande. Political differences aside, after the 
controversy of 2010 both the Sarkozy and Hollande governments’ clamp down on illegal 
camps was premised on a common dilemma: how to address a problem perceived to 
pertain to the Roma without directly naming or targeting any ethnic community. French 
officials tried to address this dilemma by designing policies explitly devoid of ethnic 
distinctions to resolve a problem they, at least unofficially, framed in ethnic terms.  
 
Why did the French state pursue such a paradoxical approach to illegal camps? The 
answer lies in the appeal of republicanism as the dominant public philosophy officials 
deployed to communicate and justify public policy in France. Forged in the wake of the 
French Revolution, republicanism holds a privileged position in France’s political history. 
Those who champion it see themselves as upholding a political tradition passed down 
from previous generations and consider it their duty to carry it into the future.6 Although 
republicanism has proved remarkably resilient and malleable, its dominance in French 
politics is relatively new. Only after the collapse of the trente glorieuses in the late 1970s 
did French officials seek to revive a republican political discourse. This was not simply a 
regurgitation of outdated values but a conscious articulation of a new national project: 
neo-republicanism. A dedicated discussion of neo-republicanism will follow, but at this 
stage it is sufficient to note that its central tenets comprise a commitment to universalism 
founded on the rejection of ethnic and religious categories; a renewed emphasis on 
preserving the public sphere; a deep scepticism of communitarianism; and a firm belief 
that membership of the national community should surpass all other attachments.7   
 
																																																								
6 Sudhir Hazareesingh, Political Traditions in Modern France (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
7 For a path-breaking study of the ideological development of neo-republicanism see: Emile Chabal, A 
Divided Republic: Nation, State and Citizenship in Contemporary France (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015). 
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The task of this thesis is to untangle the relationship between the colour-blind philosophy 
of neo-republicanism and the French state’s targeting of the Roma. My thesis addresses 
one core research question: how did political actors use neo-republican ideas to 
communicate and justify policies targeting the Roma? I do this by analysing the discourse 
of key French and European Union (EU) actors involved in the formulation and 
implementation of what I call ‘French Roma policy’ from 2010 to 2016. In my analysis, I 
focus on the strategic deployment of neo-republican ideas, notably the ways in which 
political actors were able to exploit their polyvalence.8 To achieve this, I draw and 
modestly build upon Christina Boswell and James’ Hampshire’s theory of discursive 
strategies.9 My research aims to show how it is precisely the flexibility and ambiguity of 
neo-republican ideas that allow them to be deployed strategically in political discourse. In 
so doing, I hope to contribute to a growing literature on the role of neo-republicanism in 
French politics and provide a rich empirical study that captures the influence of a general 
public philosophy on specific policy decisions.  
 
The Resurgence of Republican Ideas  
 
Republican ideas have experienced a revival in French politics since the late 1970s. 
Following the death of de Gaulle in 1970 and the OPEC oil embargo in 1973 that helped 
to drive the French economy into recession, France’s future appeared uncertain. In 
response to the changing political landscape, French officials on the mainstream Right 
and Left resurrected republican ideas in public debate. The aim was to unite increasingly 
unemployed and apathetic citizens, guard against the rise of the Far-Right in France and 
counter the ‘creep’ of greater European unification. Perhaps most significantly, the 
deployment of republican ideas in French politics was linked to the emergence of a new 
public debate on immigration. It was not so much the arrival of guest workers, post-
colonial exiles and other immigrant populations to France but their permanent settlement 
and clustering into communities that became the subject of controversy. Given the public 
nature of the issue, the French state assumed responsibility for ensuring the erosion of 
immigrant communities transformation of their residents from foreigners into Frenchmen. 
																																																								
8 Emphasising strategic deployment helps me to avoid the trap of ‘subsumption’ raised by David Howarth, 
Aletta J. Norval and Yannis Stavrakakis in their work Discourse theory and political analysis: identities, 
hegemonies and social change (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 5. 
9 Christina Boswell and James Hampshire, ‘Ideas and agency in immigration policy: A discursive 
institutionalist approach’, European Journal of Political Research, 56(1) (2017), pp. 133-150. 
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Yet, the question of how these immigrants ought to be integrated into French society 
remained open.  
 
To address this newly politicised immigration question, the French state sought to design 
a set of policy solutions. As has often been the case in French history, the French state in 
the 1980s and 1990s drew inspiration from its own history to devise a programme of 
clearing immigrant ‘ghettos’ and assimilating residents into French society. This included 
the provision of public housing initiatives that promoted the cohabitation of people from 
diverse social, ethnic, religious and other particularistic communities in the same 
geographical area known as mixité sociale, compulsory schooling for all children 
regardless of their origin, and French language training and professional and cultural 
education schemes for adult immigrants to facilitate their assimilation to French society 
without extensive, or ongoing government support. The programme was based on the 
republican conception of the nation as a mosaic of individuals united not through ethnic 
or religious ties, but through their integration into a common national community of 
citizens. It also resembled a modern civilising mission, in which the French state aimed to 
civilise ‘immigrants’. A distinctly republican philosophy underpinned the French state’s 
policies on immigration, which, as this thesis demonstrates, were also circumscribed by 
its obligations of EU membership.  
 
Even at this early stage, it is worth outlining some of the core concepts of French 
republicanism. Over the course of my research, it became clear that these concepts were 
given different meanings in the context of broader ideological debates, especially about 
immigration and identity, which varied across ideological groupings and over time. 
Additionally, and more directly relevant to the argument of this thesis, I found that the 
meanings of republican concepts differed depending on how officials strategically 
deployed them to communicate and justify their positions.  
 
Nevertheless, despite the varied meanings of republican concepts, historians and political 
scientists tend to agree on their historical significance. When a person employs a 
republican concept, it has connotations of certain events, institutions and individuals in 
French history. Thus, while the meaning of republican concepts is neither fixed nor 
singular, it is not entirely ‘empty’ or up for grabs either. Chapter two of this thesis 
provides a detailed analysis of the historical development of key republican concepts I 
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encountered in my research. However, to demonstrate the flexible uses of republican 




Concept Examples of the concept in political 
discourse 
What do the examples tell us about the 
interpretations of the concept?   
Universalisme ‘Cet universalisme n’efface pas les 
variétés des sociétés humaines. 
Incompressible, il fonde un monde 
réellement commun parce que 
respectueux de chacun. C'est en se 
respectant qu'on peut vivre ensemble.’10  
François Hollande (PS)  
 
‘Le message évangélique, il est fait 
d'universalisme, pas de nationalisme.’11 
Nicolas Sarkozy (UMP) 
Sarkozy and Hollande appear to interpret 
universalisme as the precedence of shared 
values over particularistic affiliations. 
Hollande suggested that universalisme 
trumped particularistic affiliations such as 
religion and ethnicity and claimed that 
universalisme is about humans respecting 
one another and living harmoniously in one 
society. However, Sarkozy blurred the 
boundary between religion and universalisme 
by stating that evangelism was born from 
universalisme.  
L’Espace public ‘Ici c’est la France, la Nation y est 
première et la religion y est seconde. Ici 
c’est la France, la religion se fait discrète 
dans l’espace public.’12 
Nicolas Sarkozy (UMP) 
 
‘[Il faut] lutter avec la plus grande 
détermination contre l'islamisme radical, 
contre ces symboles qui visent à occuper 
l'espace public.’13  
Manuel Valls (PS)  
 
‘Je vais interdire les signes ostensibles 
dans l'espace public. Je vais prendre la loi 
de 2004 qui est la loi qui a interdit les 
signes ostensibles à l'école, et je vais 
l'étendre dans l'espace public.’14 
Marine Le Pen (FN)  
Sarkozy, Valls and Le Pen appear to present 
l’espace public as a physical public place in 
which the behaviour of individuals is 
expected to conform to a set of norms. Yet, 
their interpretations of norms differ. In this 
instance Sarkozy framed l’espace public as a 
place where religion should be discreet, 
while Valls suggested there was no place for 
radical Islam or its religious symbols in 
l’espace public. The implication was that 
some Islamic practices were symbols of 
radicalism that challenged the norms of 
French society. Le Pen took this further by 
stating that she would extend the law 
banning religious symbols in schools to 




10 Francois Hollande, Président de la République, cited in ‘Découvrez le nouveau Musée de l'Homme à 
Paris’, RTL (17 October): http://www.rtl.fr/culture/arts-spectacles/decouvrez-le-nouveau-musee-de-l-
homme-a-paris-7780139812 (accessed 1 May 2018). 
11 Nicolas Sarkozy, Ancien Président de la République, cited in ‘Eglises transformées en mosquées: 
Sarkozy sous le feu des critiques’, L’Express (10 July 2015): 
https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/lr/eglises-transformees-en-mosquees-sarkozy-sous-le-feu-des-
critiques_1698010.html (accessed 1 May 2018). 
12 Nicolas Sarkozy, Ancien Président de la République, cited in Alexandre Jeziorski, ‘« Ici c'est la France », 
l'anaphore très remarquée de Nicolas Sarkozy’, L’Opinion (17 November 2016): 
https://www.lopinion.fr/video/ca-fait-buzz/ici-c-est-france-l-anaphore-tres-remarquee-nicolas-sarkozy-
114522 (accessed 1 May 2018). 
13 Manuel Valls, Ministre de l’Intérieur, cited in Sylvain Chazot, ‘Manuel Valls voit dans le port du voile 
islamique "une revendication politique"’, Le Lab Europe1 (25 August 2016): 
http://lelab.europe1.fr/manuel-valls-voit-dans-le-port-du-voile-islamique-une-revendication-politique-
2829610 (accessed 1 May 2018). 
14 Marine Le Pen, Députée française et Présidente du Front National, cited in ‘Marine Le Pen veut interdire 
"les signes religieux ostensibles dans l'espace public". Un "sacrifice" nécessaire’, Le Nouvel Observateur 
(16 October 2016): http://www.nouvelobs.com/en-direct/a-chaud/28912-presidentielle2017-lepen-marine-
interdire-signes.html (accessed 1 May 2018). 
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Concept Examples of the concept in political 
discourse 
What do the examples tell us about the 
interpretations of the concept?   
Intégration  ‘Nous subissons les conséquences de 
cinquante années d’immigration 
insuffisamment régulée, qui ont abouti à 
un échec de l’intégration.’15 
Nicolas Sarkozy (UMP)  
 
‘On n'est pas français par son lieu de 
naissance, sa couleur de peau ou ses 
origines mais parce qu'on adhère à un 
projet, à des valeurs, à une communauté 
nationale…A l'école, certains de mes amis 
italiens, portugais et espagnols, souvent 
de milieux très modestes, ne parlaient pas 
leur langue natale! Il y avait une marche 
forcée vers l'intégration, voire 
l'assimilation.’16 
Manuel Valls (PS)  
While Sarkozy appears to frame intégration 
as an end that immigration policies should 
achieve, allowing him to use intégration to 
justify hard-line immigration policies. Valls 
presented intégration as a process whereby 
foreigners learn the skills and behaviours 
deemed necessary to assimilate in France. 
For Valls, integration was not an end it was a 
means to achieving assimilation.  
 
Communautarisme ‘En défendant les valeurs républicaines et 
le respect des lois et en refusant le 
communautarisme et toutes les formes 
d'extrémisme, le Gouvernement défend et 
protège tous ceux qui, quelles que soient 
leurs opinions religieuses, prônent le 
respect et l'équilibre.’17 
Brice Hortefeux (UMP) 
 
‘Je défendrai […] une vision de la laïcité 
que je veux incarner, la lutte contre le 
communautarisme.’18  
Manuel Valls (PS)  
 
‘Il y a aujourd’hui des gens qui se sentent 
en rupture avec la société française. Le 
communautarisme est le terreau de 
l’islamisme.’19 
Marine Le Pen (FN) 
It is clear from the examples that Hortefeux, 
Valls and Le Pen spoke of communautarisme 
in a pejorative sense to describe the 
clustering of ethnic and/or religious 
communities into ghettos. Hortefeux 
presened communautarisme as an extremist 
idea that challenges republican values. Valls 
was more specific, positioning 
communautarisme as a threat to laïcité. Le 
Pen used communautarisme to discredit the 
presence of Islam in France by saying that 





15 Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, Déclaration sur la lutte contre la criminalité, la 
délinquance et l'immigration illégale, Grenoble (30 July 2010). 
16 Manuel Valls, Ministre de l’Intérieur, cited in Tristan Quinault-Maupoil, ‘Valls a voulu devenir français 
après un interrogatoire dans un commissariat’, Le Figaro (12 March 2015): 
http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/le-scan/citations/2015/03/12/25002-20150312ARTFIG00107-valls-a-
voulu-devenir-francais-apres-un-interrogatoire-dans-un-commissariat.php (accessed 1 May 2018).  
17 Brice Hortefeux, Ministre de l’Intérieur, cited in ‘Hortefeux : « jamais le dialogue entre la République et 
la communauté musulmane n'a été aussi dense et approfondi »’, Atlas Info (8 September 2010): 
https://www.atlasinfo.fr/Hortefeux-jamais-le-dialogue-entre-la-Republique-et-la-communaute-musulmane-
n-a-ete-aussi-dense-et-approfondi_a9262.html (accessed 1 May 2018). 
18 Manuel Valls, Ministre de l’Intérieur, cited in ‘Valls juge Hamon "ambigu" sur la laïcité’, Reuters (22 
January 2017):  https://fr.reuters.com/article/topNews/idFRKBN1572MS (accessed 1 May 2018).  
19 Marine Le Pen, Députée française et Présidente du Front National, cited in Christophe Forcari, ‘Marine 
Le Pen sort l'artillerie lourde contre la «racaille radicalisée»’, Libération (16 January 2016):  
http://www.liberation.fr/france/2015/01/16/marine-le-pen-sort-l-artillerie-lourde-contre-la-racaille-
radicalisee_1182377 (accessed 1 May 2018). 
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Concept Examples of the concept in political 
discourse 
What do the examples tell us about the 
interpretations of the concept?   
Laïcité20 ‘Il n'est plus contesté par personne que le 
régime français de la laïcité est 
aujourd'hui une liberté  : la liberté de 
croire ou de ne pas croire […] La laïcité 
n'a pas le pouvoir de couper la France de 
ses racines chrétiennes.’21  
Nicolas Sarkozy (UMP) 
 
‘La laïcité n’est pas dirigée contre eux [les 
musulmans], mais au contraire [elle est] là 
pour les aider, pour les protéger. L’État 
que j’incarne est là à leurs côtés.’22 
Manuel Valls (PS) 
Sarkozy and Valls presented laïcité as the 
absence of religion in the public domain. But 
neither treated all religions as equal. While 
Sarkozy spoke of laïcité as a form of 
freedom, he also said it could not separate 
France from its Christian roots. His 
comments suggested that Christianity was 
permissible in the public, while other 
religions were not because they did not have 
the same historical legitimacy. In contrast, 
Valls framed laïcité as a form of protection 
against discrimination. He did not make 
exceptions for Christianity; instead he 
implied laïcité was embodies by the French 




The terms in this table should not be taken as definitive. Nor should they be seen as 
capturing an eternal essence. These ideas are flexible and were deployed for various 
reasons in relation to specific historical circumstances. As such, I am careful in this thesis 
to avoid presenting an illusion of a unified doctrine of republicanism ‘en bloc’ in my 
analysis. Instead, I focus on the ways in which officials could deploy the same republican 
concept in different ways, based on different interpretations. The terminology or language 
officials used might have been consistent, but the meanings varied. 	The examples in the 
table above demonstrates that officials on the left, right and the extreme-right employed 
the same words but their interpretations differed.  
 
Although officials often interpreted republican ideas differently, they rarely questioned 
their relevance to solving public problems. To take only one example, the concept of 
laïcité is crucial to understanding political debates concerning religion, notably l’affaire 
du foulard in 1989, the 2004 law prohibiting religious symbols in French schools, and the 
banning of the burqa in 2010. The principle of universalism has also informed questions 
regarding race. For example, during his 2012 presidential election campaign François 
Hollande pledged to remove the word ‘race’ from the constitution, arguing that ‘il n'y a 
																																																								
20 Despite its prevalence in other political debates in France, it is important to note that French officials did 
not use the term laïcité in their political discourses on the Roma.  
21 Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, Discours au Palais du Latran, Vatican (20 December 
2007).  
22 Manuel Valls, Ministre de l’Intérieur, cited in ‘La laïcité « n’est pas dirigée » contre les musulmans 
assure Manuel Valls’, La Croix (18 October 2016): https://www.la-croix.com/Urbi-et-
Orbi/Actualite/France/La-laicite-nest-dirigee-contre-musulmans-assure-Manuel-Valls-2016-10-18-
1200797172 (accessed 1 May 2018). 
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pas de place dans la République pour la race’.23 This generated a public conversation over 
whether the French constitution could protect citizens against racism if it did not 
recognise race. In these debates, as elsewhere, it has become abundantly clear that 
republicanism has normative implications for French policy and contains a legitimising 
power that officials can draw upon to support their own initiatives.  
 
My research on the Roma in France offers a new case through which critically to analyse 
neo-republicanism. The aim is not to condemn the republican public philosophy outright; 
instead, it is to show how political actors strategically deployed republican ideas to 
communicate and justify discriminatory policies against the Roma and how political 
actors exploited the polyvalence of republican ideas in their discourses on the Roma. In 
doing so, I hope to demonstrate how the strategic deployment of republican ideas 
facilitated discrimination against the Roma in France, and to suggest how, in some cases, 
officials could rely on republicanism as a rhetorical tool to communicate and justify their 




While republicanism may have been the dominant public philosophy in French political 
discourse, it did not exist in an ideological vacuum. Other ideas were periodically present 
in the political discourse I analysed. I was able to identify seven key alternative ideas. I 
will not try to capture the meanings of these alternative ideas because I do not believe that 
any essential and decontextualised meanings exist. However, I will provide brief 
descriptions of the alternative ideas I encountered and give each idea an appellation, 
which I will use throughout the rest of the thesis.  
 
The first alternative idea was racism: the idea that individuals belong to different races, 
and members of a race possess qualities specific to that race, marking them as inferior or 
superior to others. The second was crypto-Christianity: the covert practice of Christianity, 
which can be concealed by an attempt to abide by the norms of secularism or another 
religion in public. The third was heteronormative family values: the idea that a family 
																																																								
23 ‘Hollande propose de supprimer le mot "race" dans la Constitution’, Le Monde (11 March 2012): 
http://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2012/article/2012/03/11/hollande-propose-de-supprimer-le-
mot-race-dans-la-constitution_1656110_1471069.html (accessed 15 August 2017).  
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should generally include two parents of the opposite sex, and a small number of children, 
who live under the same roof but tend to sleep in different rooms. The fourth was anti-
Gypysism: the discrimination of people based on the stereotype of a nomadic Gypsy. The 
fifth was classism: the notion that individuals or groups can be ranked into different 
classes by their socio-economic situation. The sixth was a sort of security-focused 
paternalism ideas: the idea that individuals require protection from the state against 
threats to their security. And finally, the seventh was multiculturalism: the idea that 
society should recognise cultures as distinct communities and support the coexistence of 
these diverse communities. 
 
It is important to note that the brief descriptions of ideas are my own. I am conscious that 
these ideas are often far more complex and nuanced than the brief descriptions I have 
provided, that their precise meaning varied depending on the context in which officials 
deployed them, and that the line between these ideas and republican ones are not 
necessarily clear. However, the purpose of these descriptions is not to give a 
comprehensive literature review of the debates behind these alternative ideas or provide 
reductionist essentialist definitions. Rather, I included them to help signpost alternative 
ideas that appeared to be separate from republican ideas in the discourse of French 
officials I analysed.  
 
The focus of this thesis is squarely on the strategic deployment of republican ideas. As I 
will show, republicanism was one of the most important – if not the most important – 
public philosophy officials used to communicate and justify French Roma policy. But 
these alternative philosophies are a reminder that, despite officials’ insistence on 
republicanism, their discourses on the Roma also contained other ideas that sometimes 
seemed at odds with the republican ones they promoted. These alternative ideas offer 
vital clues as to why officials framed illegal ‘Roma’ camps as unacceptable. Their 
contempt for illegal ‘Roma’ camps was based on more than a rejection of illegality. It 
was also because these camps were often visible to the public eye. Officials tended to 
frame ‘Roma’ camps as challenging the norms governing the French public sphere, 
suggesting that their discourse was often based on crypto-Christian, heteronormative, 
anti-Gypsy, class-based, security-based and/or multiculturalist assumptions. Many of my 
empirical chapters explore how republican ideas became entangled with these alternative 
– and often competing – ideas.    
	 10 
Defining the Roma in France  
 
Who were the ‘Roma’ that French officials discussed? Rather than providing an 
essentialist definition, I argue that it is better to interpret Roma as a social construct. As 
such, I do not attempt to specify precisely who the Roma were, by presenting a 
supposedly authoritative, static and abstract characterisation of ethnicity. Instead, I 
examine how specific actors have constructed Roma at precise points in time, under 
particular circumstances, based on ideological traditions. This approach acknowledges 
that the construction of ethnicity can take various forms. For example, how an individual 
or group articulates its self-conceptualisations is one permutation, whereas how an 
individual or group assigns ethnic categories to others is another. My study focuses on the 
latter by examining the ways in which French officials framed migrant populations living 
in informal settlements, known as campements illicites or bidonvilles, as Roma. This is 
because my research is concerned with how this constructed category of Roma became 
the subject of national public policy. Of course, to argue that ethnicity is a social 
construct is by no means original.24 But, by highlighting the role French officials played 
in creating a Roma category from the outset, I can differentiate my research from others 
who overlook this point or simply hint at, but fail to tease out, the social construction of 
ethnicity.25  
 
Focusing on social construction also allows me to question the reasoning behind French 
officials’ framing of illegal camps as a Roma problem and show how French officials 
made ethnic claims that appear inconsistent with the republican ideas they endorsed. As 
the French state is constitutionally proscribed from collecting ethnic and religious data, it 
is clear that the racialisation of illegal camps was built on unfounded generalisations of 
camp residents. This stands in contrast to the Anglo-Saxon approach of using self-
conceptualisations of race and ethnicity gleaned from the census or other official statistics 
																																																								
24 For key works that use a constructivist framework to interpret race and ethnicity see: Stephen Cornell and 
Douglas Hartmann, Ethnicity and Race: Making Identities in a Changing World (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine 
Forge Press, 1998, 2007); Joane Nagel, ‘Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity 
and Culture’ Social Problems, 41 (1994), pp. 152–76; Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation 
in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s, Second Edition (New York and London: Routledge, 
1994); and Werner Sollors, The Invention of Ethnicity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
25 See, for example: Owen Parker and David Toke, ‘The Politics of a Multi-Level Citizenship: French 
Republicanism, Roma Mobility and the EU’, Global Society, 27(3) (2013), pp. 360–78; and Alexandra 
Nacu, ‘From Silent Marginality to Spotlight Scapegoating? A Brief Case Study of France’s Policy Towards 
the Roma’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 38(8) (2012), pp. 1323–1328. 
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to design affirmative action policies.26 As I show throughout the thesis, the 
generalisations of French officials were linked to the conspicuous nature of the 
campements illicites or bidonvilles. Officials’ external observations of these visible living 
arrangements and superficial interactions with its resident populations crystallised into 
ethnic stereotypes, some of which were anchored in a long history of anti-Gypsyism in 
France.27 These stereotypes were based on but not limited to the following factors: the 
appearance of individuals, the size and configuration their families, the practice of 
Romani language, the possession of Romanian and Bulgarian citizenship, as well as 
perceptions of poverty, poor hygiene and crime. These stereotypes permitted officials to 
construct their own definitions of ethnicity, and meant that most officials who referenced 
the Roma did not offer any explanation for the term, assuming it was self-evident.    
 
Nevertheless, the French state did occasionally try to define its use of the ethnic term. For 
example, the French Ministry of Information (Dila) provided a classification of gens du 
voyage and Roma on Vie Publique:28  
 
"Gens du voyage" est un terme administratif qui désigne un mode de vie non sédentaire: 
il apparaît avec deux décrets de 1972, qui se réfèrent à la loi de 1969 sur l’exercice des 
activités économiques ambulantes. Celle-ci remplaça notamment le carnet 
anthropométrique institué par la loi de 1912 sur les nomades par un livret de circulation. 
Dans la pratique, cette appellation est souvent utilisée pour désigner les Roms (ou 
Tsiganes) de France (y compris les Manouches et les Gitans), bien qu’ils ne soient 
itinérants que pour environ 15% d’entre eux. La plupart des Roms en France sont 
français. Ceux qui ne le sont pas sont souvent d’origine bulgare ou roumaine et sont 
devenus citoyens européens après l’adhésion de ces deux pays à l’Union européenne en 
2007. Ils bénéficient de la liberté de circulation dans l’Union européenne depuis cette 
date. Depuis janvier 2014, ils ont libre accès au marché du travail.29   
 
This classification advanced three central claims: the majority of non-French Roma were 
Romanian or Bulgarian, Roma could be sedentary or nomadic, and those nomadic Roma 
																																																								
26 The Anglo-Saxon model does not prevent the emergence of ethnic stereotypes in practice but its explicit 
use of ethnic categories is the antithesis of the colour-blind principle which is integral to the French 
republican philosophy. For comparisons of Anglo-Saxon and French republican approaches to race, see: 
Adrian Favell, Philosophies of Integration (Houdmills, Palgrave: 1998); and Erik Bleich, Race Politics in 
Britain and France (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
27 Michael Steward (Ed.), The Gypsy Menace: Populism and the New Anti-Gypsy Politics (Hurst: London, 
2012). 
28 Vie Publique is a government project created in 2002 to promote freedom of information. It is an 
annotated digital archive of unclassified government documents and speeches, which includes some 
definitions of key terms synopses. The French Ministry of Information is responsible for providing content, 
as well as curating, updating and managing the project.       
29 Vie Publique, Roms et gens du voyage (15 May 2015): http://www.vie-publique.fr/chronologie/chronos-
thematiques/roms-gens-du-voyage.html (accessed 20 July 2017).  
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who held French citizenship came under the administrative category of gens du voyage. 
Following this logic, one could deduce that gens du voyage were in fact Roma.  
 
Yet, not all French officials shared this interpretation. Some argued that conflating Roma 
and gens du voyage created a false link between foreign migrants and French citizens 
who held an itinerant legal status. This criticism intensified after President Sarkozy 
announced a cabinet meeting under the topic of ‘problèmes que posent les comportements 
de certains parmi les gens du voyage et les Roms’ on 22 July 2010. For example, Pierre 
Hérrison, Senator of the Haute-Savoie and President of the Commission nationale 
consultative des gens du voyage, argued that ‘Roms’ were ‘des étrangers, ressortissants 
de l'Union européenne’.30 Five years later, a senior national civil servant shared this view, 
claiming that ‘les gens du voyage et les Roms sont deux communautés distinctes. Les 
gens du voyage français ne veulent rien à voir avec les Roms migrants principalement de 
Roumanie et Bulgarie’.31 In contrast to the Ministry of Information, these officials 
constructed Roma as non-French EU citizens, attaching an ethnic label to a group of 
foreign migrants in France. Clearly, the French state’s attempts to define Roma were 
often internally inconsistent.  
 
Furthermore, it is important to remember that Roma discrimination has a long history in 
France. As Ilsen About notes, in 1912 the French state created an anthropometric 
notebook, une carnet anthropométrique des nomades, a biometric and portable identity 
document for travellers. This notebook adopted the same approach the French state had 
hitherto reserved for criminals. In the early twentieth century, the French state issued 
recidivist criminals with special notebooks to monitor their movements. By issuing 
travellers with such a document the assumption was that they could not be trusted in the 
same way as other French citizens and therefore needed to be under public surveillance. 
Worse still, these notebooks facilitated the internment of gypsies in France under the 
Vichy regime.32 Yet anti-nomad policies lingered long after the war. The anthropometric 
notebook remained in place until 1969 when it was replaced by a carnet de circulation for 
																																																								
30 Constance Jamet, ‘Gens du voyage, Roms : une réalité méconnue’, Le Figaro (24 August 2010): 
http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2010/07/21/01016-20100721ARTFIG00512-gens-du-voyage-roms-
une-realite-meconnue.php (accessed 20 July 2017).  
31 Interview with National Official, Dihal, Paris (5 December 2014). 
32 Hubert Filhol, Un camp de concentration français. Les Tsiganes alsaciens-lorrains à Crest, 1915-1919 
(Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 2009) 
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French travellers. Although the explicit reference to nomads vanished, these documents 
became a system for controlling the geographic mobility of travellers and a way for the 
state to exert genealogical surveillance on families and related families through filiation 
and matrimonial links.33  
 
In contemporary France, the stigma attached to nomads and Gypsies has morphed into a 
suspicion of free movement. Migrants residing in illegal camps found themselves 
entangled in the stereotype of the suspect nomad. Although many may have been 
economic migrants who moved to France in the hope of accessing better opportunities 
than in their country of origin, their precarious and exposed living arrangements led 
officials – and other observers – to assume they were nomadic. As this thesis will 
demonstrate, French officials often tried to avoid explicit anti-gypsy references, not least 
to avoid allusions to Vichy, but a bias against vagrancy underpinned public policies. For 
example, a number of French social services, such as the ability to register oneself as a 
patient at a local doctor’s surgery, were contingent on having a fixed domicile. Given that 
residents living in illegal camps did not possess a formal proof of domicile, many were 
not eligible to register as patients irrespective of their medical needs and/or proximity to 
the surgery. Consequently, illegal camp residents did not receive the same degree of 
public support as other individuals who could demonstrate a fixed proof of address.  
 
Anti-Gypsyism also underpinned officials’ confusions between so-called Roma migrants 
who populated illegal camps and French travellers known as gens du voyage. During an 
interview, one official uttered the words ‘voleurs de poule’, a pejorative pseudonym 
typically used in relation to gens du voyage, to describe non-French immigrants they 
deemed Roma living in an illegal camp. The implication was that immigrants living in 
illegal camps possessed the same characteristics as French travellers (gens du voyage) 
and were consequently classed as untrustworthy thieves. Perhaps more fundamentally, 
President Sarkozy’s overt criticism of the Roma in his speech at Grenoble in July 2010 
responded to events that had nothing to do with the Roma: a riot concerning members of 
the gens du voyage community in the town of Saint Aignan. This example, and many 
																																																								
33 Ilsen About, ‘Underclass Gypsies: An Historical Approach on Categorisation and Exclusion in France in 
the Ninteenth and Twentieth Centuries’, in Michael Stewart (Ed.), The Gypsy ‘Menace’: Populism and the 
New Anti-Gypsy Politics (London: Hurst, 2012), p. 98. 
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others throughout my thesis, revealed a deep-rooted historical and racial prejudice in the 
French state’s communications and justifications of its policies regarding the Roma.    
 
Theory and Methods  
 
I draw upon theories of discursive institutionalism to explain how political actors used 
neo-republican ideas to communicate and justify policies targeting the Roma. Rather than 
viewing ideas as either delimiting political action or strategic tools used by political 
actors, discursive intuitionalists argue that although deeply entrenched ideas can restrict 
the course of political action this does not prevent political actors from selecting or 
combining ideas to shape policy. Discursive institutionalists highlight discourse as the 
means through which ideas are connected to policy. In line with this position, my thesis 
takes the discourse of French and EU political officials as its central object of 
investigation. Focusing on discourse also allows me to examine the normative dimension 
of republicanism. In the words of Stuart Hall, the celebrated cultural theorist:  
  
[Discourse] governs the way that a topic can be meaningfully talked about and 
reasoned about. It also influences how ideas are put into practice and used to regulate 
the conduct of others, defining an acceptable and intelligible way to talk, write or 
conduct oneself, so also by definition, it ‘rules out’, limits and restricts other ways of 
talking, of conducting ourselves in relation to the topic or constructing knowledge 
about it.34 
 
Vivien Schmidt, the founding theorist of discursive institutionalism, distinguishes 
between three levels of ideas.35 According to Schmidt, policy ideas represent specific 
initiatives that policymakers propose or implement, programmatic ideas consist of 
broader programmes that underpin initiatives, and public philosophies provide an 
overarching framework of principles on which society should be structured. My thesis is 
a study of public philosophies – not of programmatic ideas or of policy ideas, or how 
these three levels of ideas interact. Schmidt’s three levels of ideas are helpful insofar as 
they allow me to categorise republicanism as a public philosophy, but I have chosen not 
to use the three levels of ideas as a conceptual framework for understanding the 
relationship between republicanism and French Roma policy. This is because I am 
																																																								
34 Stuart Hall, ‘The spectacle of the other’, in Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor and Simeon J. Yates 
(Eds.), Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader (London: Sage, 2001), p. 73. 
35 Vivien Schmidt, ‘Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse’, Annual 
Review of Political Science, 11(1) (2008), pp. 303-326. 
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primarily interested in the strategic deployment of republicanism. By concentrating on 
strategic deployment rather than influence, I have sought to minimise the risk of reading 
republicanism into discourse. In other words, I have sought to avoid confirmation bias. 
This is because my analysis is based on observed explicit invocations of republican 
concepts in discourse.  
 
To develop a conceptual framework, I have employed Boswell and Hampshire’s work on 
the discursive strategies actors employ to mobilise ideas.36 Boswell and Hampshire 
highlight three discursive strategies: actors can prioritise one level of ideas over others, 
exploit the polyvalence of public philosophies, and combine different policy or 
programmatic ideas by presenting them as legacies. I have concentrated on the second 
discursive strategy – in which actors exploit the polyvalence of public philosophies – to 
organise the analysis of my data. This has led me to make three theoretical claims based 
on selectivity, prioritisation and exploitation of ambiguity. First, I argue that actors can 
selectively emphasise one strand of a public philosophy, even if it conflicts with another 
strand of the same public philosophy, Second, I maintain that actors can prioritise one 
public philosophy over another to conceal – and sometimes legitimise – discredited and 
normatively unacceptable ideas. Here the logic is that certain ideas, for example, the 
alternative ideas listed above, are not legitimate so officials invoke republican ideas to 
conceal a perceived legitimacy deficit. Focusing on concealing ideas rather than interests 
also lets me avoid making assumptions about the preferences of public officials. Third, I 
claim that some public philosophies are sufficiently ambiguous that they are open to bias 
that actors can exploit. This explains why officials were able to use the same set of 
republican concepts but assign different meanings to them.  
 
To locate data through which to examine these claims, I collected the discourse of public 
officials working on the formulation and implementation of French Roma policy. As a 
preliminary step, I gathered official publications, transcripts of political speeches and 
radio and television interviews on the topic of illegal camps and the Roma in France. 
These were available on ministerial websites and Vie Publique, an online archive of 
																																																								
36 Christina Boswell and James Hampshire, ‘Ideas and agency in immigration policy: A discursive 
institutionalist approach’, European Journal of Political Research, 56(1) (2017), pp. 133-150. 
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unclassified documents run by the French government’s Direction de l'information légale 
et administrative (Dila).  
 
As the official use of the term ‘Roma’ was so politically sensitive, I quickly realised that 
private interviews with public officials would give me a deeper understanding of how the 
French state framed the Roma ‘problem’ and why they employed supposedly colour-blind 
polices to address it. Additionally, interviews helped me to separate, for analytical 
purposes, the normative pressure of republican ideas on French officials, the ways in 
which these officials mobilised republican ideas to justify their policies, and the gap 
between republican policy prescriptions and discriminatory outcomes. As I indicate in 
chapter one of this thesis, the fact that I was an outsider meant that interviews were 
generally candid conversations in which officials tended to reflect on the significance of 
republican ideas. The result was a rich and diverse dataset of political discourses on the 
topic of French Roma policy.      
 
To analyse this data, I followed Anselm Strauss’ grounded theory method of qualitative 
analysis.37 This was an iterative process consisting of open coding, axial coding and 
selective coding. I document this process in detail in chapter one, but here it may be 
useful to get a sense of how each step guided my analysis. Open coding led me to realise 
that I was specifically interested in actors and the ways in which they deployed 
republican ideas to communicate and justify policies. Axial coding helped me to narrow 
my focus to a small sample of republican concepts and differentiate them from concepts 
based on the alternative ideas I mentioned above. And selective coding allowed me to 
hone in on four key republican concepts: universalism, the public sphere, selection and 
integration. This final step enabled me to identify systematically examples of how 
officials used these four concepts to communicate and justify policies targeting the Roma. 




37 Anselm L. Strauss, Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 
1987).  
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Outline of Chapters  
 
This thesis comprises four empirical chapters, prefaced by two prologue chapters 
establishing the theoretical, methodological and historical foundations on which my 
argument rests. Chapter one focuses on the theory and methods that underpin my analysis 
of political discourse. It makes a case for using discursive institutionalism as a theoretical 
framework to examine the relationship between republican ideas and French Roma 
policy, clarifies the theoretical and empirical contributions that studying the case of the 
Roma affords, and details the data collection and analysis methods I employed to bring 
this project to fruition.  
 
Chapter two traces the evolution of French republicanism since its birth, and its rise to 
become France’s dominant political ideology since the end of the 1970s. It highlights the 
key concepts that crystallised at different points in French political history, which became 
incorporated into the canon of (neo-)republican ideas. It suggests how this canon shaped 
the institutional memory of officials in contemporary France and Brussels and became a 
resource for them to strategically deploy.  
 
The subsequent chapters provide an empirical analysis of how officials used certain 
republican ideas to justify and communicate policies targeting the Roma. Chapter three 
explores how the French state’s insistence on the republican idea of universalism allowed 
officials to deny the existence of policies targeting the Roma. It reveals differences 
between the Sarkozy and Hollande governments’ approaches to universalism, arguing 
that universalism only became a discursive strategy to demonstrate commitment to 
France’s republican tradition under Hollande, in spite of the Hollande government’s 
intensified program of evacuations. It also illustrates the persistence of a tacit link 
between the Roma, campements illicites and bidonvilles in the political discourse despite 
claims of universalism.  
 
Chapter four focuses on the place where universalism was enforced: the public sphere. It 
highlights the ways in which officials deployed the idea of a ‘neutral’ public sphere to 
communicate and justify the eviction and (sometimes) deportation of residents living in 
illegal Roma camps. It argues that neutrality was defined in terms of a particular concept 
	 18 
of what officials deemed to be normal and acceptable and suggests that officials framed 
illegal Roma camps as an unacceptable communitarian threat to the French public sphere.  
 
Chapter five investigates the basis on which the French state chose to support or reject 
evicted Roma residents. It exposes a logic of administrative selection based on whether a 
resident possessed the willingness and capacity to integrate, and maintains that 
interpretations of what constituted such a willingness and capacity were highly subjective 
and suspect. The chapter also raises ethical concerns about the outsourcing of public 
policy to non-government associations, who were subcontracted to decide which Roma to 
support or reject.  
 
Chapter six scrutinises the process of integration that selected Roma undertook in 
exchange for state support. It argues that this process was akin to a modern republican 
civilising mission. It finds that despite the French state’s rigorous administrative selection 
and socialisation programmes, evicted Roma tended to remain segregated from rather 
than integrated in French society.  
 
In the conclusion, I step back from the specific strands of republican ideas addressed in 
the empirical chapters to reflect on the potency of the republican public philosophy in 
contemporary French political discourse. I consider how the case of the Roma might help 
to explain the ways French officials communicate and justify policies targeting other 





 THEORY AND METHODS 
 
Over the last thirty years scholars have come to accept that republican ideas have 
influenced contemporary French politics. Yet the question of how this influence has 
operated remains contested.38 My thesis focuses on the ways in which public officials 
strategically deployed republican ideas to justify and communicate policies targeting the 
Roma. To explore this phenomenon, I examine the discourse of French and EU officials 
from the summer of 2010 to the autumn of 2016, a period that begins with Sarkozy’s 
campaign to systematically clear ‘campements de Roms’ and concludes with a wave of 
Islamist terrorist attacks that quickly overshadowed the Roma in public debate. 39 This 
requires three steps: a theoretical framework to conceptualise the relationship between 
ideas and policy, a justification of the merits of applying the theoretical framework to the 
case of the Roma in France; and a set of methodological guidelines for collecting and 
analysing data capturing the strategic deployment of republican ideas. This chapter 
follows these three steps to establish a research design on which to structure my empirical 
analysis in chapters three to six of this thesis.  
 
Before I begin, let me clarify what I mean by French Roma policy. Political scientists 
have dedicated considerable attention to studying policy as a distinct field of enquiry, 
splitting into strands focusing on policy formulation and policy implementation.40 In this 
thesis I do not wish to use the case of the Roma to devise a detailed schema of the 
different parts of public policy as, for example Theodore Lowi and Benjamin Ginsburg 
																																																								
38 For various conceptualisations of the influence of French republicanism see: Erik Bleich, Race Politics in 
Britain and France (Cambridge, 2003); Adrian Favell, Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the 
Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998); Rogers Brubaker, 
Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1992); 
Dominique Schnapper, La communauté des citoyens. Sur l'idée moderne de nation (Paris: Gallimard, 
1994); Sophie Duchesne, Citoyenneté à la Française (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1997); Claude Nicolet, 
L’idée républicaine en France, 1789-1924 (Paris: Gallimard, 1982); Charles Joppke, ‘Transformation of 
Immigrant Integration in Western Europe’, World Politics, 59(2) (2007), pp. 243-273; Martin Schain, The 
Politics of Immigration in France, Britain and the United States (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); 
Sara Wallace Goodman, ‘Questioning National Models’, Perspectives in Europe, 40(2) (2010), pp. 47-50; 
and Sudhir Hazareesingh, Political Traditions in Modern France (Oxford, 1994).  
39 Nicolas Sarkozy, Déclaration sur la lutte contre la criminalité, la délinquance et l'immigration illégale, 
Grenoble (30 July 2010). 
40 For a concise review of the literature on policy formulation and implementation see the introduction of: 
John R. Turnpenny and Andrew J. Jordan, The Tools of Policy Formulation Actors, Capacities, Venues and 
Effects (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015). 
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have done in their work on American politics.41 Rather, I share Michael Moran, Martin 
Rein and Robert Goodin’s position that actors make policy ‘in response to problems’ and 
‘what is perceived as puzzling or problematic is not predetermined or fixed for all 
time’.42 In the words of C. Wright Mills, policy becomes public when ‘personal troubles’ 
shift into the realm of perceived ‘social problems’.43  
 
I draw upon the work of Joseph Gusfield who emphasises the public character of social 
problems because ‘all social problems do not necessarily become…matters of conflict or 
controversy in the arenas of public action. They do not eventuate in agencies to secure or 
movements to work for their resolution.’44 Gusfield also raises the question ‘how is it that 
an issue or problem emerges as one with a public status, as something about which 
“someone ought to do something”?’, drawing attention to the role of actors and 
institutions in resolving public problems.45 Gusfield’s conceptualisation clarifies the dual 
function of the French state in relation to the Roma: French officials were responsible for 
constructing the Roma problem, but they were also charged with its resolution. 
Accordingly, I define ‘French Roma policy’ as not simply the French state’s response to 
an objective Roma problem but the measures that diverse officials designed and 
implemented to respond to their own constructions of Roma as a public issue. The 
specific functions officials played will be discussed later in this chapter. At this point, 
however, it sufficient to note that the key task of political officials was to decide ‘which 







41 Theodore Lowi and Benjamin Ginsburg, American Government (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996), p. 
607. They define public policy as ‘an officially expressed intention backed by a sanction, which can be a 
reward or a punishment.’ Public policy, they argue can be ‘a law, a rule, a statute, an edict, a regulation or 
an order’. 
42 Michael Moran, Martin Rein, and Robert E Goodin (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 26. 
43 Charles Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959). 
44 Joseph Gusfield, The Culture of Public Problems: Drink Driving and the Symbolic Order (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 5. 
45 Ibid.  
46 Michael Moran, Martin Rein, and Robert E Goodin (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy 




Once dismissed by positivists, political scientists now tend to agree that ideas matter to 
public policy.47 This ideational shift48 represents a break from the previously ‘well-
established dictum that politics is about who gets what, when and how’.49 Nevertheless, 
opinions diverge on precisely how ideas and policy interact. This section reviews three 
different theories mapping the relationship between ideas and policy. First, interest-based 
accounts view ideas as tools that political actors manipulate to gain support for their 
objectives. Second, institutional interpretations see ideas as constraints, limiting the 
decisions political actors can take. Third, discursive institutionalism offers a novel 
approach by reconciling interest-based and institutionalist arguments to suggest that 
actors are restricted by the legacy of ideas, but they enjoy some autonomy in selecting 
and combining ideas.50 I see discursive institutionalism as the most convincing theory 
because it views structure and agency as mutually constitutive, explains both continuity 
and change, takes historical context seriously, and highlights the normative quality ideas 




Interest-based accounts tend to interpret ideas as tools that actors strategically use to 
obtain outcomes. From this perspective, actors can use ideas as weapons to win political 
battles, focal points in political negotiations that allow actors to agree on outcomes that 
																																																								
47 See Erik Bleich, ‘Integrating Ideas into Policy-Making Analysis’, Comparative Political Studies, 35 
(2002), pp. 1054-1076; Jeffrey Checkel, ‘The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory’, World 
Politics, 50(2) (1998), pp. 324-348; Martha Finnemore, ‘Norms, Culture and World Politics’, International 
Organization, 50(2) (1996), pp. 325-347; Randall Hansen and Desmond King, ‘Eugenic Ideas, Political 
Interests, and Policy Variance’, World Politics, 53(2) (2001), pp. 237-263; and James I. Walsh, ‘When do 
Ideas Matter?’, Comparative Political Studies, 33(4) (2000), pp. 483-516. 
48 For reviews of the ideational turn in political science see Sheri Berman, ‘Ideas Norms and Culture in 
Political Analysis, Comparative Politics, 33(2) (2001), pp. 231-250; Mark Blyth, “Any More Bright 
Ideas?”’, Comparative Politics, 29(2) (1997), pp. 229-250; Jeffrey Checkel, ‘The Constructivist Turn in 
International Relations Theory’, World Politics, 50(2) (1998), pp. 324-338; Martha Finnemore, ‘Norms, 
Culture and World Politics’, International Organization, 50(2) (1996), pp. 325-347; Martha Finnemore and 
Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Taking Stock’, Annual Review of Political Science, 4 (2001), pp. 391-416; John Kurt 
Jacobsen, ‘Much Ado about Ideas’, World Politics, 47 (1995), pp. 283-310. 
49 Erik Bleich, Race Politics in Britain and France (Cambridge, 2003), p. 18. 
50 Christina Boswell and James Hampshire, ‘Ideas and agency in immigration policy: A discursive 
institutionalist approach’, European Journal of Political Research, 56(1) (2017), pp. 133-150. 
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satisfy their interests,51 resources mobilised by ‘policy entrepreneurs’ to promote their 
policy preferences,52 or signposts to guide actors down the most stable or productive path 
of action.53 Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones claim that by prioritising particular 
elements of issues political actors can induce or block policy change, suggesting that 
ideas are mechanisms for choosing among interests.54 In contrast, Robert Henry Cox and 
Daniel Béland, maintain that political actors can manipulate the ‘valence’ of ideas to 
promote their interests.55 Baumgartner and Jones highlight selection while the Cox and 
Béland focus on ambiguity, but both accounts emphasise the role of actors in deploying 
ideas. 
 
A sub-genre of interest-based accounts is ‘rational choice institutionalism’.56 Rational 
choice institutionalism, as the name suggests, applies the logic of rational choice theory to 
explain the role of ideas in policy.57 It focuses on how rational actors pursue their 
interests within political institutions by following a logic of calculation, and define 
institutions as structures of incentives.58 Rational choice institutionalists claim that actors 
strategically deploy ideas to maximise their preferences while relying on institutions to 
minimise uncertainty. However, their argument rests upon four core assumptions: actors 
are self-interested beings who behave rationally, their preferences are fixed, their interests 
are objective, and institutions are inherently ‘good’ and stable, thereby reducing risk.59  
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Interest-based accounts highlight the ability of actors to use ideas to support their own 
positions. By focusing on the toolkit of strategies that actors employ, interest-based 
accounts are particularly good at explaining policy change. Emphasising the agency of 
political actors also implies that ideas require communication to affect policy, a point 
which discursive institutionalism extends to argue that communication takes the form of 
discourse. Interest-based accounts allow scholars to generalise about the range of reasons 
motivating the decisions political actors make, providing opportunity for comparison 
across a wide array of cases. 
 
Nevertheless, interest-based accounts have limitations, which have elicited considerable 
criticism, especially from institutional interpretations.60 The principal shortcoming is that 
interest-based accounts fail to appreciate the ways in which ideas shape the construction 
of interests. Some of its advocates such as Baumgartner and Jones allow for bounded 
rationality, and offer a nuanced theory of how actors adopt and deploy different ideas.61 
Yet, even these sophisticated studies tend to take interests as a given, and see ideas as 
hooks that are tactically appropriated to further these interests. The implication is that 
interest-based accounts risk deterministic tendencies by suggesting that actors have a 
relatively limited range of responses with which to navigate new circumstances.62 
 
Institutionalist Approaches  
 
Countering the claims of interest-based accounts, institutionalists argue that ideas cannot 
be analytically or empirically separated from interests because they are mutually 
constitutive. Political scientist, Peter Hall identifies three main strands of institutionalist 
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theories: rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and historical 
institutionalism. Of these strands, historical institutionalism is the most relevant to my 
analysis of the relationship between the republican public philosophy and French Roma 
policy due to its focus on path dependency. How then, do historical institutionalists 
conceptualise the relationship between ideas and policy?  
 
Historical institutionalists highlight how institutions, understood as sets of regularised 
practices with a rule-like quality, structure the choices of political actors and shape the 
direction of policy. 63 From this perspective, institutions are historical products that exist 
as anterior and a priori to any actor operating within them at a given moment in time.64 
Rather than emphasising the role of actors, historical institutionalists examine the 
prevailing institutions to understand how power is parcelled out. As such, they see pre-
existing policies as legacies that constrain new policies.65 Through this logic, certain 
policies appear more administratively viable than others because they are consistent with 
prevailing legacies.66 As Peter Hall suggests, ‘some interests will be privileged as a result 
of the overall organization of interlocking institutional frameworks, while others receive 
less attention’.67 According to Hall, policy outcomes are fashioned by the institutional 
context. Historical institutionalism shares a close affinity with theories of path 
dependency that account for biases towards policy continuity arising from lock-in effects 
of past decisions. 68  As Sheri Berman argues, ‘policy paths were the result of…long-held 
ideas and the distinct policy legacies these ideas helped to create’.69 The implication is 
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that policy outcomes might not necessarily reflect actors’ intentions; they may be 
unintended consequences constrained by the path dependent nature of institutions.70 
Berman also suggests that interest-based accounts take ideological structures for granted 
when they can shape the very interests of actors deploying ideas.  
 
Historical institutionalism is an important counter-approach to interest-based accounts. 
By concentrating on how the ‘rules of the game’ impact policy, for example what 
political elites deem as acceptable and unacceptable modes of action, historical 
institutionalists demonstrate how norms can be institutionalised and highlight that 
institutions can be both formal or informal. 71 Another strength of historical 
institutionalism is that it captures the important imprint historical legacies can have on 
contemporary politics. From this perspective, ideas are political traditions that invoke 
specific memories of the past.72  
 
Yet, historical institutionalism also has shortcomings. First, although historical 
institutionalists help uncover the ways in which ideas constrain policy, they tend to 
downplay the role of actors. In doing so, historical institutionalists overlook the interests 
and strategies of political actors, failing to explain how or why political actors mobilise 
ideas to justify policies. Second, focusing on how ideas constrain policy helps to account 
for policy continuity, but it struggles to explain change. This is problematic as it suggests 
that ideas are static. Some historical institutionalists have recently tried to overcome this 
problem by incorporating incremental change into their theories, interpreting it as drift, 
layering or conversion.73 However, similarly to interest-based accounts, historical 
institutionalists tend to describe change as exogenous, rather than emanating from the 
actors themselves. Third, although historical institutionalists take history seriously, they 
tend to overlook other variables, such as unforeseen events, impending elections or party 
politics, that could drive political action. Precedents established in the past may leave an 
imprint on political elites’ agendas, but other pressures that these elites may experience at 
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a particular moment in time deserve equal attention. Fundamentally, both historical 
institutional and interest-based approaches share one limitation. While historical 
institutionalists can explain policy continuity and interest-based accounts can explain 




In an attempt to balance the strengths and flaws of historical institutionalist and interest-
based accounts, my thesis adopts the recent theory of discursive institutionalism. 
Combining elements of interest-based and historical institutional approaches, discursive 
institutionalists argue that, although actors are constrained by deeply entrenched ideas, 
they are nonetheless able to select and combine ideas to shape policy. Political scientist 
Vivien Schmidt, the founding theorist of discursive institutionalism, draws a distinction 
between three levels of ideas.74 First, ‘policy ideas’ consist of specific measures that 
policymakers propose or implement. Second, ‘programmatic ideas’ encompass broader 
programmes that underpin policies. Programmatic ideas define problems that specific 
policies aim to solve, set objectives and norms, and present methods and instruments for 
policymakers to apply.75 Both policy and programmatic ideas tend to be products of 
expert knowledge and technical rather than emotive. Third, ‘public philosophies’ include 
fundamental ideas, ‘sentiments’,76 ‘global frames of reference’,77 or worldviews 
(Weltanschauung).78 Public philosophies comprise a set of values and moral principles 
that guide how society should be structured. As I stated in my introduction, my thesis is a 
study of public philosophies. It does not consider programmatic or policy ideas, or how 
these levels of ideas interact. Instead, it delves deeper into one public philosophy, French 
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republicanism, and the ways in which French officials use it to communicate and justify 
policies targeting the Roma in France.  
 
Accordingly, my thesis shares the view of discursive institutionalists who see discourse as 
the link between ideas and policy. Actors, they contend, are ‘sentient agents’ who 
communicate and debate ideas through discursive interactions, which in turn influences 
public policy. 79 The focus on discourse differentiates discursive institutionalists from 
their interest-based and historical institutionalist counterparts. Their argument is that 
without examining discourse it is impossible to identify how ideas are conveyed and how 
they influence collective action. In other words, how can one know what another person 
is thinking unless they say or write it? This question goes straight to the heart of the 
policymaking process because, notwithstanding authoritarian governments, political 
actors are required to communicate and justify their ideas sometimes through formal 
cabinet processes. Discursive institutionalists thus perceive actors as dynamic agents who 
both shape and are shaped by institutions.  
 
Christina Boswell and James Hampshire take a deeper look at the role political actors 
play from a discursive intuitionalist perspective. They identify three discursive strategies 
that political actors can employ to selectively mobilise ideas.80 First, they argue, actors 
can prioritise one level of ideas over others. For example, actors may highlight 
programmatic ideas to support a new policy without drawing upon underlying public 
philosophies. Alternatively, actors may skirt around technical aspects of policies, such as 
feasibility, pilot programmes, or implementation plans, while foregrounding emotive 
ideas that resonate with public philosophies.  
 
Second, actors can exploit ambivalence in public philosophies. As Boswell and 
Hampshire contend, public philosophies are complex composites of ideas that lend 
themselves to diverse interpretations.81 One element may have a distinct connotation, 
historical significance, or status that others do not. Actors can select one strand of public 
philosophies to push a particular agenda while downplaying another strand that could 
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contradict or undermine their agenda. Boswell and Hampshire highlight the susceptibility 
of national traditions of immigration and ‘philosophies of integration’ to these 
manipulations, citing French republicanism as an example.82 Similarly, scholars across a 
variety of discourses point to the flexibility of French republicanism and demonstrate 
some of the ways in which political actors have taken advantage of its ambiguity in an 
attempt to legitimise an array of policies.83 This thesis explores how French policymakers 
have relied upon the polyvalence of republicanism to justify a new ‘Roma’ policy, parts 
of which might appear to contradict some of republicanism’s underlying principles. Yet, 
by appreciating the ability of actors to select and combine strands of republican ideas, it is 
possible to make sense of these contradictions.  
 
The third discursive strategy that Boswell and Hampshire suggest is that actors can 
connect different policy or programmatic ideas over time by presenting them as 
legacies.84 Actors advocating or opposing prospective or current policies can use this 
strategy to associate the policy with previous measures that cast it in a positive or 
negative light. This relates to historical institutionalist theories that stress the path 
dependency of policies over time. Yet, discursive institutionalism sees policy legacies as 
ideological constructs, created and reproduced by actors, who can mobilise these legacies 
strategically to achieve their objectives. For example, Hollande’s Interior Minister, 
Manuel Valls, employed this strategy when he appropriated the language that former 
French Prime Minister, Michel Rocard, used in an interview in 1989, to justify the 
Hollande government’s response to the Roma question in September 2012. By claiming 
that ‘[La France] ne peut pas accueillir toute la misère du monde et de l'Europe’, Valls 
made a connection with one of France’s leading Socialist politicians of the post-Second 
World War period. However, by failing to capture the entirety of Rocard’s statement – 
‘La France ne peut accueillir toute la misère du monde, mais elle doit savoir en prendre 
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fidèlement sa part’ – Valls was criticised for manipulating the legacy of Rocard for his 
own ends. 85    
 
My thesis shares Boswell and Hampshire’s interest in the role of actors by concentrating 
on their second discursive strategy: actors can exploit the polyvalence of public 
philosophies. Through analysing how French and EU officials exploited the polyvalence 
of French republicanism I developed three theoretical claims for future scholars to test 
based on selectivity, prioritisation and exploitation of ambiguity. First, I argue that actors 
can selectively emphasise one strand of ideas within a public philosophy, even if it 
conflicts with another strand of the same public philosophy. Second, I maintain that 
actors can prioritise one public philosophy over another different public philosophy or 
alternative set of ideas to conceal – and sometimes legitimise – discredited and 
normatively unacceptable ideas. Here the logic is that certain ideas (such as the 
alternative ideas listed above) are not legitimate so officials invoke republican ideas to 
conceal the legitimacy deficit. Focusing on concealing ideas rather than interests also lets 
me avoid making assumptions about the preferences of public officials. Third, I claim that 
some public philosophies are sufficiently ambiguous that they are open to bias that actors 
can exploit. These three claims structure my analysis of how French and EU officials 
deployed republican ideas to justify and communicate policies targeting the Roma. But 
they also allow me to extend theories of discursive intuitionalism to explain more about 
the relationship between public philosophies and public policy.  
 
As this discussion has suggested, I find discursive institutionalism the most appropriate 
theory on which to build my theoretical framework. Unlike interest-based and historical 
institutionalist approaches discursive institutionalism accounts for both continuity and 
change, allowing researchers to view structure and agency as intertwined, rather than 
polarising forces. This reflects Antony Giddens’ theory of ‘structuration’, which posits 
that structure and agency have a mutually constitutive relationship.86 Discursive 
institutionalism also takes historical context seriously: this matters because modern 
France was forged as a republic and its history has always been entwined with 
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republicanism. Furthermore, discursive institutionalism draws attention to the normative 
property of ideas, which as my thesis reveals is a key driver of political action.  
 
However, in spite of its strengths, discursive institutionalism is not without flaws. Some 
critics argue that it risks categorising everything as an idea or social construction, rather 
than perhaps an unintended outcome or unconscious action.87 This derives from the 
positivist claim that the abstraction of ideas and discourse means they cannot be clearly 
identified or separated from other variables shaping policy. Nevertheless, this thesis 
shares Schmidt’s view that instead of ignoring ideas and discourse because they might not 
be the cause, it is still worthwhile to ask whether they constitute a cause.88  
 
Additionally, critics could argue that discursive intuitionalism oversimplifies the nature of 
political systems. I support this view. Schmidt posits that communicative discourse, the 
interaction between political actors and the general public, is more relevant to centralised 
governments, and coordinative discourse, the private deliberation between political 
actors, is more pertinent to decentralised governments. Yet, in reality both centralised and 
decentralised political systems employ communicative and coordinative discourse to 
respond to different circumstances. This is especially clear in France, which has a hybrid 
semi-presidential system, characterised by a centripetal force pulling towards the Elysée 
in Paris and its corresponding legislature, and a counter force dispersing authority 
throughout the 96 departments, recently supplanted by 13 newly formed regions across 
France.89 This is why I do not employ Schmidt’s distinction between communicative and 
coordinative discourse in my thesis. Besides this relatively small point of contention, this 
thesis sees the theories of discursive institutionalism as the most productive way of 
mapping the relationship between ideas and policy.  
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It is necessary to clarify why I selected the case of the Roma in France. The rationale is 
twofold. First, the interaction between republicanism and what I term ‘French Roma 
policy’ makes it a ‘critical case’ for exploring strategic deployment of public 
philosophies. 90 Second, scholars have hitherto overlooked the role of republican ideas 
when studying the stigmatisation the Roma in France. This means they cannot fully 
comprehend why French officials sought to employ colour-blind policies to resolve a 
problem they framed in ethnic terms. Those who have examined the stigmatisation of the 
Roma in France also tend to focus on the national level of politics, downplaying the 
diversity of political actors working on the formulation and implementation of French 
Roma policy across multiple levels of government, geography, and seniority. With these 
considerations in mind, this section highlights the theoretical and empirical contributions 
this thesis hopes to make.   
 
Theoretical Significance  
 
The case of French Roma policy is theoretically significant for three reasons. First, 
focusing on how republican ideas were deployed in relation to a newly politicised Roma 
problem helps explain the flexibility and resilience of public philosophies as new 
circumstances emerge. Not only does this afford me the opportunity to examine the 
relationship between public philosophies and policies, it also allows me to avoid artificial 
comparisons between national models.91 The philosophy of French republicanism has its 
own set of principles that emerged as products of particular events and were conditioned 
by specific historical experiences. For example, the republican model of integration, 
requiring immigrants to discard ethnic and religious particularisms in exchange for 
membership into the national community is a distinctly French construct. Comparing this 
model of integration with another national model to explain the relationship between 
ideas and policy would mean assuming that each model is a stable, homogenous block, 
rather than an intricate and malleable cluster of ideas. I adopt the view of Christophe 
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Bertossi, who claims that models of integration should be treated as ‘complex structures 
of reference on the basis of which a multiplicity of conceptions of identity, equality, and 
inclusion are developed by a wide range of social agents in each national context’.92 
Although cross-national comparisons can facilitate generalisations, in this case, focusing 
on a single case study affords more insight into the potency of a grand public philosophy 
in public policy.  
 
Second, by deliberately looking at public philosophies, my thesis delves deeper into the 
arguments of discursive institutionalists who propose a relational ontology of ideas and 
policy. As Vivien Schmidt notes, discursive institutionalists have hitherto devoted little 
attention to testing public philosophies because of their seemingly overwhelming 
influence on policy and multifaceted nature.93 I argue that these features make public 
philosophies especially fruitful sites of study, and given the insistence of French officials 
to ground their policy proposals in republican terms, identifying strands of the republican 
public philosophy was relatively straightforward. Focusing on public philosophies 
therefore highlights how an unmistakably republican discourse has seeped into French 
policymaking, demonstrating that ideas, institutions and actors are inextricably linked. 
Furthermore, by examining how public officials interpreted and mobilised these strands 
of republicanism, it is possible to explain why elements of French Roma policy might 
appear internally inconsistent. The case of the Roma thus offers a good site for exploring 
the selective mobilisation of different strands of a public philosophy, exemplifying the 
polyvalence of public philosophies. Additionally, my investigation of how officials 
defined policy objectives versus their reflection on policy outcomes extends theories of 
discursive institutionalism to study another level of contradiction. In doing so, it exposes 
the elevated status of republican ideas in French politics and provides clues as to why 
officials might find it difficult to refute republican ideas even if they produced 
unsatisfactory policy outcomes.  
 
Third, the contentious and highly politicised nature of French Roma policy meant it 
generated rich sources of discourse through which to examine the strategies of French 
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public officials. Even referencing the term ‘Roma’ could spark fiery public debate and 
deliberation, lead to serious legal dispute, and stimulate an explosion of criticism from 
sources outside the administration, ranging from EU institutions, French and foreign 
media, activist organisations, the United Nations and even the Pope. French public 
officials exercised a number of discursive strategies to counter these internal and external 
pressures. Some of the internal tension, or coordinative discourse, was made public, 
through media, political debate, radio and televised interviews. However, complementing 
publicly available sources, I undertook in-depth elite interviews with key French and EU 
officials, to delve deeper into this internal process and shed light on unanswered 
questions. A detailed discussion of my methods is below. Nevertheless, it is important to 
mention here because it points to the fact that French Roma policy exemplifies both 




My thesis also makes three important empirical contributions. First, it builds upon a 
growing inter-disciplinary literature on the treatment of the Roma minority in Europe.94 
Since Sarkozy first politicised the Roma question in the summer of 2010, scholars writing 
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in English95 and French96 have become increasingly interested in the French case. Yet few 
have drawn the link between French Roma policy and republicanism. A notable exception 
is the work of Owen Parker and David Toke, who present a compelling study of how 
Roma mobility reveals a conflict between French and EU conceptions of citizenship.97 By 
arguing that French discourses have tended to present mobility and integration as binary 
opposites, while EU discourses emphasise mobility as a facilitator of integration, Parker 
and Toke suggest that French republicanism and European integration are incongruous. 
However, the focus of their argument is on the limitations of European citizenship, rather 
than the influence of French republicanism. My thesis addresses this gap to examine the 
relationship between French republicanism and the formulation and implementation of 
Roma policy. In doing so, it complements Parker and Toke’s European focus by 
providing a detailed analysis of multiple components of the French policymaking 
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machine, an element lacking in accounts that tend to treat the French state as a unitary 
actor.    
 
Second, my thesis contributes to scholarship examining the challenges of European 
integration, especially the free movement of EU citizens.98 Following the 2004 and 2007 
enlargements of the EU project, scholars have highlighted the privileges and plights of 
what they term intra-EU migrants99 or European migrants.100 A recent work by political 
scientist Ettore Rechi investigates the theory and practice of free movement through a 
cross-national quantitative approach. Recchi asserts that free movement is:  
 
[…] a regime sui generis which still technically takes the form of international migration, 
but it does so on the conditions of internal migration. In order to mark this change 
semantically, EU documents increasingly refer to intra-EU movements as ‘mobility’, 
rather than as ‘migration’, restricting the latter term to the movements of people from 
third countries. In everyday terms, ‘mobility’ means migration ‘in first class’, without the 
nuisance of documents nor the risks that characterize the journey and settlement of 
traditional migrants.101  
 
Recchi rightly contends that EU Roma citizens have been disproportionally affected by 
member states’ interpretations of the EU free movement regulatory framework. Yet, he 
commits a number of oversights. For example, Recchi assumes that Roma are EU 
citizens. This may be possible to prove in countries other than France where the 
collection of ethnic data is permitted but, even if this were possible, further complications 
exist. A person who self-identifies as Roma may not be willing to publicly disclose their 
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ethnic identity to the stigmatisation the term Roma has historically elicited. Conversely, a 
person or group who live in a so-called ‘Roma camp’ may not in fact identify as Roma at 
all and might not even be European citizens. Instead their dwellings might reflect their 
socio-economic circumstance rather than their cultural or ethnic community. Recchi’s use 
of the term EU Roma is also misleading because, as sociologists and anthropologists have 
stressed, the Roma are by no means a homogenous or unified group.102 To avoid this 
quagmire, my thesis concentrates on those whom French political actors framed as Roma 
in their political discourse. This highlights that the category of Roma is a social 
construction without any essential ethno-cultural base.   
 
Another oversight is that Recchi’s work makes no claims about why Roma move, 
implying that they are naturally nomadic, which is not necessarily the case. Few Roma 
are nomadic, in the sense that they deliberately have no permanent dwelling. Instead, 
their migration tends to be driven by their marginalisation and suffering from deep 
structural poverty and the prospect of a better life in a country other than their own.103 
Additionally, and in contrast to Recchi’s assertion above, my research findings reveal that 
those perceived as Roma in France do not experience migration ‘in first class’. Other 
migrants, such as refugees from the Middle East and North Africa living in informal 
settlements also received similar alternative housing and support from the French state. 
Thus, although Recchi’s work draws important conclusions about the gap between 
theories and practices of EU mobility, he has a tendency to focus on the higher end of the 
socio-economic spectrum, overlooking the experience of poorer migrant populations, 
such as the Roma who disproportionately bear the brunt of anti-immigrant and 
Eurosceptic sentiments. My thesis addresses this oversight by studying how a leading EU 
member state has managed the integration of mobile Europeans at the lower end of the 
socio-economic spectrum.  
 
Third, my thesis extends the recent literature on the rise of neo-republicanism in French 
politics. As I suggested in the introduction, since the 1980s French political actors have 
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revived and adapted republican ideas to respond to new challenges of immigration and 
integration.104 French Roma policy is a particularly interesting case because it is one of 
the few examples of a neo-republican response to a question detached from religion. The 
Roma may be constructed as an ethnic, cultural or socio-economic ‘problem’ but never as 
a threat to the core republican value of laïcité. This sets the case apart from the majority 
of empirical studies that examine neo-republican responses to Muslims or post-colonial 
migrants in France. Although not always stated explicitly, these studies highlight conflicts 
between laïcité and religious expression. This meant that an implicit tension between 
religion and republicanism has tended to underpin neo-republican scholarship to date. 
This is not surprising in part because of French republicanism’s roots in anti-clericalism. 
Nevertheless, to see republican ideas deployed in a context where religion does not 
necessarily feature is striking because it validates Bent Flyvbjerg claim that single cases 
are crucial for refuting initial hypotheses.105 Drawing on the philosophy of Karl Popper, 
Flyvbjerg reminds us that the observation of a single black swan falsifies the argument 
that all swans are white. Falsification, he states, ‘is one of the most rigorous tests to which 
a scientific proposition can be subjected: if just one observation does not fit with the 
proposition it is considered not valid generally and must therefore be either revised or 
rejected […] The case study is well suited for identifying “black swans” because of its in-
depth approach: what appears to be “white” often turns out on closer examination to be 
“black”’.106  By investigating political actors’ formulation and implementation of French 




To examine the strategic deployment of republican ideas, I analysed discourses of French 
and EU officials who formulated and/or implemented policies targeting the Roma in 
France from the summer of 2010 to the autumn of 2016. The aim was to discover what (if 
any) republican ideas officials employed, and explore the ways in which officials used 
these republican ideas to communicate and justify the policies on which they worked. 
Given the sensitivity of the Roma question in France, accessing and categorising 
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officials’ discourses required careful preparation, tact and creativity. Some publicly 
available data, such as government circulars, contained words and messages the 
government of the time wished to share with the public. Longer policy reports tended to 
target technical audiences, especially those charged with implementing the national 
government’s measures.   
 
Yet, much of the information I required was not apparent in public sources. This is why 
elite interviews played such a significant role in my doctorial project. Interviews 
permitted me to ask officials to elaborate on specific measures, explain and define the 
choice of words they used to describe these measures, spell out rationales behind these 
measure, and reflect on whether these measured achieved the government’s objectives. 
Asking these questions afforded a more nuanced understanding of how officials 
communicated and justified policies targeting the Roma. It also generated a rich source of 
textual data for systematic coding. This section sets out the sources I have collected and 
methods I have employed to locate and analyse the strategic deployment of republican 
ideas. 
 
Sources   
 
My thesis draws upon two sets of data. The first is a collection of publicly available 
political discourses. These included political speeches, and transcripts of television and 
radio interviews given by members of the Sarkozy and Hollande Governments, such as 
the President, Prime Minister, Interior Minister, Minister for European Affairs, Minister 
for Housing. I also gathered publicly released policy documents available online, 
including circulars, bills, draft legislation, senate and legislative committee reports, and 
technical policy papers intended for the readership of regional and local officials. It is 
important to note that in French politics, a circular is more than a memo. It is a document 
in which political leaders (e.g. ministers and prefects) provide direction to their staff and 
civil service ‘pour exposer les principes d'une politique, fixer les règles de 
fonctionnement des services et commenter ou orienter l'application des lois et 
règlements’.107 Circulars tend to allow scope for varied interpretations while setting the 
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parameters for what the government believes to be acceptable actions, making them 
especially productive sites to examine the role of ideas in the French policymaking 
process. 
 
Additionally, I consulted monthly newsletters published on the website of the Délégation 
interministérielle à l’hébergement et à l’accès au logement (Dihal), a national agency 
comprising of civil servants from various policy backgrounds, responsible for 
coordinating the government’s policy on campements illicites defined by the circular of 
26 August 2012.108 These newsletters helped me understand policy development over 
time, especially under the Hollande government. Complementing national documents, I 
gathered regional and local government reports and reviews (bilans) of specific 
initiatives. I also consulted select press coverage of national, regional and local officials’ 
remarks on the Roma, which, while on the record, tended to be more candid 
conversations than scripted speeches and rigorously edited documents.   
 
The second set of data consisted of discourses that did not exist in the public domain. As I 
mentioned above, these were primarily elite, in-depth interviews. These interviews were 
crucial sources of information for interpreting the ways in which officials framed and 
responded to the Roma question. By using a semi-structured format, I was able to probe 
officials on why they employed particular measures as well as what they saw as the limits 
of acceptable political action. Interviews also revealed that most officials viewed policies 
targeting the Roma as largely unsuccessful in practice. Throughout December 2014, June 
and September 2015, and February, March and April 2016, I conducted 50 interviews 
with French and EU officials.  
 
The majority of interviews were face-to-face but I undertook two interviews over the 
phone to accommodate conflicting schedules. Discussions ranged from half an hour to 
three hours long. Some were one-on-one discussions, while others comprised of multiple 
respondents who had decided to meet with me as a group rather than individually. I 
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deliberately wrote to officials separately to request interviews. Early on in my data 
collection process, one official asked me why I was seeking to talk to her if I had already 
met her colleague, who she insisted was an expert in my field of study. The official did 
not consider that I specifically wanted to speak to her to gain her perspective and compare 
it to that of her colleague. After that experience, I decided to contact each official 
separately to minimise rejections. I did not mind if officials wanted to meet me in a 
group, but I sought to minimise the risk of officials declining to talk to me on the basis 
that I had already talked to their colleagues.  
 
I interviewed incumbent and former office bearers, political advisors, and civil servants 
working in local, regional, national and European governments at different levels of 
seniority. Although the French system distinguished between Régions and Départements, 
for the purpose of this thesis I use the term ‘regional officials’ to refer to Prefects and 
other civil servants working in the Prefecture. I also deliberately targeted political actors 
in cities with a population over 500,000 and secured interviews in Paris, Lille, Lyon, 
Bordeaux, Marseille and Nice. Only Toulouse is missing from this sample despite 
numerous communications with secretaries and attempts to arrange meetings in person 
and over telephone. Although not part of my initial geographical target, I travelled to 
Quimper, Annecy and Ajaccio to interview political actors who previously held important 
positions in the larger cities mentioned above. I chose to focus on larger cities because the 
majority of camps are situated on the outskirts of urban centres, and I inferred that 
political actors in these cities would likely to be involved in implementing policies 
affecting the camps. The population cut-off served as an arbitrary but necessary limit, 
restricting my fieldwork to a manageable size appropriate for doctoral research. Towards 
the end of my fieldwork, I became aware that some smaller cities, such as Grenoble, 
Nantes and Montpellier had experience implementing French Roma policy. Some of the 
officials I interviewed had formerly worked in one or other of those smaller cities, and 
provided glimpses into their local initiatives. Nonetheless, I focused on the larger cities 
mentioned above due to time and resource constraints.  
 
To account for the European dimension, I interviewed key civil servants from three 
Directorates at the European Commission in Brussels who oversaw the implementation of 
EU directives in France. This was important because it provided background information 
on external factors that shaped French Roma policy, such as the logic behind the 
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European Commission’s requirement of all member states to develop national Roma 
strategies and the funding sources available for local and regional integration initiatives. 
Discussions with EU officials also helped me appreciate how they perceived the French 
government’s policies, which led me to draw conclusions about the tension between the 
EU’s commitment to affirmative action and France’s refusal to recognise ethnic or 
religious minorities.  
 
Additionally, I interviewed representatives from Adoma, the state-contracted opérateur 
charged with housing and integrating displaced camp residents, and two NGOs actively 
engaged in protecting the Rights of Roma in France. Although not strictly employed by 
the government, NGO representatives were part of the policymaking machine as a result 
of their involvement in Dihal’s working groups. Unsurprisingly, NGO representatives 
shed light on the discrimination of Roma populations and shared specific examples, 
which undermined the French state’s insistence on colour-blind policies. These interviews 
contributed to a comprehensive and varied sample of actors involved in the formulation 
and implementation of French Roma Policy. During each interview I asked respondents 
to recommend other relevant political actors with whom they thought I should meet. 
Towards the end of my fieldwork I noticed that the recommendations often pointed me to 
people whom I had already interviewed, indicating that the sample was near 
completion.109 
 
When I initially identified interview targets, I did not expect to receive positive responses 
to my meeting requests from such a large and diverse pool of political actors. I used 
purposive sampling to locate the names and email addresses of relevant political actors in 
publicly available sources including policy documents, newsletters, working group 
attendance lists, organisational charts, press coverage and NGO reports. Roughly two 
thirds of the political actors I emailed agreed to meet me. I was surprised by the 
effectiveness of ‘cold’ emailing in the first instance, however this success was enhanced 
by the support of a senior ministerial adviser I interviewed early in the process, who gave 
me a list of key political actors to contact with her endorsement. All but one person on the 
list consented to an interview, and while there was a risk my reliance on this adviser’s list 
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could have skewed my research sample, in fact the respondents I spoke to on this list 
expressed a wide range of views. Additionally, I made sure to interview people other than 
those suggested by the adviser, thus making doubly sure to guard against potential bias. 
 
Nevertheless, accessing political actors was not always easy. It often involved multiple 
exchanges and on two occasions respondents asked for proof of identification and a copy 
of my curriculum vitae before accepting a meeting. In Toulouse, as I mentioned above, I 
was confronted by immovable ‘gatekeepers’ who obstructed my repeated requests to 
interview their superiors. This reluctance might have been due to the sensitivity of the 
Roma question in Toulouse but it is also a common obstacle for researchers seeking 
interviews with elites.110 An official working at the Préfecture de Police also declined to 
talk to me. Although a number of people had recommended I interview her, she denied 
any involvement in polices regarding illegal camps and Roma migrants. I thought 
interviews with elected officials and their advisers would be the most challenging to 
secure, due to their public profiles and the sensitivity of the Roma question. Nevertheless, 
I was lucky to interview seven national political advisers and six local political advisers 
and mayors.    
 
Type of Official Number Interviewed 
National political advisers 7 
Local political advisers and mayors 6 
Regional civil servants and prefects  18 
National civil servants 12 
EU civil servants 3 
Consultants  2 
NGO representatives 2 
 
Most interviews took place in the respondents’ offices, which helped me to see the 
institutional environment of the workplace, better understand the role of the respondent 
and, in some cases, catch other political actors passing by who contributed to the 
interview. The sample was predominantly male (34 males and 16 females). Many 
officials, especially in senior or developmental roles, were also alumni of the prestigious 
École Nationale d'Administration (ENA), as might be expected of the upper echelons of 
the French political class. Some were experienced at giving public interviews, slipping in 
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prepared sound bites and clear policy statements at appropriate moments. Others 
preferred to speak about specific examples and policy instruments of a more technical 
nature. Four respondents declined to be recorded but were happy for me to take notes. 
The remainder did not take issue, appreciating that an aural record of the meeting would 
be a valuable resource for me given that French is not my mother tongue.  
 
In Brussels, I conducted two interviews in English because the respondents preferred it to 
French, but the remainder of my interviews were in French. This meant that I had to 
sharpen my technical language skills to ensure smooth conversation. I decided to take this 
as an opportunity to read and listen to public sources before I progressed to the fieldwork 
stage of my doctorate, providing me with a basis from which to check the validity of 
interview responses.111 I also took the time to research respondents’ backgrounds and 
search for recent press clippings referencing them or their work. I used the information to 
contextualise comments and draw on examples from their own experience to relate to 
respondents. My principal aim was to ask respondents questions that had the potential to 
shed light on pressures, agendas and other variables influencing policy choices that public 
data could not reveal.112  
 
The interviews were semi-structured. I prepared a questionnaire for each interview drawn 
from a common stock of general questions as well as specific questions tailored to each 
respondent’s role and experience (see a sample list of interview questions at Appendix 1). 
Five respondents asked for a list of questions prior to the interview to help them prepare 
for discussion. I have attached an appendix of sample questions I asked during interviews. 
While conducting interviews, I did not always stick strictly to the format of the 
questionnaire, allowing conversation to flow naturally from the respondents’ answers. I 
wanted interviews to be informative exchanges not forced interrogations. I opened 
interviews with a summary of my research objectives and asked respondents to tell me 
about their role in the policymaking process. Given that ethnic categories such as ‘Roma’ 
are considered anti-republican and taboo, I was careful to avoid using the term in the first 
instance. I spoke of ‘la politique à l’égard des campements illicites’ and as discussion 
progressed, I introduced the term ‘Roms’ to see if it provoked a reaction. 
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Overwhelmingly respondents rejected the existence of a ‘politique à l’égard des Roms’ 
but had no issue talking about ‘Roms’ in relation to the policy measures discussed in the 
interview. I also employed the same formulation of phrases adopted in policy documents 
so that I was literally speaking the same language as political actors rather than using 
unfamiliar concepts or jargon.  
 
Some questions focused on practical or technical issues, for example: ‘Quelles mesures 
avez-vous pris pour empêcher l’installation de nouveaux campements illicites?’ Others 
tested whether respondents targeted the Roma, after asking who lived in the camps, I 
asked: ‘La présence des campements illicites représente-t-elle un défi pour l’état?’. I also 
asked questions to determine whether respondents mobilised republican concepts, for 
instance: ‘Une politique envers les Roms doit-elle incarner certaines valeurs? Si oui, 
lesquelles?’. This allowed me to identify whether republican ideas featured in the 
discourse of French officials and judge their role relative to other ideas. One question 
consistently caused contention among respondents: ‘La politique suivie à l’égard des 
Roms a-t-elle changé depuis l’élection de François Hollande? De quelle façon?’. I had not 
anticipated that a question about the different approaches of respective conservative and 
socialist governments would raise concerns. On reflection, I understood that civil servants 
took their political neutrality seriously. However, even those who were politically 
appointed tended to treat the question with caution, some declining to comment. Only one 
political staffer took the chance to frame his government’s policies as a positive step 
forward and cast his predecessors in an unfavourable light. As I completed more 
interviews, I became increasingly adept at picking up inferences and reading the mood of 
discussion to determine which questions to ask. 
 
Gaining the trust of respondents was no small task. The fact that I am an Australian, 
studying in the United Kingdom made me an unlikely expert on the Roma in France. 
Almost all respondents asked me how I came to study such a topic that seemed so 
removed from my personal experiences. My strategy for building trust was two-fold. 
First, I tried to put respondents at ease. Contextual research about each individual helped 
to provide topics that I thought would spark conversation if discussion became stilted. I 
made a point of telling each respondent that their comments would be treated 
anonymously even if they had not insisted upon it and expressed gratitude for their time 
and expertise. Second, I used the fact that I was an outsider as an advantage. Although I 
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had a reasonably good grasp on the key policies and public debate on the Roma question, 
having just read publicly available sources, and I understood the structure of the French 
political system, having studied at Sciences-Po Paris during my undergraduate degree and 
completed an MPhil in European Politics at Oxford, I positioned myself as if I were a 
sponge eager to absorb any information officials were willing to share. This meant 
respondents could effectively teach me everything they thought I needed to know about 
the French government’s approach, placing them in an active rather than defensive 
position. However, this did not mean I ‘played dumb’. Instead, I positioned myself as an 
active listener, interjecting facts and comments into the conversation to help guide 
discussion.  
 
In some ways, I benefited from being an outsider. As I was not French, writing in French 
or affiliated with a French institution, I did not appear threatening. Respondents did not 
seem concerned that I would expose private or sensitive information to the French press, 
nor were they worried about my political orientation or sceptical about my underlying 
motives. On occasion, respondents shared private documents with me. Sometimes they 
sent me reports and policy papers by email or gave me physical copies to keep. At other 
times, they showed me documents during the meeting as clarification or to exemplify the 
sorts of initiatives on which they were working. I kept detailed notes during each 
interview and tried to capture as much of this information as possible. I did however 
recognise the sensitivities of accessing private, sometime classified, data and used my 
judgement to make ethical decisions about how and when to use the data, as I will discuss 
at the end of this chapter.   
 
Complementing the sources collected during my doctoral fieldwork, I drew upon the 
transcripts of seven telephone interviews with French political actors undertaken as part 
of my Masters dissertation on the securitisation of the Roma question in early 2013. The 
questions were focused on security politics rather than the relationship between 
republicanism and French Roma policy, but the interview transcripts afforded background 
information into the formulation and implementation of policies before 1 January 2014. 
This date was significant because it marked the end of the transition phase of EU 
enlargement enforced on Bulgaria and Romania, which lifted restrictions on free 
movement. Additionally, the interviews provided more information on the policies under 
the Sarkozy government because the previous regime was not such a distant memory and 
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some officials had held their position for years, working under both the Sarkozy and 
Hollande governments. These interviews prompted me to compare the strategic 




To analyse the publicly available and private discourses, I undertook a qualitative 
discourse analysis of the text. The initial task was to transcribe all interview material into 
an electronic form, a laborious process that took me several months but was facilitated by 
the help of a generous Francophone friend and a native French research assistant (who 
focused on one exceptionally long and technical interview). They were faster and more 
accustomed to typing large-scale documents in French. This was an iterative process 
whereby I simultaneously transcribed recordings and reviewed transcriptions from my 
French colleagues, adding contextual comments (for example, to explain silences, 
respondents’ reactions and interruptions) and ensuring that no words were misrepresented 
or forgotten. I subsequently inserted the text from the interview transcripts, policy 
documents, newsletters, press clippings and civil society reports into NVivo software, a 
programme to store data and facilitate coding.  
 
To code the data, I followed Anselm Strauss’ grounded theory method of qualitative 
analysis.113 This involved three key steps. The first step was open coding, that is the 
unrestricted categorisation of the data by scrutinising the text, line by line. The aim is to 
generate concepts that open up enquiry. As Strauss notes, concepts derived through open 
coding are provisional but they prompt the researcher to ask further questions about the 
conditions, strategies, interactions and consequences that underpin them.114  Some of the 
codes may be in vivo codes, that is, terms used by the people who are being studied. For 
example, I employed the term ‘intégration’ to categorise officials’ comments on the 
process through which immigrants became part of French society because officials 
preferred it to assimilation, a term more common in the English language. I also chose to 
use ‘intégration’ because the term has strong intellectual connotations of Gérard Noiriel’s 
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path-breaking study, Le Creuset Français, which argued that until the 1970s public 
officials and intellections wrote immigration out of the French national narrative. In this 
sense, ‘intégration’ was both an in vivo code and a sociological construct. The latter, as 
Strauss argues, ‘are based on a combination of the researcher’s scholarly knowledge and 
knowledge of the substantive field under study…[adding] more sociological (social 
science) meaning to the analysis’.115 
 
The second step was axial coding, which is essentially a more focused type of open 
coding. It involved intense analysis, revolving around the axis of one category derived 
from the data at a time, allowing me to map the relationship between that category, its 
subcategories and other categories. For example, through this approach I was able to link 
officials’ denial of any ‘Roma’ policy with their recurring use of the terms campements 
illicites and bidonvilles and categorise these comments under the code ‘universalism’. 
The final step in Strauss’ method was selective coding. This consisted of deliberate and 
systematic coding of data into core categories. At this stage, I had decided upon most of 
the core categories and was able to narrow the analysis by reclassifying existing codes as 
components of the core categories. All other codes became subservient to the core 
categories. In the final thesis, I chose to focus on four core categories: universalism, the 
public sphere, selection and integration. Each represented a strand of French republican 
public philosophy. Each word or phrase coded under these categories was used by 
officials to communicate or justify policies targeting the Roma. Later, these four 
categories respectively formed the subjects of my four empirical chapters.  
 
While coding the data, I made sure to label each document with the characteristics of the 
person from whom the words originated. This meant clarifying whether the person was a 
local, regional, national or EU official, indicating where they were located in a 
geographical sense and the level of position they held (e.g. elected/appointed and their 
rank as junior/senior). I also measured the frequency of keywords and phrases through a 
content analysis, and took note of deviations from the coding framework I devised. The 
point of these tasks was to facilitate comparisons and identify patterns. Interview 
transcripts sometimes revealed information that I had not yet considered but 
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corroborating the interview data with other sources increased its validity and reliability. 
On a more fundamental level, coding meant that I could draw inferences about the ways 
in which officials strategically deployed republican ideas in relation to policies targeting 
the Roma.  
 
I should note, however, that coding as a single researcher has some limitations. Given the 
modest resources of a doctoral project, I was not able to follow John Kingdon’s advice in 
his study of interviewing US congressmen of having other researchers review a portion of 
the data to assess coding reliability, minimise scope for error and identify problematic 
responses.116 Yet on balance, the fact that I was present in all of the interviews was of 
greater advantage. I was in a better position than any ‘external’ researcher to understand 
the subtleties of conversation, and judge the tone, reactions and intimations of the 
respondents on the topic of French Roma policy. These details were important because 
they often provided crucial clues for interpreting the mechanism underpinning the 
relationship between republican ideas and French Roma policy.  
 
Throughout my research, I sought to fulfil my ethical obligations by making judgements 
to protect the officials I interviewed and the ‘Roma’ population that they identified. The 
first decision related to anonymity. To preserve the anonymity of interview respondents, I 
have removed their name and precise job title in citations throughout this thesis. Each 
interview citation contains only a respondent’s location and level of government or 
institution to which she or he were affiliated. I use the term ‘official’ to refer to civil 
servants and the term ‘political adviser’ to designate staffers working for elected 
politicians. In some cases, I differentiate between junior and senior respondents to 
demonstrate points of continuity or change but I have avoided divulging too much 
background information that would give away an individual’s identity.  
 
I also had to exercise caution when examining documents that officials shared with me 
during interviews. One of these was a diagnostic report of a camp conducted by a 
subcontractor, which included personal details of evicted camp residents, such as their 
names and medical history. This information should never have been shared with me but 
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as I suggest in chapter five of this thesis, it should not have been disclosed to government 
officials either. To protect the anonymity of the evicted residents, I did not reproduce any 
personal details in the text of my thesis. Furthermore, conscious of the sensitive nature of 
the Roma question, I made sure to keep the comments officials shared with me in context. 
This helped me to distinguish between the different venues of discourse. For example, 
one official spoke of a stereotype of Roma as ‘voleurs de poules’, which I acknowledged 
was a candid comment expressed in a private interview setting separate from the sorts of 
language used in public debate. Ethical judgement also affected my decision to use an 
ethnic lens to examine the discourse of officials who refused to recognise ethnicity. 
Advocates of the influence of neo-republicanism in French politics would likely criticise 
this decision as an Anglo-Saxon imposition. Yet, in light of the abundance of 
unambiguous references to the Roma evident in the discourse of public officials, it is a 




In this chapter I have sought to develop a roadmap to guide my study of the interaction 
between republican ideas and the formulation and implementation of French Roma policy 
from the summer of 2010 to the autumn of 2016. I argue that discursive institutionalism is 
the most appropriate theoretical framework for conceptualising the interaction between 
ideas and policy. I have presented theoretical and empirical justifications for choosing the 
case of French Roma policy, outlined the sources – both publicly available and private – I 
collected, and detailed the methods I employed to analyse the discourses of key public 
officials. I turn now to the historical significance and development of French 








THE EVOLUTION OF REPUBLICANISM IN FRANCE 
 
Despite their prevalence in contemporary French political discourse, the dominance of 
republican ideas is relatively new. Prior to the 1980s republicanism was widely contested 
– whether by a clerical vision of Catholicism or by Napoleonic ideas of grandeur. In the 
words of historian Claude Nicolet, ‘France is a Republic. But the Republic is not 
France…in the last two centuries France has also been an absolutist monarchy of the 
divine right, two empires, two constitutional monarchies, a “State”, subject to provisional 
revolutionary governments, not to mention periods when there has been no state at all’.117 
Only after the trente glorieuses (c. 1945 to 1975) did French officials seek to revive 
republican ideas. The aim was to unite increasingly unemployed and apathetic citizens, 
respond to challenges of integrating immigrants, and guard against pressures from the far-
right Front National (FN) party and the impinging ‘creep’ of EU integration. Since then, 
officials have deployed republican ideas as their philosophy of choice to communicate 
and justify policies, especially relating to questions of how to manage migrants.118 But it 
is important to remember republican ideas were forged in distinct historical contexts, 
during the peak of the high-colonial era and at a time when the French state had little 
independence from the Catholic church, so when officials deploy these terms today they 
can scarcely avoid engaging with history. With this in mind, this chapter explores the 
ways in which officials used republican ideas to address changing circumstances 
throughout modern French history and how these ideas became the dominant public 
philosophy in French political discourse, transcending partisan lines.119 First, it traces the 
historical development of republican ideas from the French Revolution to postwar France. 
Second, it examines the impetus behind the recent revival of republican ideas. Third, it 
concentrates on four (neo-) republican ideas officials have deployed to communicate and 
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A Brief History of Republican Ideas   
 
French officials who endorse republican ideas see themselves as upholding a specific 
legacy.120 This is because republican ideas carry rich connotations of moments in French 
political history that, when applied in the present, conjure memories of the past. To 
account for this dialogue between past and present, this section identifies major events in 
modern French history through which republican ideas crystallised and developed. It 
traces the trajectory of republican ideas from the French Revolution of 1789, through its 
alleged apogee in the Third Republic, and reconstruction in postwar France. In doing so, 
it aims to expose how contradictions between republican ideas emerged as officials 
sought to deploy them in new circumstances and presents these ideas as an archive from 
which future officials could draw to communicate and justify their policies.  
 
The Birth of the French Republic  
 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the emergence of an anti-clerical Republic was but one 
of the possible responses to the pre-revolutionary corruption of the Ancien Régime.121 
Rival responses challenged and on occasion toppled the new republican order. The 
political turmoil of the First and Second Republics, the violent history of the Terror 
(1793-1794), the war between the revolutionary government and the Vendée (1793-
1795), and the years of the Restoration (1815-1830), July Monarchy (1830-1848) and 
Second Empire (1852-1870), demonstrate that the history of early republicanism is a 
story of conflict rather than stability.122 Even eschewing the discontinuities that marked 
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its history, the First Republic took at least three political forms: a parliamentary 
dictatorship (1792-1795), a limited-suffrage republic (1795-1799), and a plebiscitary 
system following Napoleon Bonaparte’s coup d’état of 18 Brumaire (9 November 
1799).123 The First Republic was not a distinct, coherent system of government but an 
experiment with no clear beginning or end. In fact, the First Republic was not declared in 
the immediate aftermath of the 1789 Revolution, but in 1792 after the dismissal of the 
constitutional monarchy. Nor was it formally abolished. The First Republic still existed 
officially long after Napoleon Bonaparte was appointed First Consul of the Republic in 
1802, and its end was only signalled by the return of the Bourbons in 1814.  
 
The difficulty in defining the parameters of the First Republic, claims historian Patrice 
Gueniffey, was linked to the uncertainty of what ‘the Republic’ meant at the time of its 
inception.124 According to the philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), the 
Republic was ‘any government guided by the general will, which is the law’.125 Yet, 
Rousseau did not suggest what form the government enforcing the law should take, or 
distinguish between elected and hereditary officials, arguing that, if supported by the 
general will, even ‘the monarchy itself is republican’.126 Charles Baron de Montesquieu 
(1689-1755) also emphasised the legal dimension of the Republic, referring to the 
Republic as a regime governed ‘in keeping with fixed and settled laws’, but did not 
specify the content of those laws.127 This ambiguity of the early republic and the ideas it 
represented left room for embellishment, which as Serge Bernstein argues, led many 
public officials and intellectuals to mythologise the Revolution as the singular, 
uncontested moment of French republicanism.128 
 
In addition to unpacking this revolutionary myth, scholars of modern French history have 
tended to view the French Revolution not as a single moment but a period in which the 
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normative and civic dimensions of republicanism began to take shape. As political 
scientist and historian Sudhir Hazareesingh suggests, there are five ways in which the 
Revolution informed the republican public philosophy: it established the principle of 
popular sovereignty; affirmed the possibility and desirability of constructing a rational 
political order; emphasised the universality of principles; projected a specific conception 
of patriotism and nationalism; and highlighted the notion that political structures could be 
used to promote greater equality (of outcome) and social justice.129 These translated into 
five ideas that republican enthusiasts of the nineteenth century used to communicate and 
justify policies: a belief in universal (male) suffrage, a commitment to enlightenment 
rationality, secularism and anti-clericalism, an interest (albeit limited) in social 
conditions, and a civic conception of patriotism.130 These ideas became reference points, 
differentiating republicans from their rivals and they inspired the political developments 
of the brief but volatile Second Republic (1848-1851), such as the freedom of press, 
application of universal (male) suffrage and the abolition of slavery.131  
 
As the French Revolution was far from peaceful, it is not surprising that the early years of 
the French Republic were characterised by ideological conflict. Two key tensions 
underpinned republican ideas officials deployed in this period. First, republicanism 
emphasised popular participation in French public life, most notably through universal 
suffrage granted in 1793. Yet, although public officials and intellectuals accepted the 
value of greater public participation, they also believed that mass involvement in political 
life could not be effective unless the public was educated in the principles of ‘good’ 
citizenship. Through educating its citizens the French state could reduce ignorance and 
illiteracy, which political elites of the time considered paramount obstacles to the 
development of a stable political community.  
 
The second tension was between elitism and representation. The early years of the 
Republic saw political and intellectual elites as the sole drivers of republican ideas on the 
basis that only they possessed the skills capable of designing policy and the practical 
means of attaining it. This reflected a lingering class hierarchy from the Ancien Regime. 
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Yet, this elitism had to be reconciled with the fact that republicanism was born out of a 
populist movement that forged a direct relationship between state and citizens, and 
decisions were made in the interest of protecting these citizens. A sovereign people could 
not be governed by constantly being told what to do.132 Nevertheless, fears associated 
with uncontrolled mass involvement outweighed the legitimacy of citizens, which came 
to a head in December 1848 when Louis Napoleon was elected president of the Second 
Republic and four years later abolished the Republic.  
 
The Republican ‘Apogee’ 
 
The collapse of the Second Republic led to a hiatus of the republican regime and the 
marginalisation of republican ideas. It was not until the creation of the Third Republic 
(1870-1940) that French officials in mainstream politics resurrected the ideas of the First 
and Second Republic and deployed them to inform policy.133 This is why the Third 
Republic is commonly referred as ‘the apogee of republicanism’.134 Advocates of 
republicanism in intellectual and public circles often celebrate the legacy of the Third 
Republic as the purest form of French republicanism, generating nostalgia for an idealised 
France that in fact never existed. The myth of the Third Republic concealed social and 
ideological divisions in French society. A key dichotomy emerged between the ruling 
elites (politicians), and radicals (both inside and outside the National Assembly), who 
reminded the elites that the Republic was a product of a popular revolution rather than the 
establishment of a new aristocracy. This distinction was enhanced by the rise of socialism 
and anarchism, the aggravation of social cleavages between peasants, workers and the 
middle classes, and the emergence of France as the world’s second largest imperial 
power.135   
 
Despite its tensions, the Third Republic was the longest and most stable Republic in post-
revolutionary France at the time, lasting seventy years. Three political figures were 
instrumental to the success and longevity of the Third Republic: Adolphe Thiers, the 
journalist, historian and first President of the Third Republic who believed that France 
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should be simultaneously liberal and conservative and introduced extensive social 
reforms; Léon Gambetta, who relentlessly campaigned to re-establish the Republic in the 
1860s and 1870s and fought to secure its social base in rural France; and Jules Ferry, who 
among other things was the architect of the secular French state school system. The 
initiatives of these men and others significantly reshaped republican ideology and set 
precedents for future republican policies.  
 
From the political developments of the Third Republic emerged a new stock of republican 
ideas, some of which continue to feature in the discourse of French officials today.136 
Three ideas that crystallised in the Third Republic stand out. The first was the value 
placed on free, compulsory and secular primary education. This was reflected in the 
creation of l’école républicaine, the state school, through which ‘peasants’, argued Eugen 
Weber, were transformed into Frenchmen.137 l’Ecole républicaine continues to be one of 
the most powerful institutions of republican integration today.138 The idea was that l’école 
républicaine would reshape individuals into rational republican citizens through a process 
of education, suggested that membership into the community of citizens had no 
preconditions. The school was the place where knowledge was disseminated and 
republican ideals were projected. In practice this ideal was often betrayed, as the case of 
the Roma demonstrates, but few would dispute the symbolic value of l’école républicaine 
as the principal institution of republican integration.  
 
The second idea to come out of the Third Republic was laïcité, loosely defined as the 
removal of religion from the public domain. Although laïcité is mainly remembered 
through enforcement of the 1905 law on the separation of church and state, in reality it 
was a product of a long, complex process of untying the church from the state and 
school.139 The third idea was the emphasis on citizenship as the defining condition of 
membership to the national community, illustrated in the political scandal of the Dreyfus 
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Affair.140 Nationalists and anti-republicans viewed Captain Alfred Dreyfus as inherently 
treacherous and unworthy of full membership into the French nation due to his Jewish 
origins. In contrast, republicans emphasised the principles of equality and fraternity: all 
members of society were entitled to the same rights and privileges and subject to the same 
treatment of justice. The exoneration and reinstatement of Captain Dreyfus in 1906 was 
considered a major victory for republican ideas. The principle of equal citizenship also 
influenced France’s treatment of its colonial citizens and immigrants: if they wished to 
make France their patrie they could theoretically do so if they demonstrated a willingness 
to integrate into their new national community. Nevertheless, in practice French officials 
viewed some colonial citizens as too uncivilised to integrate without assistance, 
subjecting them to an exercise of state-led socialisation, termed a ‘civilising mission’. 141   
 
Although in many ways the Third Republic represented the triumph of republicanism, its 
success proved to be fragile. The installation of the Vichy government in July 1940 
devastated the republican regime, betraying core republican principles of liberty, equality 
and fraternity, and discrediting its institutions.142 Contrary to some accounts of the 
resistance which try to separate the Third Republic from Vichy, the horrors of Vichy 
tarnished the rule of law on which the Republic was built. Vichy relied on the institutions, 
processes and employees of the Third Republic, and consequently undermined the Third 
Republic’s reputation. 143 It is therefore not surprising that General de Gaulle did not 
explicitly choose republicanism as the principal discourse with which to rebuild postwar 
France.  
 
Rebuilding the Republic in Postwar France 
 
After the Second World War, France fell from power and grace. It had suffered its worst 
defeat in history, had been occupied by the Germans and, despite the Resistance, France 
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had largely been liberated by the Allies.144 So liberation offered a new beginning but 
remained clouded by memories of demise, occupation and collaboration. France’s 
economy was in ruin, food supply was limited and social discontent was rife. Returning 
from exile to head the provisional government of France, de Gaulle sought to rebuild the 
country. His reconstruction project was not just material but also ideological: to 
emphasise the resistance despite a fraught and complex history of collaboration with Nazi 
Germany. It is important to clarify that this narrative of postwar reconstruction was not 
simply Gaullist. Various ideas of resistance were prevalent in postwar France and 
persisted even while the General was out of office from 1946 to 1958. However, de 
Gaulle was able to cultivate these manifold ideas of resistance into a national myth, which 
reached its apogee in the 1960s. 
 
The purpose of this resistance myth was to boost morale and unite French citizens. 
Although implicit, the language of resistance was linked to the republican idea of 
fraternity. The discourse of resistance also erased the link between the Third Republic 
and Vichy. For example, while the Third Republic’s textbooks taught generations of 
children to believe in ‘our ancestors the Gauls’, the Vichy regime’s emblem of the double 
headed axe and the linking of Pétain with Vercingétorix led to the banishment of Gallic 
symbols from the national narrative.145  
 
This banishment did not, however, simply advance the republican cause. The Third 
Republic lingered as an uncomfortable reminder of failure and the Parti Communiste 
Français (PCF) succeeded in transforming wartime resistance into political capital, rising 
to become the largest communist and pro-Soviet party in Western Europe.146  
 
Nevertheless, the Fourth Republic (1946-1958) undertook several reforms that appeared 
consistent with the ideas forged in the Third Republic and in its precursors, including the 
introduction of universal female suffrage and the establishment of the Ecole Nationale 
d’Administration (ENA), an academy preparing elite French citizens to become 
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republican leaders, which many public officials still attend today. Critics of the Fourth 
Republic, including de Gaulle himself, disparaged its rotating coalition governments and 
lack of a strong executive, condemning them as a source of political instability. Yet, 
perversely, the weak institutions of the Fourth Republic allowed innovative civil servants 
to advance technical policies that may not have been politically possible under a strong 
executive.147 The civil servants concluded that France could no longer remain isolated 
from the world economy and international competition. From their perspective, the 
country needed a strategy of European stabilisation to pursue French interests. The Fourth 
Republic facilitated the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, which later 
provided a foundation for the reorginisatoin of the French economy. By the end of the 
Fourth Republic, France was a strong and wealthy European state.   
 
Although the Fourth Republic generated positive economic reforms, it was embroiled in 
conflicts related to the global reordering often termed decolonisation.148 France’s ill-fated 
colonial policy led to defeat in Indochina and war in Algeria, both of which were costly. 
Between December 1955 and December 1957, France lost two thirds of its currency 
reserves, despite steady economic growth.149 Additionally, the colonial conflicts severely 
damaged the Republic’s reputation. By the mid-1950s, republicanism appeared to have 
lost its ideological appeal. The advent of the Fifth Republic (1958-) did not see a rebirth 
of republican ideas, but de Gaulle’s presidency plays a significant role in republican 
mythology.150 Under the Fifth Republic, de Gaulle set out to restore the French state’s 
authority and resolve the Algerian crisis that had undermined it. However, resolution was 
far from optimal, marked not by resounding victory for the French but a ceasefire and 
subsequent withdrawal of the French army from Algeria in 1962. The Algerian war was 
also a pivotal moment in France’s imperial decline, which was exacerbated by the 
migration of Algerians to the hexagon. These changes also spurred an upheaval of 
republican institutions, manifested in the reduction of the powers of the Assembly and the 
strengthening of political parties and the executive. As such, the new constitution gave 
the president paramount power over policy-making and prime ministers. Many on the 
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Left viewed these changes as anti-republican, arguing that the subservience of an 
executive power to a legislative power was central to the republican tradition. Despite the 
absence of explicitly republican terms from de Gaulle’s speeches, he, and his officials, 
deployed republican ideas to guide policies. For example, de Gaulle’s 1962 referendum 
on the direct election of the president could be interpreted as the purest form of 
republican popular sovereignty, establishing for the first time an unmediated relationship 
between French citizens and the state.151  
 
Most importantly, de Gaulle was responsible for the ‘republicanisation’ of the Right.152 
Until the middle of the twentieth century, most parties of the Right viewed the democratic 
heritage of the Republic as the product of a populist insurrection. Under de Gaulle, the 
republican public philosophy took on a different emphasis. Gaullist republicanism 
appropriated elements of postwar Christian democracy, providing the Right with a 
legitimate and acceptable way of expressing national pride at a time when nationalism 
was still politically toxic due to its association with Vichy.153 This entailed the creation of 
a robust welfare state for French citizens and new immigrants, based on an blend of 
republican integration with crypto-Christian values, rather than social democratic ones.154 
As officials deployed republican ideas to fit the political circumstances of the postwar 
period, republicanism transcended the boundaries of Right and Left, allowing different 
social and political groups to identify with an overlapping core set of republican values.  
 
The Revival of Republicanism  
 
Although de Gaulle adopted elements of republicanism, it did not yet dominate French 
politics. It was only after the trente glorieuses that French officials on the Left and Right 
endorsed republicanism as the prevailing public philosophy to drive their policies. This 
section turns to examine the impetus behind this revival of republican ideas in French 
public policy. It argues that French officials’ deployed republican ideas to pursue three 
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main missions: to unite frustrated citizens in the midst of economic crisis, to respond to a 
new public challenge of how to manage new immigrants intensified by the rise of far-
Right populism, and to guard against the encroachment of EU integration.   
 
From Crisis to Revival 
 
When de Gaulle died in 1970, France was not in a strong position. The subsequent oil 
shocks destabilised the French economy to the point of recession. At roughly the same 
time, many guest workers mainly from France’s former colonies who had helped rebuild 
postwar France, decided to settle permanently in the hexagon. While unemployment rose, 
the question of integrating immigrants became increasingly prominent in political debate. 
Some French citizens feared that immigrants might take their jobs, placing pressure on 
political elites. Politicians began to frame immigrants as scapegoats for economic 
deterioration, blaming them for the alleged désintegration of the nation. Additionally, the 
shortage of social housing meant that many of these immigrants lived in slums, exposing 
a level of deprivation and squalor that both French citizens and politicians considered 
intolerable. Responding to these challenges, French officials had to find a way 
simultaneously to integrate immigrants into French society and to appease frustrated 
French citizens. Throughout this period the French party system was also in flux. The 
1968 protests broke the Left’s consensus and by the 1980s the PCF was dying.155 
Gaullism faded in de Gaulle’s absence and in 1981 François Mitterrand was elected as the 
first left-wing president since the Popular Front of 1936.156 The Fifth Republic appeared 
to have reached a crisis. 
 
As the foundations of the Fifth Republic buckled under political and economic pressures, 
public officials scrambled for an ideology to unite an increasingly fragmented and 
apathetic France. It was in this context that French politicians invoked neo-republicanism, 
both as a response to these pressures and as a means of bringing together a diverse 
electorate. Public officials began to use republicanism, not as a depiction of past events, 
but as a living political ideal that could offer solutions to contemporary public problems 
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and lend credibility to their policies.157 This allowed Mitterrand to redefine republicanism 
as a tool for national unity and consensus rather than a reference to class struggle and 
revolutionary principles. 
 
The year 1989 marked a turning point in the revival of republican ideas in French politics. 
It was the bicentennial anniversary of the Revolution and France found itself in the midst 
of a global geopolitical reorientation after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The 
European Project was beginning to expand its borders to include member states, while 
impinging on France’s ability to control its own national borders. 1989 was also the year 
of the affaire du foulard, which led to a heated public debate over immigration and 
secularism.158 By the 1990s republicanism had become the dominant public philosophy in 
French politics; officials on both the mainstream Left and Right increasingly used 
republican ideas to communicate and justify policies. Since then, republicanism has 
occupied this privileged position among the French political elite and administration. Yet 
although a similar set of republican ideas appealed to a diverse array of political actors, 
their interpretations of these ideas differed significantly. Since 2011 even the Far Right 
Front National, under the new leadership of Marine Le Pen, has used republican rhetoric 
to detoxify its image and appeal to a broader portion of the French electorate.159  
 
Immigration and Politics 
 
The revival of republicanism is closely linked to the emergence of immigration as a 
highly politicised issue. The French state has had immigration policies since at least the 
mid nineteenth century, and French political elites often debated – and especially in the 
years of Vichy, adopted – xenophobic positions. Yet, it was not until the 1980s that 
French political elites merged the ideas of immigration and xenophobia in public debate 
to mobilise the electorate. This situation is not unique to France. The politicisation of 
immigration has been well documented across Europe, and as the literature suggests, it 
was often related to the collapse of the far Left, whose former supporters have tended to 
switch their allegiance to the Far Right in a geopolitical climate increasingly hostile 
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towards Europe’s ethnic and religious minorities, especially Muslims.160 As was the case 
elsewhere, politicians in France framed France’s resident immigrant population as a 
public problem that required a public policy response.  
 
Three factors characterised the French response to immigration. First, the integration of 
immigrants into French society became a key policy priority. As millions of North 
Africans from France’s former colonies and a growing number of sub-Saharan Africans 
sought to permanently settle in France, public debate shifted from controlling the inflow 
of migrants to managing the assimilation of migrants once they arrived in the Hexagon.161 
The fear was that without the hand of the state, immigrants might concentrate into ethnic 
ghettos, undermining the idea of an indivisible Republic and eroding legitimacy of its key 
institutions. From this perspective, immigration carried the threat of multiculturalism, 
which officials saw as a dangerous foreign public philosophy that undermined the idea of 
a Republic une et indivisible. It was within this context that the French state saw certain 
immigrants as assimilable while regarding others as not. As discussed below, 
assimilability has become a fundamental condition of neo-republican integration.   
 
Second, until the late 1980s France’s long history of immigration was systematically 
absent from the country’s official memory. Gerard Noiriel’s seminal work Le Creuset 
Français ended this amnesia and generated a surge of scholarship re-evaluating France’s 
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history of immigration.162  Noiriel argued that eminent republican intellectuals and 
historians such as Ernest Renan, Pierre Vidal de la Blanche and Fernand Braudel fostered 
this amnesia by depicting the modern French nation as an ideological fixture that 
crystallised during the French Revolution, long before the widespread use of the term 
immigration.163 By the time immigration became a significant phenomenon in France, 
Noiriel claimed, the national narrative was already fixed, with no room for the experience 
of immigrants or foreigners.164  
 
Noiriel’s work was a breakthrough in the field of French immigration, and its empirical 
contribution is undisputed. Nevertheless, as historian Emile Chabal contends, Noiriel’s 
argument was underpinned by two fallacious assumptions: it understated the role of 
colonialism in France’s history of immigration and interpreted ethnic integration as a 
form of social integration.165 The latter suggested that integration is the same process for 
all foreigners, which draws no distinction between the experience of postcolonial 
migrants from Algeria, for example, and the settlement of Portuguese populations in 
France. By equating ethnic integration with social integration, Noiriel attempted to 
dismiss populist claims that the explosion of migrants in France would produce a crisis of 
integration. In doing so, Noiriel failed to highlight challenges specific to the integration of 
ethnic groups, such as language barriers or religious differences, foreclosing the 
possibility of reaching practical, tailored solutions. Thus, even France’s most 
distinguished scholar of immigration, who sought to reinsert immigration into the 
national narrative, found himself reproducing neo-republican ideas. In the subsequent 
chapters of this thesis we shall see that public officials have employed a similar logic to 
reject accusations of ethnic discrimination and justify policies that disproportionally 
stigmatised populations living in slums that officials framed as a Roma problem.  
 
The third defining factor of France’s experience of immigration is the growth of the Far-
Right party, the FN, since the 1980s.166 The FN has posed a threat to mainstream parties, 
pushing immigration to the top of the political agenda. The reasons for the emergence of 
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the FN are many but, as James Hollifield asserts, the common thread binding a volatile 
electorate was opposition to Mitterrand’s policies on immigration and a fear of 
unemployment.167 In recent years the FN has moved from the fringes of French politics to 
become a mainstream party. This is in part due to its change in leadership in January 
2011when Marine Le Pen, the eldest daughter of FN founder Jean-Marie Le Pen, took 
over the party presidency. In an effort to de-demonise the FN, Marine Le Pen employed 
the idea of laïcité, albeit using it in a controversial manner, to argue that migration was 
causing ‘l’islamisation de la France’. She argued that ‘la France peut être laïque parce 
qu’elle est chretienne de culture et on s’aperçoit d’ailleurs que les pays musulmans ont les 
plus grandes difficultés à être laïcs…la laïcité n’est pas compatible, pas naturelle, avec 
l’islam, puisque l’islam confond le spirituel et le temporel’.168 Additionally, Marine Le 
Pen’s use of catchy slogans such as ‘la France aux Français’ and ‘UMPS’ – an 
amalgamation of the acronyms for the conservative Right-wing party, the UMP, and the 
Socialist party, the PS –undermined the idea of an ethnically neutral Republic and 
attacked France’s ruling political elites.  
 
Europe’s current refugee crisis, France’s sluggish economic recovery and the fear of 
terrorism have intensified anti-immigrant sentiment and bolstered support for the FN. 
Yet, although the FN has grown substantially since its early success in the 1983 
municipal elections, it is debatable whether the party has changed in substance or merely 
in style. Their strategy ‘if you can’t beat republicans, join them’, softened the party’s 
xenophobic image, but it is unclear whether Marine Le Pen’s ideology differs 
dramatically from that of her emphatically anti-republican father. Nonetheless, the FN’s 
appropriation of republican language reinforces the dominance of republicanism in 




Since the ratification of the Schengen Agreement in 1985, the integration of the European 
Union has posed new challenges to the national sovereignty of its member states, and 
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tested the limits of France’s republican ideas.169 To be clear, European integration is 
distinctly different from the French concept of republican integration, yet their meanings 
are equally contested.170 Drawing on the work of political scientist, Ernst Haas, European 
integration can be understood as ‘the process whereby political actors in several distinct 
national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities 
towards a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-
existing national states’.171 The end result, according to Haas, is ‘a new political 
community, superimposed over the pre-existing national states’.172 Given that 
republicanism has become the dominant national public philosophy in France, it is 
scarcely surprising that the deepening of supranational European integration has tested its 
limits.173  
 
Three challenges to republicanism stand out. First, the opening of EU borders and free 
movement of citizens within them. The Schengen Agreement was significant because it 
marked the first step in the formal removal of national border controls of EU member 
states. In doing so, it enabled the free movement of persons across national borders, 
fulfilling a fundamental objective outlined in Article 69 of the European Coal and Steel 
Community Treaty of 1951. By abolishing physical borders between EU member states, 
France (along with Germany and the Benelux countries) relinquished national control and 
enforcement of immigration at three of its five land-locked frontiers. The application of 
the Single European Act in 1987 and the completion of the European Single Market in 
1992 removed further obstacles to the free movement of goods, services, people (self-
employed and employees), and capital throughout the European Community.174 The free 
movement of people was codified in the 2004/38/EC Directive on the free movement of 
European Citizens.175  
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Today the Schengen Zone encompasses 22 of the 28 EU member states, opening France’s 
borders with all neighbouring states except Switzerland. Porous borders have specific 
ramifications in terms of republicanism. They erode national sovereignty, and call into 
question the legitimacy of other EU member states’ decisions to regulate the flow of non-
EU citizens. Elected by their own citizens, other EU member states are not obliged to 
represent the will of French citizens, posing a risk to the republican pact between French 
citizens and the nation-state. The largescale migration of refugees mainly from Syria and 
other parts of the Middle East to Europe since the summer of 2015 has accentuated this 
tension. It has also highlighted a new balance of power in Brussels, with Germany at the 
helm.  
 
The second challenge to republicanism is the concept of EU citizenship. Signed in 1992, 
the Maastricht Treaty states that ‘every person holding the nationality of a Member State 
shall be a citizen of the Union’.176 Specifically, Article 8 declares that EU citizens have 
the right to free movement and residence in any member state, the right to vote and stand 
as a candidate in municipal and European Parliament elections in the member state of 
their residence, and the right to petition the European Parliament and the European 
Ombudsman. This poses ideological and practical challenges to republicanism.  
 
Ideologically, the concept of supranational citizenship undermines the link between 
integration and French national citizenship. Before 1992, French citizenship was the key 
to permanent residence and the result of undergoing dedicated assimilation into French 
society. However, following the Maastricht Treaty, immigrants from EU member states 
were exempt from this procedure. French citizenship and integration into French society 
were no longer requirements of residency. Free movement is not without conditions. 
After a period of six months, EU citizens cannot reside indefinitely in a member state 
other than their own. According to the free movement directive 2004/38/EC, EU citizens 
can be refused entry or returned to their country of origin if they are deemed to pose a 
threat to public order, public security or public health. The directive also stipulates that 
residence is only guaranteed up until three months, after which EU migrants can be 
deported if they fail to demonstrate possession of ‘sufficient resources’ and therefore 
considered to be a burden on the welfare state of the host country. Yet, porous borders 
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and lack of passport checks means that this is difficult to enforce, compromising the 
power of French authorities to make these calls.  
 
The provision of voting rights to EU citizens in municipal and European parliamentary 
elections also allows non-French citizens to theoretically have some say, in French 
politics. This contradicts the emphasis on civic engagement, that is the engagement of 
French citizens in the political process, that has been a feature of modern French history, 
challenging the bond (known as le pacte républicain) between the French state and its 
citizens. It is important to remember that the voting rights of non-EU foreigners in France 
is a partisan issue. The question of whether foreigners residing in France should have the 
right to vote has been a longstanding debate in French politics and part of the Socialist 
Party’s manifesto since 1981. Nevertheless, the fact remains that non-French nationals 
now have the capacity to shape elements of French politics that could influence the lives 
of French citizens, a key example of the often-criticised EU ‘competence creep’.177    
 
The third challenge that European integration posed to republicanism was the 2004 and 
2007 waves of EU enlargement. The 2004 enlargement wave included ten new member 
states: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia. The 2007 enlargement wave encompassed Romania and 
Bulgaria, which are of particular interest to this thesis. Whereas the EU was previously a 
predominantly Western European project, these two waves of enlargement expanded the 
EU across Central and Eastern Europe to absorb former communist states.  
 
Throughout accession negotiations, existing EU member states feared that the economic 
and political instability of the fallen USSR might lead to a civil war and an exodus of 
refugees.178 This was arguably justified in the case of Yugoslavia, but not in other former 
communist states. Upon accession to the EU, no overarching Central and Eastern 
European civil war took place and citizens of these new member states tended to migrate 
for socio-economic reasons in search of a better quality of life. For these new EU citizens, 
accession to the EU meant access to the labour markets of prosperous Western European 
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states without the need to apply for a visa, or work permit that previously required 
renewing every two years. Transitional measures still applied to these new member states 
for seven years following their accession, the objective of which was to gradually 
introduce free movement and prevent mass migration. For France, and other existing EU 
member states, enlargement marked the arrival of immigrants from new national and 
ethnic minorities, such as the Roma.  
 
Whether Romanians and Bulgarians personally identified as Roma or whether they were 
merely perceived as such, is extremely difficult to prove. Whether those perceived to be 
Roma were even Romanian or Bulgarian nationals is also questionable. However, putting 
self-identification to one side, the French state’s colour-blind discourse on immigration 
gave rise to ethnic stereotypes, which transformed into a tacit construction of a Roma 
category. French officials saw the settlement of populations living in illegal camps on the 
outskirts of French cities as a Roma problem, prompting a public response. It is clear that 
European integration has limited the political action of French officials and altered the 
context in which republican ideas are deployed. Yet, as this thesis suggests, European 
institutions have fallen short of protecting the ethnic discrimination of its citizens moving 
freely across member states.  
 
Key Neo-Republicanism Ideas 
 
To address these new challenges, French officials drew upon (neo-) republican ideas to 
communicate and justify policies. This section focuses on four key neo-republican ideas: 
universalism, the public sphere, selection and integration. These ideas were not 
necessarily complementary or distinct. Their meanings were contingent upon the inter-
subjective understandings of officials who deployed them and the circumstances to which 
they responded. But it is analytically useful to separate ideas to study how officials 
deployed them to communicate and justify policies. These four neo-republican ideas were 
not the only ones that officials deployed but I have chosen to focus on them because they 
emerged as the most germane to my study of political discourse on the Roma. To pave the 
way for my empirical study of political discourse on the Roma in subsequent chapters, 
this section analyses how officials deployed these four ideas to address challenges other 





Universalism is perhaps the most well-known republican idea, typified by the 
revolutionary notion of the French nation that is ‘one and indivisible’ and enshrined in 
article 1 of the 1958 Constitution.179 Yet, as officials have deployed it to respond to 
developments in contemporary French politics, universalism has acquired particular neo-
republican elements. Today it implies more than simply a rejection of the particular in 
favour of a common good. Neo-republican universalism is defined as the refusal to 
recognise the identities of ethnic or religious minorities in the French public sphere. The 
emphasis on the public sphere is significant because it relies on an ethnically neutral 
conception of not only public participation but also public space, as is discussed in detail 
below. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the republican notion of the public sphere 
is not neutral but normative, with neutrality defined in terms of a particular concept of 
what officials consider to be normal and acceptable.  
 
Over the last three decades French political elites have invoked universalism to guard 
against the désintegration of the French nation. The depiction of désintegration as the 
principal existential threat to the Republic is not new. As Lucien Jaume asserts, ‘during 
the Revolution of 1789’ it was believed that ‘the situation, opinion, interest and even 
behaviour of the individual…should disappear behind the general will’.180 Today the 
argument is less about regional divisions than alleged threats to national cohesion from 
external forces, such as immigrants, and minorities inside France. The fear is that ethnic, 
religious and cultural difference would reduce the Republic to what one journalist termed 
‘the pandemonium of the tower of Babel’.181 Advocates of republicanism tend to depict 
multiculturalism as the antithesis of the republican idea of universalism. From this 
perspective, multiculturalism is an alternative public philosophy based on the idea that 
society should recognise and protect ethnic and religious communities and support the 
coexistence of these diverse communities. Some republican advocates go one step further 
to present multiculturalism as a threat to the republican public philosophy. Various 
republican intellectuals have expressed concerns about the ‘atomising’ and tendency of 
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multiculturalism.182 The political commentator and historian Pierre-André Taguieff 
argues that multiculturalism is deeply divisive of the civic community and is likely to 
foster a society in which ‘tribe war would replace class war’.183 Similarly, the philosopher 
Alain Finkelkraut asserted in 1989 that ‘the nation is disappearing in favour of 
tribes…[and] cultural unity will make way for a juxtaposition of ghettos’.184 
 
It is worth distinguishing the French interpretation of multiculturalism from the Anglo-
American one. In English, multiculturalism is viewed positively and is based on the view 
that cultural differences should be accommodated for a society to function 
harmoniously.185 In the United States, for example, ethnic communities are regarded as an 
outlet for minorities to have a voice. In France, however, multiculturalism is considered a 
dangerous threat to the republican pact between state and citizen that could fragment the 
nation into interest groups divided by race, religion, culture and previous nationalities.186 
This is what is pejoratively termed communautarisme. Carrying a stronger meaning in 
French than its English equivalent, communitarianism is a powerful political tool. This 
term has generally been used in public discourses to criticise calls for positive 
discrimination or counter demands for cultural diversity. The division of spaces à l’anglo-
saxonne into China Towns, Little Italies and Harlems is precisely what republicans wish 
to avoid.187 Viewed from this perspective, multiculturalism is considered the cause and 
communautarisme the consequence of the Republic’s désintegration.  
 
Universalism is also closely related to the concept of laïcité. For example, French 
officials have used the refusal to recognise religious identities to justify policies that have 
disproportionate effects on religious minorities, especially Muslims. This colour-blind 
logic also applies to ethnic minorities, that is those who are characterised by linguistic, 
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racial, cultural or moral codes different from those of the dominant population.188 Two 
key examples illustrate the use of universalism in contemporary French politics. The first 
is the opposition of the Charter for Regional Languages in 1999. As Danièle Sallenave 
asserted, the acknowledgement of regional languages could lead to the division of the 
national community, which is a “community of citizens”, not a federation of various 
ethnic, linguistic and religious groups.189 
 
The second example of universalism is the French government’s longstanding ban on 
collecting racial and ethnic statistics, which erupted into a public debate in 2004.190 The 
debate generated tension between those who saw ethnic and racial statistics as an 
important research tool and a means of measuring discrimination, and those who viewed 
ethno-racial classifications as contributing to an essentialisation of ethnic identities, with 
potentially dangerous consequences.191 The former position tends towards the Anglo-
Saxon idea of multicultural diversity, whereas the latter is a classical defence of 
universalism to apparently protect all French citizens. There are also fears about what 
ethno-racial statistics might reveal. A republican might argue that uncovering ethnic 
diversity could play into the hands of Marine Le Pen who claims that ‘there are too many 
immigrants’ in France. Yet the validity of this view remains untested.  
 
Although most French officials would insist that the institutions of modern France are 
founded upon universalist principles, the French state sometimes promotes ethnic and 
religious initiatives, albeit mostly at a local level. For example, some republican 
institutions, such as local town halls, now provide Muslims with prayer spaces, Muslim 
cemeteries now exist and there are Muslim chaplains in French prisons and the national 
army.192 The official discourse of universalism is also difficult to square with the 
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persistent use of code words such as ‘youths’ and ‘delinquents’ to refer to ethnic 
categories (predominantly Arabs and black Africans).193 As this thesis demonstrates, the 
term ‘campements illicites’ has been increasingly used as a pseudonym for the Roma. 
These anomalies are a reminder that universalist ideas were in fact ideals. 
 
Even Dominique Schnapper, a leading intellectual champion of French republicanism, 
conceded that universalism is best seen as an ideal rather than a reality: ‘transcendence 
through citizenship appears to a humiliated people as something purely formal that has 
the function of consecrating the domination of the other under the guise of 
universality’.194 Jeremy Jennings took this point a step further, arguing that universalism 
could be seen ‘as a perverse form of communitarianism, for which the national 
community is the supreme community, forcibly imposing a unitary common good over 
the plurality of sub-national groups’.195 This would not be problematic if the French 
Republic were, in fact, ethnically and religiously neutral. However, as the empirical 
chapters of this thesis demonstrate, this ideal was often betrayed in practice.  
 
The Public Sphere 
 
Another central tenet of neo-republicanism is the preservation of a ‘neutral’ public 
sphere. As mentioned above, this concept of a neutral public sphere is normative, with 
neutrality defined in terms of what is normal and acceptable. To conceptualise this notion 
of the public sphere, scholars of French republicanism have tended to use the work of 
German philosopher Jürgen Habermas.196 According to Habermas, the public sphere is 
defined as an abstract arena in which individuals can come together to freely discuss and 
debate societal issues, form public opinion and consequently influence politics. This 
definition is inextricably linked to the civic engagement of French citizens, a factor that 
republican policymakers and philosophers have long considered crucial to the success of 
the Republic and the legitimacy of its leader. Thierry Paquot, philosopher and professor at 
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the l’Institut d’urbanisme de Paris, stresses that unlike in English, the French singular and 
plural forms of the term ‘public sphere’ have different meanings. He builds upon this 
point to argue that espace public and espaces publics are separate and irreconcilable 
concepts. In contrast, Paquot defines singular term, espace public, using the Habermas’ 
concept of the public sphere. 197 Paquot defines the plural term, espaces publics, as 
geographical places open to the public and free of charge, such as parks, streets, beaches, 
mountains, fields and forests.198 These geographical places, he claims, are not necessarily 
publicly owned, as he argues shopping malls and department stores can also be 
considered espaces publics.  
 
Paquot’s distinction between the abstract espace public and the physical espaces publics 
is a useful conceptual tool, but it has three shortcomings. First, it fails to capture the 
particular republican significance of the public sphere. For example, republican 
institutions are conspicuously absent from Paquot’s list of espaces publics. The omission 
of l’école républicaine is especially problematic. L’école républicaine has been a key 
forum in which the boundary between public and private has been tested, re-negotiated 
and re-defined. Second, Paquot offers no definition of the private domain, which makes it 
difficult to envisage the limits of the public sphere. From my perspective, the private 
domain is located outside the public sphere and includes matters of private interest, such 
as family, religion, ethnicity and sexuality. Third, espace public and espaces publiques 
are not entirely independent. Rather, I would argue they are two sides of the same 
republican coin. One is an abstract and imagined realm in which French citizens can 
freely exercise civic rights to shape politics, the other is a physical and geographic place 
that is governed by universalistic principles. Both are conceived as emancipatory spaces 
that allow individuals to leave behind private attachments in exchange for the common 
good.  
 
Indirectly, however, Paquot’s work makes an important contribution to understanding 
neo-republican ideas. By highlighting the physical and geographical dimension of 
espaces publics, he draws attention to an often-overlooked feature of the public sphere: 
its visibility. Not all types of visibility appear to challenge the republican concept of a 
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neutral public sphere. However, officials have tended to criticise conspicuous 
manifestations of poverty, and concentrations of some ethnic and religious groups on the 
grounds that they challenge the neutrality of the public sphere. This point is particularly 
relevant to the Roma. As chapter four of this thesis will reveal, the geographical 
interpretation of the public sphere helps to explain why French policymakers have 
targeted campements illicites (visible and often in public places), rather than squats 
(hidden, and often in derelict private properties). The visibility of the public sphere means 
that if an individual or group fails to leave behind their private attachments, they appear 
to challenge the norms of what is considered acceptable in French society. The public 
sphere thus magnifies religious and ethnic difference and highlights the distinction 
between the majority population and minorities, a distinction that theoretically would be 
considered inconsequential in the private domain. The issue is not that minorities exist; it 
is that they are exposed. This implies that diversity is considered undesirable if on display 
but permissible if covert. 
 
In recent years, French officials have drawn upon the idea of preserving a neutral public 
sphere to communicate and justify policies. Two interrelated examples demonstrate this 
point. The first was the 2004 law banning ‘conspicuous’ religious symbols in state 
schools, which put an end to a decade of legal uncertainty and controversy, known as the 
affair du foulard.199 Although hijabs, turbans, skullcaps and large crosses were 
prohibited, it has often been argued that the Muslim headscarf was the principal target.200 
The second example of French political elites’ efforts to preserve the public sphere was 
the 2010 law banning the burqa, the full face covering, in public.201 These two examples 
polarised political opinion: liberals criticised the measures as an infringement of the 
freedom of religious expression, while republicans viewed them as a necessary means of 
protecting laïcité and defending the Republic from cultural fragmentation and 
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désintegration.202 The fact that the republican idea was enshrined in French law reveals 
that the preservation of the public sphere moved from rhetoric to institution, and 
highlights the dominance of republican ideology in contemporary French politics.  
 
Yet, despite the fact officials strategically deployed the idea of preserving a neutral public 
sphere, the demarcation between public and private remains ambiguous. For example, the 
very case that prompted the 2010 legislation banning the burqa ruled that a private day-
care nursery was within its rights when it fired an employee who refused to remove her 
burqa at work. Although the court stressed that this ruling should not be generalised as it 
related to the nursery’s specific company regulations, it demonstrated that, if deemed 
necessary, the preservation of an ostensibly neutral public sphere could be applied to 
instances in the private domain. The conditions for which this might be permitted are 
unclear, and depend on specific legislation. However, the implication is that the French 
state now has the power to intervene in a private business if officials can justify it as 
protecting the Republic.  
 
A striking example of the French state’s intervention in the private domain is the urban 
planning and housing policy of mixité sociale (social mixing).203 The idea of mixité 
sociale first appeared in 1972 directive introduced by Olivier Guichard, the then Minister 
for Land, Infrastructure, Housing and Transport, stating that 20 per cent of social housing 
is reserved for ‘particular categories’. Two decades later mixité sociale was formally 
enshrined the 1991 loi d’orientation pour la ville. The aim of mixité sociale was to create 
a social housing system and local community in which families from a variety of different 
ethnic, religious and national backgrounds could live side-by-side.204 The logic behind it 
was that mixité sociale would transform poorer neighbourhoods, which often contained 
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new immigrant populations, into cohesive, integrated communities and prevent the 
creation of ethnic and religious ghettos. Mixité sociale is an interesting example because 
it applies universalist principles, traditionally linked to public sphere, to the private 
domain of the home. This raises the question of whether social housing (fully subsidised 
hébergement and partially subsidised logement) falls into the public or private sphere. It 
also suggests that officials consider those who cannot afford independent housing should 
be governed by universalist principles in both the public and private sphere. This example 
highlights that the distinction between public and private varies depending on socio-




The third strand of neo-republican ideas is selection. Although public officials have often 
presented the idea of an inclusive and equal community of citizens as the bedrock of the 
Republic, their policies also reflect the conditionality of its membership. Republicanism 
is often a Janus-faced philosophy that officials use to foster cohesion through the 
integration of citizens, while excluding others who they deem incapable or unwilling to 
assimilate into French society. Of course, the distinction between citizens and non-
citizens has always existed, but so have internal hierarchies based on gender, ethnicity as 
religion. Republican purists would strongly contest this claim, but even a glance at 
France’s modern history reveals that the French state has systematically excluded ‘others’ 
(such as Jews and Catholics) whose loyalty to the Republic was deemed suspect.205  
Additionally, as late as 1945, women were excluded form ‘universal’ suffrage.  
 
Nevertheless, the selection of citizens based on a prerequisite of assimilability has 
become increasingly explicit in the discourse of French officials. As Epstein argues, 
whereas the policies of the early Third Republic encouraged immigrants to integrate after 
living in France for some years, the Fifth Republic asks some of them to do so before 
arriving.206 When l’école républicaine was founded, cultural conformity was the desired 
outcome of integration, not a litmus test for entry.207 The same logic applies to foreigners. 
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The discourse of French officials suggests foreigners are now expected to conform to 
French society and possess sufficient financial resources to live independently of the 
welfare state before they arrive in France.208 This was reflected in the 2007 Hortefeux 
Law that demands French language ability and acceptance of universal principles as a 
prerequisite for family reunification. A report by the Haut Conseil à l’Intégration (HCI) in 
2003 also outlined conditions for integration: proficiency in French, the dispersal of 
immigrant populations across residential areas, the weakening of community ties and 
their replacement by an individualised relationship with the state, and above all, the 
acquisition of French citizenship in two generations.209 The implication is that immigrants 
must integrate pre-emptively or they are not welcome in France.  
 
For example, as Amelia Lyons demonstrates in her study of the Algerian Welfare 
Network in the 1950s to the 1970s, French officials only helped support the integration of 
Algerians in France who they deemed to have ‘civilising potential’ by providing them 
with housing and comprehensive social support.210 This argument was based on the 
assumptions that some Algerians did not wish to integrate, or were too ‘culturally 
different’ to be absorbed into French society.211 Given the influx of North African 
immigration to France during and after the Algerian War and the deep colonial ties 
between France and its former département, it is difficult to take these assumptions as 
more than deep-seated prejudice. Nevertheless, despite politicians’ efforts to maintain a 
commitment to universalism in their public comments, references to the incompatibility 
of ethnic or religious communities were not always supressed. For example, in 1984 the 
then Interior Minister, Gaston Defferre, asserted: 
 
When Poles, Italians, Spanish, and Portuguese live in France and decide to naturalize, it 
matters little whether they are, Protestants, Jews, or atheists… But the rules of Islam are 
not simply religious rules. They are rules of living that concern… marriage, divorce, the 
care of children, the behaviour of men, the behaviour of women… These rules are 
contrary to all the rules of French law on the custody of children in case of divorce, and 
they are contrary to [French rules on] the rights of women with respect to their husbands. 
What is more, in France we don’t have the same habits of living.212 
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By framing Islam as total belief system that cannot be reduced to the private sphere, 
Defferre suggested that the presence of Muslim migrants in France created public and 
political demands that conflicted with the secular and universalist ideas of the republican 
tradition. But, in trying to protect a colour-blind conception of French society, Defferre 
paradoxically essentialised Islam, ignoring its various interpretations. As such, Defferre’s 
commitment to universalism concealed a logic of discrimination that prioritised some 




The fourth neo-republican idea I found most germane to my analysis was integration. 
From the outset, the French Republic has been concerned with transforming individuals 
into French citizens to create a common national community. Originally integration was 
the assimilation of regional populations from, for example, Brittany, Provence and 
Burgundy, through the imposition of a national language, culture and identity.213 
Recently, integration has taken on a new meaning. Instead of uniting rural populations by 
turning ‘peasants into Frenchmen’, the aim of the French state’s integration policies has 
been to absorb immigrants and foreigners residing in France. The assumption was that 
through gradually integrating immigrant groups into French society, their presence would 
be relatively small, their needs could be attended to, French institutions could continue 
without interruption, and over time immigrants would ‘become French’.214 In 1989 this 
new definition of integration became official. Responding to the perceived political crisis 
of immigration, socialist Prime Minister Michel Rocard established the HCI. The task of 
this inter-ministerial committee was to provide answers to questions on the integration of 
foreign residents or French residents of foreign origin.215 According to the HCI: 
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The term integration (generally used to describe the situation of immigrants who have 
settled permanently in their host country) refers to both a [social] process and the policies 
that are put into place to facilitate it. Note: This process requires the effective 
participation of all those called to live in France in the construction of a society that 
brings them together around shared principles (liberty of thought and conscience, equality 
between men and women for example) as they are expressed in equal rights and common 
responsibilities…To lead a policy of integration is to define and develop actions that tend 
towards the maintenance of social cohesion at both a local and national level, so that 
everybody can live peacefully and normally by respecting the law and exercising their 
rights and responsibilities.216  
 
This definition recast integration in terms of immigration and reinforced the republican 
idea of political participation. The notion of citizenship is strikingly absent, however. 
Whereas integration traditionally implied the process whereby individuals were made into 
citizens, the absence of citizenship in this definition meant that the question of precisely 
what immigrants were integrating into was left open to interpretation. The implication 
was that any person who wished to live in France, regardless of their origins, could 
integrate if they agreed to participate in public life, reflecting the republican idea of the 
public sphere mentioned above. A 2003 HCI report made this emphasis on participation 
explicit:  
 
integration is not only destined for French citizens of immigrant origin, but concerns any 
individual who participates in the public space…National identity is experienced through 
shared values: it is not enough to be born on French soil to feel French. In order to come 
together, we must forget our particularities and discover what we have in common with 
others.217 
 
Yet, as officials were selective, they did not consider all individuals as willing or capable 
of public participation on the grounds that some were more assimilable than others. What 
did the process of state-led integration entail for the select few? Children were 
predominantly subject to assimilation through education in l’école républicaine. As the 
historian Marc Sadoun observes, ‘the Republic does not conceive of citizenship without 
the education of the citizen: the individual is not born but becomes French’.218 He argues 
that the school provides a forum in which children can leave behind the dogmas and 
traditions of family, religion and ethnicity and learn to adopt the principles of 
republicanism. This implies that ‘true’ integration is only possible for second-generation 
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immigrants and their descendants. The emphasis on integrating children has remained a 
priority for neo-republican political elites. For example, the Ministry of Education runs 
compulsory French language classes for new arrivals and established a Priority Education 
Zone policy from 1981 to 2007 providing more resources to educational staff working in 
disadvantaged, often largely immigrant, populations. Municipal governments also offer 
various forms of support to pupils outside school in an effort to reduce social inequality. 
But despite these efforts to reduce social inequality, French schools do not treat all 
populations equally. As Riva Kastoryano and Angéline Escafré-Dublet argue, French 
public schools promote ‘une laïcité “à deux vitesses” où la place accordée à la religion 
catholique (à travers le calendrier des jours fériés, par exemple) est plus importante que 
celle accordée à la pratique d’autres religions (absence pour le jour de l’Aïd).’219  
 
With regards to adults, the French state has approached the integration in terms of broader 
socialisation projects, by assisting them with social housing, language training, 
employment opportunities and health cover. In the absence of sending adults to l’école 
républicaine, the aim is to equip adults with the skills to navigate French society and 
prepare them for life within French society but without financial or social support from 
the French state. These projects are informed by a republican notion of paternalism that 
restricts the freedom of immigrants to help them blend into the French melting pot. This 
is exemplified in the French governments’ various transitional housing policies, ranging 
from the cités de transit of the 1960s and 70s that absorbed Algerian immigrants living in 
bidonvilles to local and regional projets d’insertion initiatives that offered alternative 
housing to Roma campements illicites today.220  
 
Chapter six of this thesis provides a detailed analysis of projets d’insertion, but to 
understand the assumptions behind the integration of adults, it is useful to identify four 
key characteristics underpinning the French state’s agenda. First, transitional housing 
policies were intended to be temporary, lasting ideally for a matter of months not years. 
This is because such an inclusive package of integration is extremely costly and difficult 
to justify, especially in the context of a sluggish economic climate. Second, despite the 
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projected view that integration is a state-led initiative, transitional housing policies tended 
to be financed by regional governments but implemented by non-government agencies 
and social workers, such as Adoma (formerly called Sonacotra). Third, transitional 
housing is constructed for small nuclear families of roughly two parents and three 
children. This posed a practical problem for the integration of larger families, especially 
Muslims and Roma migrants, who do not wish to be separated but cannot be 
accommodated by this type of housing. Fourth, transitional housing projects had varying 
degrees of privacy. Some were managed under lock and key, had security guards and 
strict visiting hours while others had limited surveillance and few rules. The process of 
integration varied between being hands-on or relaxed, depending on the type of 
transitional housing, the political climate in which it was created, the perception of the 
inhabitants and the relationship with the local community. The republican idea of 
integration thus translated into diverse applications in French policy. Officials may have 
invoked the same concept, but their interpretations of it varied.  
 
Yet, in spite of the French state’s efforts to integrate (or exclude) foreigners, the success 
of integration policies remains questionable. Without ethnic statistics, it is difficult to 
accurately identify ethnic minorities let alone measure feelings of belonging to and 
identification with French society.221 Measurements aside, as the historian Patrick Weil 
has observed, some French citizens of foreign origin claim that legal citizenship made no 
difference in practice, they were still seen by others as foreigners and classed as ‘the 
enemy within’.222 Thus in practice integration did not necessarily lead to inclusion. The 
Marche contre le racisme et pour l’égalité (also known as the Marche des Beurs), a 
demonstration of second-generation North African immigrants in 1983, the Indigènes de 
la République movement (founded in 2005), and the 2005 suburban riots were symbolic 
of deep frustrations over the French state’s blindness to ethnic discrimination and the 
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The purpose of this chapter has been twofold. First, it explored the ways in which 
officials used republican ideas to address changing circumstances throughout modern 
French history and second, it examined how these ideas became the dominant public 
philosophy in French political discourse. In doing so, it contextualised the republican 
ideas that officials used to communicate and justify policies targeting the Roma and 
demonstrated that the French state has a legacy of deploying republican ideas to manage 
immigrant populations in France. However, I am not alone in studying the revival of 
republican ideas in French politics. 223  Among those who endorsed this revival were three 
prominent voices: Pierre-André Taguieff, Alain Finkielkraut and Dominique Schnapper. 
Taguieff argued that France faced a threat of ‘multi-communautarisme’ (a play on the 
words multiculturalism and communitarisme) which, he contended, could lead to the 
erosion of the nation and maintained that a republican discourse of national unity was 
needed to restore the civic bond.224 Finkielkraut focused on laïcité, claiming that limiting 
religious freedom in the public sphere, especially in schools, was crucial to guarding 
against multiculturalism.225 Schnapper concentrated on the civic integration of citizens as 
the mechanism for countering national fragmentation.226 Despite their differences, these 
scholars shared a contempt for ethnic and religious interventions in French political life. 
For them, a republican discourse promoting universalism was the key to uniting the 
national community.   
 
In contrast, those who critiqued the revival of republicanism aligned with three key 
arguments. First, normative prescriptions of republicanism were out of touch with the 
empirical reality of contemporary France. Michel Wieviorka’s work on cultural 
difference and Alec Hargraeves study of a multi-ethnic France epitomise this claim.227 
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Some scholars such as Cécile Laborde and Sophie Guérard de Latour, responded by 
advocating for the recognition of ethnic and religious discrimination while remaining 
committed to universalism.228 Second, critics argued the republican ideas of universalism 
and laïcité concealed structural racism. Most of the literature focused on Islamophobia, 
but a small proportion examined forms of racial discrimination.229 This argument also 
drove the (failed) movement for the French state to permit the collection of ethnic 
statistics spearheaded by Patrick Simon.230 Third, critics argued the separation of 
republicanism and race was artificial. In this view, many republican ideas were 
structurally racist because they crystallised in an era of high colonialism.231 Historians 
have examined the link between republicanism and colonialism in detail, but even 
political scientists such as Sophie Body-Gendrot and Catherine Wihtol de Wendel have 
demonstrated clearly that contemporary republican institutions are far from race-
neutral.232  My thesis builds on these three critiques to illuminate the ways in which 
officials were able to exploit the polyvalence of republican ideas to communicate and 
justify policies targeting the Roma in France. The subsequent chapters of this thesis now 
turn to examine this phenomenon in detail.  
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DENIAL: THE STRUGGLE FOR UNIVERSALISM 
 
 
‘300 campements ou implantations illicites devront avoir été évacués d’ici 3 mois, en 
priorité ceux des Roms’.233 
Brice Hortefeux (5 August 2010) 
 
‘Il ne s’agit, en aucun cas, de stigmatiser telle ou telle population…mais il ne s’agit pas 
non plus de fermer les yeux sur une réalité, celle qui peut être crimes et délits’.234 




‘Ces populations ont des modes de vie extrêmement différents des nôtres et qui sont 
évidemment en confrontation…les Roms ont vocation à revenir en Roumanie ou en 
Bulgarie’.235 
Manuel Valls (24 September 2013) 
 
‘Il ne s’agit pas de stigmatiser mais il s’agit de regarder la réalité en face, les difficultés 
que nous connaissons dans ces villes’.236 
Manuel Valls (25 September 2013) 
 
Since the summer of 2010, successive French governments have employed the republican 
idea of universalism to communicate and justify policies on the evacuation of peri-urban 
slums. Yet, despite claims of refuting ethnic stigmatisation, references to the Roma often 
crept into public documents and out of the mouths of officials, exposing a link between 
the ethnic category ‘Roms’ and the administrative terms bidonvilles and campements 
illicites. The French state’s tacit construction of bidonvilles and campements illicites as a 
Roma problem and discursive insistence on universalism appeared mutually inconsistent. 
How was it possible for officials to frame a problem in ethnic terms yet insist that their 
policy response was devoid of ethnic categories? This chapter argues that officials were 
able to exploit the ambiguity of republican ideas to target the Roma community. It shows 
how officials selectively foregrounded the republican idea of universalism over 
alternative ideas, especially racialised and class-based ideas, which gave rise to ethnic 
stereotypes that concealed rather than countered structural racism.237 First, the chapter 
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investigates how officials in the Sarkozy and Hollande governments exploited the 
ambiguity of universalism by using the concept in different ways to justify their policies. 
Second, it examines whether universalist political rhetoric was consistent with language 
in policy documents and the language employed by officials on the ground charged with 
implementing the policies. Third, it explores how the universalist discourse of French 
officials was tested within the context of an enlarged EU. 
 
Exploiting the Ambiguity of Universalism 
 
Despite their different political orientations, the Sarkozy and Hollande governments 
shared the task of reconciling internal tensions between hard-line and humanitarian 
positions on how to manage immigrant populations. The question of ‘Roma’ migrants 
was no exception. The Sarkozy government saw its party divide into those who supported 
the President’s security-driven discours de Grenoble on 30 July 2010 and those who 
found its ethnic undertones unacceptable. The Hollande government witnessed a public 
fight between Interior Minister Manuel Valls who pushed for the eradication of illegal 
camps and Housing Minister Cécile Duflot who argued that evacuating camps without 
providing alternative accommodation was inhumane.238 As one regional official 
exclaimed ‘du temps de Nicolas Sarkozy nous traitons les camps avec humanisme et 
fermeté et maintenant nous les traitons avec fermeté et humanisme’.239 The suggestion 
that the change of administration had little effect is overstated, but it has some truth. The 
firm stance on law enforcement did not end with Sarkozy. In fact, the number of people 
evacuated from illegal camps more than doubled from 9,396 in 2011 under Sarkozy, to 
21,537 in 2013 under Hollande.240 Nevertheless, each government’s policies reflected 
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different readings of the republican idea of universalism. Regardless of their political 
affiliation, officials were able to exploit the ambiguity of universalism to communicate 
and justify their policies. This section studies different interpretations of universalism, 
arguing that while the Sarkozy government reluctantly drew upon universalism to repair a 
political rift with the European Commission, the Hollande government used universalism 
proactively to defend and distract from the intensified evacuations of illegal camps. First, 
this section traces the political developments that shaped the Sarkozy government’s 
discourse of universalism. Second, it turns to examine the Hollande government’s 
strategic deployment of universalism, which remained relatively consistent throughout his 
time in office.  
 
Deploying Universalism to Counter the Communitarian Threat  
 
On 28 July 2010 President Sarkozy called an emergency cabinet meeting on ‘la situation 
des gens du voyage et des Roms en France’.241 The ‘situation’ referred to the death of a 
22 year-old French gens du voyage male in the village of Saint Aignan, in central France, 
who was shot by police at a road checkpoint on 16 July 2010, and the subsequent 
retaliatory attack on the Saint Aignan police station, looting and vandalism by members 
of the local gens du voyage community.242 At the same time, riots erupted in Grenoble 
after police shot a 27 year-old local man who allegedly took part in an armed robbery at a 
casino. Although both cases involved persons of French nationality, the Sarkozy 
government’s pairing of French gens du voyage and migrant Roms connected the issues 
of delinquency, nomadism and immigration as if they were seamless. Following the 
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Le Président de la République, en outre, a jugé totalement inadmissible la situation de 
non droit qui caractérise les populations Roms, venus d'Europe de l'Est, sur le territoire 
français. 200 campements illégaux ont été ainsi recensés, sources de trafics illicites, de 
conditions de vie profondément indignes, d'exploitation des enfants à des fins de 
mendicité, de prostitution ou de délinquance. Il a demandé au Gouvernement de procéder, 
dans les trois mois, à l'évacuation de ces installations chaque fois que le droit en vigueur 
le permet. En parallèle, une réforme législative sera entreprise afin de rendre plus efficace 
le dispositif d'évacuation des campements illégaux.243    
 
Two days later, President Sarkozy delivered his discours de Grenoble, in which he asked 
the Interior Minister Brice Hortefeux to ‘mettre un terme aux implantations sauvages de 
campements de Roms’ and claimed that ‘ce sont des zones de non-droit qu'on ne peut pas 
tolérer en France’.244 The phrase conjures a number of connotations, such as sovereignty, 
legality and civilisation, which are mutually constitutive and difficult to disentangle. In 
this instance, the phrase also served as a justification for the French state’s evacuation 
policies. Sarkozy’s explicitly ethnic reference to the Roma appeared to undermine the 
republican idea of universalism. Yet, by associating the Roma with illegal camps, he 
suggested that Roma operated outside of French law and challenged the norms of French 
living standards. Consequently, he framed these so-called Roma camps as ethnic ghettos 
that posed a communitarian threat to l’ordre public and could use this logic to rationalise 
evacuation policies targeting Roma as guarding against communitarianism. In a perverse 
way, universalism became the end rather than the means for the French state’s evacuation 
policies. Selectively foregrounding the illegal aspect of camps also helped the Sarkozy 
government override claims of discrimination. As Interior Minister Brice Hortefeux 
maintained ‘nous n’évacuons pas…des campements de Roms illicites parce qu’ils sont 
Roms, nous les démantelons parce qu’ils sont illégaux’.245 Yet, despite Hortefeux’s 
attempt to justify the use of the term ‘Roms’, the policy remained discriminatory. If, for 
example, the government had replaced the term ‘Roms’ with ‘Juifs’ it is highly unlikely 
that the presidential order for a ‘reconduction quasi-immédiate des Roms vers la 
Roumanie ou la Bulgarie en cas d'atteintes aux biens ou de fraudes’ would have been 
considered anything but xenophobic.246 
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For a brief period, members of the Sarkozy government defended the explicit targeting of 
‘Roms’ as an acceptable means of restoring ‘l’ordre public’. As Secretary of State for 
Housing and Urbanism, Benoist Apparu said on 29 July 2010 ‘il y aura une reconduite à 
la frontière de tous ceux qui sont en situation illégale, et notamment bien évidemment, 
des Roms en question’.247 Secretary of State for European Affairs, Laurent Wauquiez, 
extended the argument outside the republican public philosophy by criticising 
universalism as an impractical concept that obstructs the reality of policymaking. 
Responding to a question on ‘les problèmes de comportement des Roms et gens du 
voyage’ he exclaimed that ‘en France, on a parfois un peu le sentiment que quand un sujet 
gène, il ne faudrait pas en parler, il faudrait le cacher sous le tapis, jeter un voile pudique’. 
248 He added that ‘dès qu’on l’aborde, on dit: oh là là, attention vous allez stigmatiser. Je 
trouve que d’ailleurs, sur ce sujet…on a le retour d’un Parti socialiste version “oui oui”, 
avec un mélange à la fois d’angélisme et de déni de la réalité. Il y a un problème, on y fait 
face’.249 This comment also suggested that it required an official policy response.  
 
Nevertheless, the Sarkozy government’s hard-line approach did not escape criticism, 
most notably from Brussels. The catalyst was the emergence of three French government 
circulars leaked by Le Canard Social on 9 September 2010.250 Among these circulars was 
one dated 5 July 2010, which stated ‘Trois cents campements ou implantations illicites 
devront avoir été évacués d’ici trois mois, en priorité ceux des Roms’ and ordered 
Prefects to engage in ‘une démarche systématique de démantèlement des camps illicites, 
en priorité ceux de Roms’.251 Signed by Interior Minister Hortefeux, the circular 
enshrined the discrimination of the Roma community in a public policy document. This 
institutionalisation of anti-Roma rhetoric raised alarm bells for both supporters of 
France’s colour-blind universalist republican tradition and human rights activists, 
advocating for the protection of marginalised minorities in an Anglo-Saxon 
multiculturalist sense. It also triggered an emergency vote in the European Parliament, 
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which adopted a resolution to urge France to suspend all collective expulsions of Roma 
immediately.252  
 
In an effort to appease Brussels and deflect further criticism, Interior Minister Hortefeux 
issued a new circular on 13 September 2010, which redacted the term ‘Roms’. The aim 
was to avoid ‘tout malentendu sur une éventuelle stigmatisation’.253 Although the policy 
measures remained consistent, the removal of the term ‘Roms’ signalled a shift in the 
Sarkozy government’s existing hard-line discursive strategy towards one of universalism. 
No longer was it acceptable to explicitly name the Roma in policy documents and other 
political discourse as a justification for restoring ‘l’ordre public’. Wary of the 
implications of the hard-line approach, Immigration Minister Eric Besson denied 
knowledge of the 5 August 2010 circular in a television interview with France 2.254 Yet, a 
leaked email revealed that Besson’s deputy chief of staff, Lucien Giudicelli, had helped 
review the circular in a meeting at Place Beauvau on 4 August, suggesting that the 
Immigration Minister was more involved that he had claimed.255 Variations of the phrase 
‘il n'est pas question de stigmatiser une communauté dans son ensemble’ emerged as the 
new party line with the noticeable omission of any reference to ‘Roms’.256 Sarkozy 
government officials switched their discursive strategy to deploying the republican idea 
of universalism in an effort to mask policies targeting the Roma. Ironically, pressures 
from outside rather than inside France induced this renewed reliance on universalism in 
French political discourse.  
 
Yet despite the Sarkozy government’s attempts to remove ethnic references from public 
policy, the roots of discrimination remained. On 14 September, a public argument erupted 
between Vivien Reding, European Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and 
Citizenship, and French President Sarkozy during the European Summit in Brussels. 
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Commissioner Reding called the developments in France regarding the Roma a disgrace 
and said ‘I personally have been appalled by a situation which gave the impression that 
people are being removed from a Member State of the European Union just because they 
belong to a certain ethnic minority. This is a situation I had thought Europe would not 
have to witness again after the Second World War’.257 Commissioner Reding’s comments 
only focused on the deportation of migrant ‘Roms’ from France. She did not address the 
systematic evacuations of so-called ‘campements des Roms’ inside France. This 
distinction is important because it provides insight into the limits of the Commission’s 
influence on French policy. Deportation relates to the rights of EU citizens to move freely 
within the Schengen zone, inscribed in the 2004/38/EC Directive. Evacuation is a matter 
of French property law, over which European institutions have little control. Both policies 
singled out ‘Roms’ as a priority, which raises questions of ethnic discrimination under the 
2000/34/EC Racial Equality Directive.258 Nevertheless, despite this common feature, the 
issue of collective evacuations was understated in Reding’s remarks and absent from the 
Commission’s subsequent line of attack.259 
 
Instead of conceding the problems of ethnic profiling, President Sarkozy and members of 
his government condemned Commissioner Reding for likening policies regarding the 
Roma in France to the treatment of Jews during the Second World War as ‘pas 
acceptable’260, a ‘dérapage’261, and ‘le type d’anachronisme ou d’absurdité que je veux 
dénoncer’.262 Commissioner Reding subsequently apologised privately for the analogy 
and told AFP news agency ‘I regret the interpretations that were made, and which detract 
from the problem at hand. In no way did I wish to establish a parallel between the Second 
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World War and the actions of today’s French government’.263 Although Reding softened 
her initial remarks on the French state’s ethnic stigmatisation of the Roma, she did task 
her directorate with analysis the legality of the French state’s policies. Reding announced 
that the Commission would carefully analyse the legality of the French policy within the 
next two weeks and take appropriate measures.264 I would argue that Reding’s initial 
remarks can be characterised as a defence of multiculturalist ideas. By drawing a parallel 
between the Holocaust – an ethnic and religious genocide – and the French state’s 
treatment of the Roma, Reding was essentially advocating the protection of an ethnic 
minority. This stood in stark comparison to the French state’s commitment to universalist 
interpretation, that did not recognise ethnic categories. Yet, I would clarify that Reding’s 
instruction to her directorate focused on the legal rights of EU citizens, rather than the 
protection of a particular European ethnic minority. This suggested that Reding drew 
upon ideas of legality to communicate her instruction to her directorate.  
 
Just in time to meet the European Commission’s schedule, on 29 September 2010 the 
European College of Commissioners informed the French government it had two weeks 
to present a legislative proposal for transposing the 2004/38/EC Directive into French law 
or it would face infringement proceedings.265 An hour before the deadline on 15 October 
the French government submitted the plan and timeline of implementation to the 
European Commission. On 19 October 2010 Commissioner Reding made a statement 
saying that ‘France has responded positively, constructively and in time to the 
Commission’s request’ and that the Commission ‘will now, for the time being, not pursue 
the infringement procedure against France’.266 This statement reflected ideas of legality 
because it focused on the protection of EU citizens’ rights when residing in France. 
Reding also announced the creation of an EU Roma Taskforce and noted that the 
Commission will present an EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up 
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to 2020 in April 2011.267 This framework focused solely on the Roma reflected the 
multiculturalist idea that ethnic groups deserve to be recognised and protected, rather than 
concealed under the cloak of universalism.  
 
Commissioner Reding’s announcement signalled a softening of relations between the 
Sarkozy government and the European Commission but it did not address the issue of 
collective evacuations. Although the Commission’s focus on the expulsion of Roma 
reaffirmed the rights of EU citizens to migrate freely, only a handful of camp inhabitants 
faced deportation from France compared to the large number of residents affected by the 
large-scale evacuation of slums. Furthermore, despite the removal of the term ‘Roms’ 
from official discourses, the French government did not change their policies, continuing 
systemic discrimination without naming the targeted community. Instead, the collision 
between France and the Commission operated as a warning to other member states who 
had not transposed the EU free movement directive into national law and an opportunity 
for the policymakers in the Commission to create an EU Framework for National Roma 
Integration Strategies. Thus, Commissioner Reding’s intervention altered the Sarkozy 
government’s discursive strategy by forcing them to remove references to the Roma from 
their policies. Nonetheless, a tacit targeting of the Roma persisted among French officials.  
 
Contributing to the Sarkozy government’s systemic discrimination of the Roma living in 
French slums was absence of national welfare policies aimed at improving the socio-
economic situation of slum-dwellers in France. Villages d’insertion had existed since the 
early 2000s but they were locally driven initiatives rather than part of a national policy to 
assist migrants. Instead, the Sarkozy government introduced a policy offering incentives 
for migrants to return or remain in their countries of origin. The first example was the 
‘aide au retour’ policy, offering Romanian migrants in France a sum of €300 per adult 
and €100 per child and a free flight to Bucharest to voluntarily leave France. Even the 
words ‘aide au retour’ were a strategic choice to incentivise leaving France; the subtext of 
the French state’s policy was that migrants living in slums were not welcome to stay and 
these slum dwellers were tacitly, and stereotypically, assumed to be Roma. This echoed 
Valery Giscard d’Estaing’s Aide au Retour policy from 1977 to 1981, intended to 
encourage Algerian, Portuguese and Spanish migrants to return to their countries of 
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origin.268 Regulating the return of migrants proved difficult due to France’s multiple 
points of entry and the low cost of coach travel to return to France, rendering the policy 
costly and futile.269 Yet, despite its perverse effects, the policy aimed to encourage 
migrants to establish their lives elsewhere instead of settling in France. The Hollande 
government eventually neutered the ‘aide au retour’ policy by reducing the sum to €50, 
keeping the policy in a reduced form. The second example of incentivising Roma to leave 
was the deepening of bilateral relations between French ministers and their Romanian and 
Bulgarian counterparts, leading to the provision of French aid to these two countries.270 
The rationale was that by confronting the socio-economic challenges in Romania and 
Bulgaria, the Sarkozy government could prevent the departure of dissatisfied citizens and 
address the problem at the source. Notably, these two examples targeted national not 
ethnic communities, reflecting the Sarkozy government’s new commitment to 
universalism in their policies and political rhetoric. Officials strategically deployed 
universalist language to encourage slum dwellers they perceived as Roma to leave 
France. 
 
Officials in the Sarkozy administration scarcely referred to the Roma in political debate 
for the remainder of their president’s tenure. This shift away from ethnic references to a 
universalist discourse was a strategy French officials employed to reduce pressure from 
the European Commission and other members of the EU political community. On 7 April 
2011 the Conseil d’Etat formally banned the controversial 5 August 2010 circular 
because it was ‘une politique d’évacuation des campements illicites désignant 
spécialement certains de leurs occupants en raison de leur origine ethnique’.271 The 
judgement represented a restoration of universalism as not only a discursive justification 
but also a framework for communicating policies on evacuating migrant camps. This 
coincided with the launch of the EU Framework for National Roma Integration 
Strategies, which outlined guidelines for member states to implement a comprehensive 
programme of Roma inclusion. The explicitly ethnic approach of the EU Framework was 
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based on the multiculturalist idea that ethnic communities should be recognised and 
protected by the state. This presented various obstacles for France, which will be 
discussed in detail in the third section of this chapter. However, it is important to note that 
the challenge of reconciling the French state’s universalist rhetoric with the 
Commission’s insistance on protecting ethnic communities was the task of civil servants 
rather than the subject of political debate. As the 2012 French presidential election drew 
near, the Sarkozy government’s focus drifted away from the Roma. In contrast to his 
discours de Grenoble, President Sarkozy made no direct mention of ‘Roms’ in his 
election campaign. When asked whether he would deliver the same discours if he had the 
chance to do it again, Sarkozy said ‘oui, mais sans parler d'une communauté en 
particulier’.272 His response suggested that betraying France’s universal principles had 
come at too high a price, even in exchange for the far-right voters it may have attracted.  
 
Using Universalism to Deny French Roma Policy 
 
On 6 May 2012, Sarkozy lost the presidential election to Socialist candidate François 
Hollande. The new government adopted a different discursive strategy: to employ 
universalism proactively to communicate and justify their policies rather than as a 
reluctant retort. During his campaign, Hollande emphasised the humanitarian aspect of 
evacuating illegal camps ‘quand il y a un risque pour la population, pour les enfants’.273 
Noticeably, he made no reference to ‘Roms’. This was a rare intervention from Hollande 
who scarcely commented on the issue of France’s illegal camps while in office. Instead, 
he gave new Interior Minister Manuel Valls the task of managing the de-ethnicised 
policy, which had caused an international political crisis not so long ago. Valls took a 
firm stance on camp evacuations, which coupled with his hard-line style and political 
leaning towards the right, earned him the pseudonym ‘le Sarkozy de Gauche’. Yet, unlike 
the former President, Valls spoke of a policy of ‘campements illicites’ and ‘la 
problématique des Roms’ separately. 274 By avoiding the amalgamation ‘campements des 
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Roms’, Valls framed the evacuation of camps as a universalist policy responding to a 
legal rather than ethnic question. Although Valls mentioned ‘Roms’ explicitly in his 
phrase ‘la problématique des Roms’, he was speaking to the French Senate, a group of 
political insiders, rather than publicly addressing the French population as Sarkozy had 
done in Grenoble. In this instance, Valls was careful to prioritise universalism over race-
based ideas in public addresses and keep references to the Roma behind closed doors.  
 
The Hollande government’s strategic deployment of universalism crystallised into a 
denial of ‘Roma’ policy. Evidence of this emerged throughout my research interviews. 
One Minister’s chief of staff claimed ‘il n’y a pas une politique à l’égard des Roms. Il y a 
une politique d’application de la loi et la nécessité de faire des évacuations des 
campements illicites.’275 Another national political adviser argued ‘on n’a pas de 
politique à l’égard des Roms au Ministère de l’Intérieur. Cette population, vue de ma 
fenêtre, est analysée dans la plupart des cas comme des citoyens Européens.’276 By 
denying French Roma policy, the Hollande government could defend its policies from 
accusations of deliberate stigmatisation.  The logic was clear: if the government refused 
to recognise ethnic or religious difference, how could its policies target Roma? However, 
the consequences of policies can be markedly different from their intentions, and as 
section three of this chapter reveals, many officials still tacitly considered illegal camps 
as ‘campements Roms’. Nevertheless, the discursive shift presented the link between 
universalism and ‘campements illicites’ as a fait accompli. As a political adviser noted 
‘en ce qui concerne les campements illicites, on n’est pas du tout dans l’idée que le 
modèle multiculturaliste, comme on dit, dans lequel on reconnait des communautés, est 
un modèle fait pour la France’.277 This exemplified the official’s prioritisation of the 
republican idea of universalism over multiculturalism. By employing this discursive 
strategy, the official framed multiculturalism as a threat to universalism and conversely 
imbued universalism with normative authority, suggesting that republicanism was the 
public philosophy of choice. 
 
What did this new discourse on universalism achieve? First, it allowed the Hollande 
government to move away from the reputation and controversies of its predecessors. One 
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civil servant tried to absolve the Sarkozy government’s ethnic policies by claiming that 
‘le système politique français, depuis la Révolution, ne reconnaît pas la notion de 
communauté’,278 a comment which revealed more about the strength of a rather ossified 
republican tradition than the reality of France’s modern history. Yet, politicians and their 
staffers insisted that the Hollande government’s approach was in fact a break with that of 
his predecessor. An adviser to President Hollande exclaimed that ‘pendant une petite 
période, sous Nicolas Sarkozy, il y avait une politique à l’égard des Roms’.279 Another 
political adviser described the events in 2010 as ‘la première fois depuis Vichy qu’on 
cible un groupe ethnique’, arguing that ‘cette formulation ne fait pas partie des valeurs 
qui sont promues par ce gouvernement’.280 It is not unusual for a new Socialist 
government to seek to differentiate itself from its conservative predecessor in their 
discourses. However, this case marked the first time in French politics that the Roma 
question was used to this effect.  
 
Second, deploying the idea of universalism helped to depoliticise a policy that was 
previously politically toxic. By removing ethnic references in political rhetoric, the 
Hollande government framed the Sarkozy government’s approach as a populist departure 
from France’s republican tradition and could consequently address any challenges 
relating to the evacuation of illegal camps through the policymaking process. Stressing 
the value of discourse, a senior political adviser told me that ‘le caractère républicain 
commence avec les mots. Sarkozy a ciblé les Roms en écrit et en discours. On est sorti 
d’une politique Rom. Maintenant c’est une politique de campements illicites. Les mots ne 
sont pas les mêmes, l’instrumentalisation n’arrive plus. Les mots qui sont utilisés dans les 
discours publics, les interviews, le débat politique ont changé’.281 This comment 
suggested that refining the government’s rhetoric towards a universalist discourse was as 
politically important as managing its substantive policies. Perversely, by employing a 
universalist discourse to communicate the evacuation of illegal camps, the Hollande 
government displaced more migrants from illegal camps while suffering less criticism 
than its predecessor. Removing references to the Roma from public discourse did not stop 
the state-led discrimination of the Roma as officials continued to tacitly consider illegal 
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camp residents as Roma. Universalism concealed rather than reduced the systemic 
discrimination of the Roma.  
 
Third, the Hollande government’s use of universalism recast the policy of evacuating 
illegal camps as a humanitarian rather than security issue. From the Hollande 
government’s position, this had the dual advantage of appealing to its Socialist base in 
France while satisfying requirements set by the Commission in Brussels. While 
discussing the evacuation of illegal camps, the new socialist Prime Minister Jean-Marc 
Ayrault said ‘c’est une question d’humanité et de respect des principes fondateurs de la 
République qui appellent à traiter de façon égale et digne toute personne en situation de 
difficulté sociale’.282  The humanitarian rhetoric soon materialised into the new 
government circular of 26 August 2012, which introduced the notions of anticipation and 
accompagnement into the policy on illegal camps.283 By presenting these new measures 
as universalist, the Hollande government could deflect potential criticism from French 
citizens concerned that the state was prioritising the problems of foreign Europeans over 
their own.284 ‘Plus on dit rom, plus ça crée cette possible concurrence des misères’ 
exclaimed one official.285 From this perspective, providing the Roma with targeted 
assistance was not only anti-republican but also counterproductive.  
 
Fourth, the Hollande government’s mobilisation of universalism aligned with Article 1 of 
the French Constitution, lending further credibility to the legal argument behind the 
evacuation of illegal camps. One official argued, ‘il s'agit d'une violation pure et simple 
d'un droit constitutionnel, le droit de propriété. Je vous le dis, je n'accepte pas et 
n'accepterai jamais que dans notre pays, les lois de la République soient bafouées’.286 
Furthermore, by refusing to recognise ethnic or religious difference in their discourses, 
the Hollande government characterised evacuations as a process whereby each camp 
resident was treated individually before the law as a European citizen. However, 
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categorising residents of illegal camps as individual citizens did not protect them from 
structural racism. According to a French Senator, ‘l’approche retenue en droit français, 
qui ne permet pas, par souci d’égalité républicaine, de fonder des politiques pour des 
groupes particuliers définis par leurs origines ethniques ou religieuses, paraît la plus 
appropriée. En effet, cette approche n’empêche pas pour autant de lutter contre les 
discriminations : elle replace seulement l’individu et non le groupe au cœur de la 
réflexion et autorise, de ce fait, la mise en place de politiques de rattrapage fondées sur 
des critères socioéconomiques objectifs’.287 Thus rather than eradicating Roma 
discrimination, the Hollande government’s deployment of universalism effectively 
individualised discriminatory policies.  
 
Despite the Hollande government’s effort to deliver a strictly universalist public 
discourse, one exception deserves attention. On 24 September 2013, Interior Minister 
Manuel Valls gave a public interview on the radio station France Inter in which he stated 
‘ces populations ont des modes de vie extrêmement différents des nôtres et qui sont 
évidemment en confrontation…les Roms ont vocation à revenir en Roumanie ou en 
Bulgarie’.288 This statement generated an intense media backlash as well as a lawsuit 
from La Voix des Rroms, both of which came to a head in December 2016 in the midst of 
Valls’ presidential election campaign.289 The Minister’s comments exposed the continued 
existence of the link between ‘campements illicites’ and ‘Roms’. To rationalise this racial 
link, officials offered different clarifications on what Valls meant to say. One political 
adviser said the correct formulation would have been ‘ceux qui ne veulent pas s’intégrer 
doivent retourner en Roumanie ou en Bulgarie’290. Another said that Valls inferred the 
French state did not have the capacity to accommodate all residents even if it wanted 
to.291 Nevertheless, both officials saw the comments as a mistake with grave reputational 
costs, suggesting a strong public reaction. The former lamented that Valls ‘est sorti de ses 
éléments de langage’.292 The latter described how the incident earned Valls the unofficial 
title ‘Ministère des Roms’.293  
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Adding to this controversy, two weeks later on 9 October 2013 a fifteen-year-old Roma 
migrant, Leonarda Dibrani, was arrested during a school excursion and deported with her 
family to Kosovo. Although Leonarda was illegally residing in France and not a citizen of 
the EU, she had lived in France most of her life and spoke fluent French. The case 
generated strong reactions from the French public as thousands of high school students 
took to the streets to demand Leonarda’s return to France. The Hollande government 
responded by announcing that Leonarda would be allowed to return to France to continue 
her education, but the rest of her family would have to stay in Kosovo. The response was 
criticised by the Left for its heartlessness, by the Right for evading the law, and by all for 
splitting up the family. The Roma question once again became a divisive political topic, 
but this time it did not lead to an international rift. Reflecting on these events, one official 
conceded ‘nous avons tout essayé de notre part de ne pas viser une population mais nous 
y sommes pas toujours parvenus. En tout cas, la stigmatisation des Roms n’a jamais été 
une stratégie consciente du gouvernement’.294 Therefore, in spite of concerted effort, the 
Hollande government’s attempt to maintain a universalist public discourse was not 
always easy to realise.  
 
A Universalist Policy? 
 
This section turns to examine whether the Hollande government’s use of universalism in 
public discourse translated into the language of public policy documents and the language 
employed by officials implementing policies. First, it focuses on the alignment of policy 
documents with political rhetoric, arguing that the Hollande government’s universalist 
discourse masked internal tensions between ‘humanisme’ and ‘fermeté’. Despite the 
Hollande government’s efforts to maintain coherent discursive strategy, its key policy 
documents, notably the ministerial circular of 26 August 2012, represented a compromise 
between hard-line and humanitarian positions on the evacuation illegal camps. Second, 
this section examines whether officials on the ground used universalist ideas to 
communicate and justify the implementation of policies. In doing so, it maintains that 
while the 26 August 2012 circular did not explicitly reference the Roma, officials 
																																																								
294 Interview with Political Adviser, Cabinet du Ministre de l’Intérieur, Paris (3 December 2014). 
	 101 
implementing the ‘préparation’ and ‘accompagnement’ measures did not always employ 
universalist ideas when discussing these measures. 
 
Aligning Policy and Political Rhetoric 
 
Once in office, the Hollande government began to reform policy. Yet, the question of 
illegal camps divided his cabinet over what approach to take. The tension between 
‘fermeté’ and ‘humanisme’ underpinned this cleavage. Interior Minister Valls represented 
the hard-line approach, emphasising the illegality of camps to justify continued 
evacuations. In an interview with Europe 1 radio on 31 July 2012, Valls said ‘les préfets 
ont pour mission de démanteler les camps de Roms quand il y a eu une décision de 
justice. Les choses sont simples. Oui, quand il y a une décision de justice, il y aura un 
démantèlement de ces campements…chaque fois qu’il y a une décision de justice, chaque 
fois que les propriétaires de ces terrains, qui sont souvent des collectivités territoriales, en 
font la demande, il y aura ces démantèlements. C’est une politique à la fois ferme et 
respectueuse du droit’.295 In an effort to soften his position, on 13 August 2012 Valls 
published an article in the French newspaper Liberation, under the title ‘Campements 
illicites: le laisser-faire ne résout rien’.296 In the article, Valls insisted that ‘aucune 
politique publique ne sera focalisée sur tel ou tel groupe culturel’ but his unambiguously 
ethnic reference on national radio undermined this claim.    
 
In contrast, Housing Minister Cécile Duflot led the humanitarian approach. Duflot’s 
criticism of Valls erupted into a public argument. On 16 August 2012, Duflot issued a 
public retort to Valls in her own Liberation article in which she denounced the 
stigmatisation of ‘Roms’, advocated for a long-term solution to ‘bidonvilles’, and 
highlighted President Hollande’s election promise of ‘pas de démantèlement sans 
solutions alternatives’.297 She also argued that ‘expulser, dans une absurde et coûteuse 
logique d'objectifs chiffrés – comme l'a fait le précédent gouvernement –, est non 
																																																								
295 ‘Valls: les démantèlements vont continuer’, AFP (31 July 2012): http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-
actu/2012/07/31/97001-20120731FILWWW00286-valls-les-demantelements-vont-continuer.php (accessed 
20 August 2017).  
296 Manuel Valls, Ministre de l’intérieur, ‘Campements illicites: le laisser-faire ne résout rien’, Libération 
(13 August 2012): http://www.liberation.fr/societe/2012/08/13/campements-illicites-le-laisser-faire-ne-
resout-rien_839576 (accessed 20 August 2017).  
297 Cécile Duflot, Ministre de l’Egalité des territoires et du logement, ‘Roms: une politique durable reste à 
construire’, Libération (16 August 2012): http://www.liberation.fr/societe/2012/08/16/roms-une-politique-
durable-reste-a-construire_840136 (accessed 20 August 2017).  
	 102 
seulement honteux, c'est aussi inefficace. On ne résout pas le problème, on le déplace. On 
crée des errants, on jette des familles dans les rues, sur les routes, on interrompt le travail 
social.’298 Duflot used the term ‘bidonvilles’ rather than ‘campements illicites’ to stress 
the poverty and squalor camp inhabitants endured. This served as a reminder to the 
‘bidonvilles’ of the 1950s and 60s, which mainly comprised of North African migrant 
workers helping to rebuild postwar France, and Portuguese and Spanish migrants fleeing 
from authoritarian regimes. The implication was that just as social housing had replaced 
the postwar bidonvilles, the same approach could be used in contemporary politics. In line 
with this view, a senior official exclaimed that ‘le volet sécuritaire étant très puissant, il 
masque les avancés qui ont pu être faites depuis 2012 qui n’auraient pas été possibles 
sous Sarkozy’.299 The dispute between hard-line and humanitarian positions within the 
government had reached a public stalemate.  
 
To resolve this public standoff, Prime Minister Ayrault called a ministerial meeting on 22 
August 2012. Both Valls and Duflot were valuable to the Hollande government in 
different ways. At the time, Valls was fast becoming the most popular member of 
government while Duflot’s allegiance to the Greens made her a key component of the 
Socialist coalition. The Prime Minister needed to strike a compromise to ensure the 
government’s in-fighting did not evolve into a political crisis. During the meeting, the 
cabinet drafted a bleue, a minute produced following a cabinet meeting, for a holistic 
policy. This was swiftly finalised and released four days later on 26 August 2012 in the 
form of a government circular.300 In the meantime, Prime Minister Ayrault announced 
two measures to help counter discrimination against Romanians and Bulgarians seeking 
employment in France. The first was the expansion of the list of jobs available to 
Romanian and Bulgarian migrants before the end of the transition period for these new 
EU member states. The second was the removal of taxes for French employers wishing to 
hire Romanian and Bulgarian nationals. These new measures demonstrated a shift from 
the previous government’s discursive strategy: the Hollande government accepted 
Romanian and Bulgarian migrants not just as temporary visitors but as long-term 
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residents. The focus on nationality rather than ethnic categories also corresponded with 
the universalist rhetoric of the Hollande government’s discursive strategy.  
 
The circular issued on 26 August 2012 presented a national government policy on 
‘l’anticipation et l’accompagnement des opérations d’évacuation des campements 
illicites’. It was signed by seven government Ministers, including Interior Minister Valls 
and Housing Minister Duflot. However, sceptics within the government and outside 
viewed the document as an administrative reconciliation of the hard-line and 
humanitarian positions settled in the cabinet room.301 As one official privately divulged, 
‘il y a une politique gouvernementale globale, mais on voit bien que le Ministère de 
l’Intérieur parle plutôt de campements illicites – donc c’est plutôt l’approche juridique – 
alors que Duflot et le Ministère du Logement parlent de bidonvilles – c’est plutôt 
l’approche du logement. Alors la politique est la même mais l’un implique plus une 
réponse juridique d’évacuation et l’autre plus une approche qui n’est pas du tout la 
même’.302 A political adviser to the Minister of Housing confirmed this division, stating 
‘chez nous, il n’y a pas de campements illicites, il n’y a que des bidonvilles’.303  
 
Despite internal differences, the Hollande government presented the circular as a 
watershed reform, distinguishing it from the explicitly ethnic policies of the previous 
administration. This was evident in the overtly universalist disclaimer at the beginning of 
the document: 
 
Il convient également, au regard de ces principes, d’assurer un traitement égal et digne de 
toute personne en situation de détresse sociale. Il vous incombe donc, en initiant le travail 
le plus en amont de la décision de justice qu’il est possible, de proposer des solutions 
d’accompagnement en mobilisant prioritairement les moyens de droit commun de chacun 
des partenaires. Cela suppose, dans une logique d’anticipation et d’individualisation, 
l’établissement, chaque fois que possible, d’un diagnostic et la recherche de solutions 
d’accompagnement, dans les différents domaines concourant à l’insertion des personnes 
(scolarisation, santé, emploi, logement/mise à l’abri...).304  
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The discursive emphasis on the treatment of individuals stood in stark contrast to the 5 
August 2010 circular, which collectively targeted ‘Roms’. It also formally introduced the 
ideas of ‘anticipation’ and ‘accompagnement’, another nod to the Hollande government’s 
recognition of EU migrants residing in illegal camps as long-term residents. In line with 
these ideas, the circular contained four new instructions.305 First, to ‘mobiliser les services 
de l’Etat et les acteurs locaux concernés’. Second, to ‘établir un diagnostic’ of the 
families or individuals living in illegal camps. Third, to ‘mettre en place un 
accompagnement’ covering the areas of ‘scolarisation’, ‘santé’, ‘hébergement’ and 
‘insertion professionnelle’. And fourth, to ‘mobiliser les moyens disponibles’ from the 
government’s housing, immigration, employment, education, health and social service 
budgets as well as from the EU, notably the FEDER and FSE funds.  
 
At first glance, the Hollande government’s 26 August 2012 circular appeared to outline a 
new policy on illegal camps that was markedly different from its predecessor. But a 
closer reading of the language in the document reveals that, although the circular 
introduced measures on what to do before and after an evacuation, the evacuation 
procedure itself remained unchanged. In fact, the document contained no directions on 
exactly how, when, under what circumstances, and by whom evacuations should be 
carried out. The only indication to evacuations was a statement at the beginning of the 
document, which highlights the responsibility of Prefects:  
 
En premier lieu le respect des décisions de justice ne saurait être mis en question. Il 
revient au préfet d’exécuter celles-ci, lorsqu’il est ordonné par le juge qu’il soit mis fin, 
au besoin avec le concours de la force publique, aux occupations illicites de terrains. 
Lorsque la sécurité des personnes est mise en cause, cette action doit être immédiate. 
Dans les deux situations, au-delà de la responsabilité de l’État, il en va des fondements 
même du contrat social dans notre nation.306  
 
The message conveyed in this statement was that although it is up to a judge to order an 
evacuation, the remainder of decisions relating to the timing and style of evacuations 
were subject to the discretion of the Prefect. The ‘exécution’ of evacuations was open to 
various interpretations. This allowed Prefects to capitalise on the ambiguity of the 
language, placing them in a position of power. For example, a Prefect could decide to 
hold off on evacuating a camp to avoid disruption or to act quickly if there was a risk of 
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danger. They could also choose to dismantle a camp in segments or destroy it in one 
exercise. Institutionalising the role of the Prefect in a public policy document represented 
a shift in emphasis rather than procedure. Yet, the circular did make one important 
administrative change: it placed the national coordination of policies relating to the 
evacuation of illegal camps in the hands of the Dihal under the direction of haut 
fonctionnaire, Alain Régnier. Although created in 2010 in affiliation with the Ministry of 
Housing, Dihal morphed into an ‘interministériel’ body comprising civil servants from 
diverse backgrounds, which reported directly to the Prime Minister.  
 
The advantages of this administrative change were two-fold. First it allowed the Hollande 
government to centralise the management of policies relating to ‘campements illicites’, 
minimising tensions between the hard-line and humanitarian positions inside the party, 
preventing potential disputes between ministries. Second, it framed challenges associated 
with illegal camps as a housing dilemma, classing Roma residents in the same 
universalist way as any other population living in precarious housing. As one official 
explained to me: ‘comme le gouvernement français ne voulait pas rentrer dans ce passage 
communautaire mais en même temps voulait faire quelque chose tout en conformité avec 
la tradition française, on a considéré que la question des bidonvilles. Donc 
essentiellement des Roms qui vivent dans les bidonvilles est une question de mal-
logement et donc il était plus naturel de confier à la Dihal de traiter également, de la 
même façon que n’importe quel autre dossier mais ces bidonvilles et les populations qui 
vivent dans les bidonvilles’.307 This comment demonstrated how an official used 
universalism to justify policies through the argument that the Roma were treated no 
differently from any other population. Therefore, in spite of internal divisions, the 
Hollande government’s policy on illegal camps appeared to align with its universalist 
discursive strategy. ‘Dans la circulaire, vous avez vu que nulle part, nulle part, le mot 
“Rom” n’apparaît’ insisted an official.308 
 
On 31 January 2014, following the controversy of the ‘Leonarda affair’ and Valls’ claim 
that ‘les Roms ont vocation à revenir en Roumanie ou en Bulgarie’309 on national radio, 
Housing Minister Duflot announced the launch of a national mission to ‘résorber les 
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bidonvilles’.310 The mission was established in partnership with Adoma, a social housing 
contractor formerly called Sonacotra. The history of Adoma was significant because its 
predecessor was created in 1956 to help provide social housing solutions to Algerian 
guest workers living in France’s postwar ‘bidonvilles’. The Minister’s choice of the word 
‘bidonvilles’ rather than ‘campements illicites’ suggested that the Hollande government 
was trying to move away from the tainted security stance of the Interior Minister towards 
a more humanitarian approach.  
 
Adoma became the key government contractor, undertaking the ‘diagnostics sociaux’ 
before evacuations and providing ‘accompagnement’ for residents in ‘bidonvilles’ in the 
regions of Ile-de-France, Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur et Loire-
Atlantique. Other organisations, such as Forum Refugiés also competed for tenders. Yet, 
the privatisation of social services, especially the assessment of whether residents were 
deemed suitable for the highly selective ‘projets d’insertion’, raised both ethical and 
intellectual questions addressed in chapter five of this thesis. These questions aside, the 
national mission to ‘résorber les bidonvilles’ represented a reinforcement of the Hollande 
government’s universalist discursive strategy from which Valls had deviated. The 
Hollande government did not propose a procedure of evacuation markedly different from 
its predecessor, but the key policy documents it produced displayed no explicit ethnic or 
collective stigmatisation. The Hollande government’s strategic deployment of 
universalism masked the same discriminatory policies as those employed by the Sarkozy 
government without mentioning the ethnic community on which the policies were built.  
 
Detaching Universalist Discourse from Policy Implementation 
 
Despite the language of official policy documents, the language officials used to describe 
the implementation of ‘anticipation’ and ‘accompagnement’ measures appeared less 
universalist.  One civil servant remarked ‘il ne faut pas confondre les postures, les 
déclarations verbales et écrites des uns et des autres, avec la réalité du travail’.311 The 
inference was that official political discourse, that is political speeches and policy 
documents,  was a guide not a prescription. Although it offered direction, documents such 
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as the 26 August 2012 circular did not capture the many variables impacting the work of 
civil servants applying policy measures on the ground. Another official claimed that ‘la 
politique souvent menée localement par nos Préfets sur le terrain est de combattre ces 
campements de Roms. Ces campements sont combattus non pas parce qu’ils sont Roms. 
S’ils étaient belges ce serait pareils’.312 This official had no problem referring to the 
Roma directly but argued that the issue was illegal camps irrespective of the community 
residing in them. Although the official used universalist ideas to justify evacuations, his 
use of the term ‘Roms’ betrayed this universalist idea, revealing an entrenched stereotype 
that illegal camps were inhabited by Roma. This official tried to defend the 
implementation of government policies as universalist, but by linking ‘campements 
illicites’ and ‘Roms’ he unconsciously fell victim to the discriminatory approach he 
sought to oppose.  
 
A similar situation emerged in a Dihal report on the ‘Application de la circulaire 
interministérielle du 26 août 2012’. 313 Published in March 2014, this report reviewed the 
experience of local officials implementing ‘anticipation’ measures specified in the 
national government circular. The aim was to equip Prefects and officials with a manual 
and set of best practices on which to base the management and delivery of ‘diagnostics’ 
before evacuations. The report stated ‘le terme “[R]oms” renvoie à une notion inopérante 
en droit français. Mais dans la mesure où l’Union Européenne interroge régulièrement les 
Etats membres, dont la France, sur les mesures qu’ils prennent pour soutenir l’intégration 
des Roms, le choix est fait dans ce document d’utiliser ce terme pour désigner les 
personnes se revendiquant de cette communauté.’314 Although the Dihal report noted that 
ethnic categories do not exist in French law, it did not take issue with using the term 
‘Roms’ in a public policy document. In doing so, its observations on the ‘Roms’ 
community were more closely aligned with the multiculturalist public philosophy, based 
on the recognition and protection of ethnic communities than the republican idea of 
universalism, which axiomatically rejects to recognise ethnic categories. This report 
highlighted a double standard between high-level texts setting the national direction of 
government policy, such as the 26 August 2012 circular, and technical documents 
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intended for local experts implementing measures on the ground. A commitment to 
universalist ideas in appeared to be a priority for only the pinnacle of France’s expansive 
public policy machine. Given the technical nature of the report, it is unsurprising that the 
mention of ‘Roms’ did not attract public criticism. However, the direct recognition and 
assessment of an ethnic community in an official policy document, regardless of its 
intended audience, undermined the Hollande government’s denial of a policy ‘à l’égard 
des Roms’.  
 
An interview with a regional government official revealed a similar gap between the 
language of policy formulation and policy implementation. Reflecting on their 
experience, the official said that conducting ‘diagnostics sociaux’ enabled authorities to 
identify ‘des camps “Rom”’ because ‘les personnes parlent la langue romani’.315 This 
admission of categorising camps on the basis of ethnicity suggested that the 
implementation of ‘anticipation’ measures were not as individualised as the 26 August 
2012 circular described. That is not to say that each assessment of ‘campements illicites’ 
employed the same logic. In Ile de France, the organisation Groupement d’intérêt public 
(GIP) conducted a ‘diagnostic social’ of a camp in Corbeil-Essonnes which made no 
reference to the ethnicity of camp residents.316 This demonstrated that different actors 
used universalist ideas to different degrees, and the way in which an official or contractor 
on the ground used universalism different from the way in which a national civil servant 
or politician used it. The term was the same but its interpretation varied.  
 
The application of the accompagnement measures also exposed a gap between a 
universalist discourse of the Hollande government and the selection of camp residents for 
state support based on ethnicity. Yet, these measures were not always discriminatory in a 
pejorative sense; sometimes they were based on the multiculturalist concept of positive 
discrimination. A national government official stressed that ‘en France, le concept de 
discrimination positive ethnique est une chose très dangereuse pour notre démocratie 
française et notre république’.317 In contrast, a regional government official remarked, 
‘c’est à la fois contraire, entre guillements, au principe républicain sur un plan formel et 
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en même temps une logique de discrimination positive en pratique’.318 The regional 
official unpacked this disconnect between official policy and practice: 
 
La notion de discrimination positive, au démarrage, était vue avec une certaine suspicion. 
Aujourd’hui, je pense néanmoins que dans son quotidien, la politique fonctionne 
forcément sur une discrimination positive. Si on prend le cas de la politique de la ville, ça 
consiste à concentrer des moyens supplémentaires sur un territoire et des populations, et 
donc à avoir finalement un traitement inégal mais non inéquitable. C’est-à-dire qu’on 
donne plus parce que les populations concernées attendent plus.319  
 
The line between the republican idea of universalism and the multiculturalist idea of 
positive discrimination was less clear than the national official implied. This revealed a 
divergence between discourse on national policy formation and discourse on policy 
implementation at a local level.  
 
Similar to the anticipation measures, the state support scheme of accompagnement for 
camp inhabitants varied across regions, depending on their available resources and pre-
existing programmes. Some municipalities already had comprehensive social housing 
initiatives that offered residents health care, language training and employment 
assistance. These were often called ‘maîtrise d'œuvre urbaine et sociale’ (MOUS). 
Although MOUS were not necessarily used to accommodate displaced residents of illegal 
camps, some were mobilised exclusively for this purpose. This was the case in Nice and 
Bordeaux. As an official from Nice said, ‘c’est vrai que des fois on nous reprochait d’en 
faire plus pour les Roms que pour des gens qui vivaient –si je prends Nice- à l’Ariane ou 
aux Moulins, des gens qui étaient déjà défavorisés.’320 A local official from Bordeaux 
defended affirmative action, maintaining that ‘le fait que le mot multiculturalisme est lié 
au communautarisme est un grand problème’.321 At a local level, universalism hindered 
rather than helped the accompagnement of migrants in practice, and in some cases local 
officials disregarded universalist principles altogether.  
 
At a regional level, a programme called Andatu exemplified the complex relationship 
between the republican idea of universalism and the multiculturalist idea of positive 
discrimination. Andatu was a social housing initiative ‘experimentation’ led by the Préfet 
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du Rhône, which was designed specifically in response to ‘la problématique des 
campements illicites de la région lyonnaise’, containing ‘[e]nviron 1 500 personnes 
venant essentiellement de Roumanie et se revendiquant de la communauté Rom’.322 
Although Andatu was created in 2011, it was widely championed by members of the 
Hollande government and Dihal as a model of best practice for its emphasis on 
accelerated integration and mixité sociale. However, Andatu was not strictly universalist. 
Its first phase of integration called ‘stabilisation’, segregated participants in one discrete 
building until authorities considered that they were ready to progress to the next phase of 
integration, which placed individual families into mixed social housing projects led by 
Adoma. The idea of affirmative action was thus used as a means to achieve universalist 
ends.  
 
Related to this was the issue of scolarisation. On the one hand, the Junior Minister for 
Education George Pau-Langevin stressed that the French system was based on the idea of 
‘l’école pour tous’ and said ‘Il s'agit néanmoins d'une obligation pour notre 
gouvernement, qui assume en la matière une politique courageuse et volontariste, tendant 
notamment à assurer l'accès à l'École à des enfants en grande précarité’.323 Yet 
undermining this universalist declaration, regional and municipal authorities 
implementing the accompagnement measures outlined in the 26 August 2012 circular 
provided Roma children with tailored education programmes. This suggested that 
officials could frame universalism as a goal to justify positive discrimination policies. As 
the 2013 interministerial report evaluating accompagment measures stated ‘[c]ertaines 
situations locales ont parfois conduit à regrouper des élèves, même temporairement, dans 
des locaux “dédiés” à cette fin. Ceux-ci ne sont en aucune façon adaptés aux besoins de 
ces élèves ni conformes à ce qui est attendu de l’École de la République (Essonne, 
Rhône). Ces solutions qui portent en elles le risque de dérives vers des classes à caractère 
“ethnique” ne sont pas acceptables’.324 As the report singled out the ‘Rhône’ as an 
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example of this perverse approach to universalism, it is likely that the example in 
question was Andatu. Thus, although the Hollande government’s discursive strategy was 
proactively universalist and its key policy documents made no reference to ethnic 
categories, the implementation of the policy measures reflected a more pragmatic rather 
than strictly colour-blind reading of republicanism.  
 
The Limits of a Universalist Discourse 
 
In addition to the gap between political rhetoric and the discourse officials used on the 
ground, another factor undermined the Sarkozy and Hollande governments’ universalist 
claims: France’s obligations as a member of the European Union. The requirement to 
submit a national strategy on ‘Roma inclusion’ in January 2012 and provide regular 
progress reports of its implementation typified this tension. Although each EU member 
was subject to the same requirements, devising and applying a strategy that overtly 
provided preferential treatment to an ethnic community was especially problematic for 
France. The overtly ethnic approach of the EU Framework for National Roma Integration 
Strategies appeared diametrically opposed to France’s republican philosophy. As such, 
this section examines the ways in which the French government managed this challenge 
to explore the limits of French universalism within the context of the EU. First it 
investigates the extent to which French civil servants, charged with the design and 
maintenance of the national ‘Roma inclusion’ strategy, undermined universalist discourse 
to comply with EU guidelines. In doing so, it reveals that the French government’s 
defence of égalité rested upon a set of discriminatory assumptions about who their 
policies affected. Second, this section considers whether the EU requirements gave 
credence to an unofficial targeting of the Roma in France, arguing that the result was a 
fusion of de jure universalism and de facto discrimination in French political discourse.      
 
French Equality Versus European Equity  
 
French civil servants were faced with the conundrum of designing a strategy to promote 
‘Roma inclusion’ without targeting an ethnic community. Accepting this task was in itself 
at odds with universalist principles but in spite of this contradiction, the Roma inclusion 
strategy was not optional. As a French official put it, ‘le système français se heurte à un 
système que promeut la Commission Européene qui est une politique d’inclusion des 
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Roms. La France ne peut pas rentrer dans une politique d’inclusion des Roms puisqu’on 
ne peut pas conduire des politiques juridiquement fondées sur les critères d’appartenance 
à une communauté ethnique’.325 To resolve this issue, French civil servants, notably from 
Dihal and the French Secrétariat général des affaires européennes (SGAE), had to find a 
way to reconcile the republican notion of égalité with the European concept of equity. 
These officials did not accept that ‘la stratégie d’inclusion pour les Roms doit [les] 
amener à remettre en cause les valeurs républicaines qui ne reconnaissant ni race, ni 
religion’.326 Instead, they added the title ‘une place égale dans la société française’ to the 
top of the strategy paper to emphasise the government’s dedication to universalist 
principles.327 This was based on the logic that universalist ends justified non-universalist 
means.  
 
Additionally, the introduction to the strategy included a disclaimer raising two 
challenges: 
 
Deux problèmes se posent en particulier. Le premier est que [l’]assimilation [de diverses 
populations sous le terme “Roms”] peut venir contredire l’un des objectifs des politiques 
d’intégration, qui est précisément de reconnaître les cultures et les identités des différents 
groupes qui composent la société française pour leur permettre d’y trouver toute leur 
place dans une logique d’égalité des droits. Si l’on ne prend pas le temps de regarder dans 
le détail les particularités de chacun, on se privera des moyens efficaces pour construire 
une stratégie. 
 
La deuxième difficulté est que le terme « Roms » renvoie à une notion ethnique qui est 
inopérante en droit français pour construire des politiques publiques. La tradition 
républicaine française, qui se traduit par une conception exigeante du principe d’égalité, 
ne permet pas d’envisager des mesures qui seraient spécifiquement ciblées sur un groupe 
ethnique. L’article 1er de la Constitution du 4 octobre 1958 énonce en effet que la 
République assure l'égalité devant la loi sans distinction d'origine, de race ou de religion. 
Le gouvernement français se refuse donc avec une grande vigueur à toute différence des 
droits fondée sur l’appartenance à une communauté définie par son origine, et continuera 
de le faire dans le cadre des processus nationaux, communautaires et internationaux.328 
 
This disclaimer afforded the French government two opportunities. First, by highlighting 
the ambiguity of the term ‘Roms’, French officials could devise a strategy that 
encompassed both foreign migrants residing in illegal camps and French travellers, so-
called gens du voyage without conflating the communities. This allowed them to present 
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their strategy as ethnically neutral because it applied to two unrelated groups of people. It 
also meant that they avoided a reproduction of the amalgamation of ‘Roms’ and ‘gens du 
voyage’ for which the Sarkozy government was heavily criticised. Second, by stating that 
‘Roms’ were not recognised as a category in French law and therefore could not be the 
target of public policy, French officials were able to clearly affirm the government’s 
commitment to universalism and communicate their policies as broad socio-economic 
schemes rather than ethnically targeted affirmative action measures.  
 
A declaration of universalism addressed one part of the conundrum, but alone it would 
not be enough to convince the Commission that the strategy was in fact one of Roma 
inclusion. To satisfy the Commission’s requirements, French officials decided to refer to 
the Roma directly but only as an unintended benefactor of its government’s policies and 
never as the object of a deliberate ethnic targeting. In this sense, French officials used 
universalist ideas to distract from the fact they framed illegal camps as Roma problem. In 
other words, officials used universalist language to conceal racial stereotypes. For 
example, the strategy stated that ‘cette politique bénéficie aux citoyens européens, quelle 
que soit leur origine’ but then noted ‘cette même année 2010 ont été financés à Bordeaux, 
40 chalets en bois pour reloger des populations marginalisées dont des Roms’.329 The 
careful choice of words presented the relocation of Roma as the outcome rather than aim 
of the French government’s policy. Despite the efforts of Dihal and the SGAE to 
showcase France’s universalist policy, as discussed above, an official from Bordeaux 
informed me that in practice accompagement was indeed a case of positive 
discrimination. A confidential presentation given by French officials to the European 
Commission social housing projects such as this financed by the European fund, FEDER, 
also directly identified ‘Roms’ under the heading of ‘publics ciblés’, demonstrating that 
the ethnic minority were in fact a target of the French government’s policies.330 
Nevertheless detaching the aim of France’s policy from its outcome was a clever and 
creative response to a difficult political, legal and ideological question. It simultaneously 
allowed the French government to appear loyal to its republican idea of universalism and 
comply with obligations of its EU membership.  
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The French government replicated this logic in its 2013 progress report to the European 
Commission by including a ‘rappel de la distinction entre Gens du voyage et migrants et 
rappel de l’interdiction des discriminations fondées sur l’origine ethnique’ in the 
introduction’.331 The report referenced Roma in two ways: either to differentiate the 
French universalist approach from ‘l’approche “ethnique’ communément admise en 
Europe’ or to reiterate the rejection of ethnic categories in French law and public 
policy.332 A document outlining the ‘Indicateurs d’évaluation de la stratégie nationale 
d’intégration des communautés marginalisées’ submitted to the European Commission in 
February 2015 did not include a single reference to the Roma. It mentioned only ‘Gens du 
voyage’ or ‘Personnes vivant dans les campements illicites’.  
 
From these documents, it seemed as though the French government’s deployment of 
universalism had intensified. First it presented Roma as an unintended recipient of French 
state support, then it mentioned Roma as a European construct with no official 
significance in France, and finally it removed the term all together. The French 
government had seemingly done the impossible: by arguing that Roma inclusion should 
be the outcome not the aim of policy in its initial strategy document, French officials 
were subsequently able to satisfy the commission’s requirements without any reference to 
the population in question. This meant that French civil servants used universalist means 
to achieve non-universalist ends.  
 
The French government’s approach appeared to both deploy and embody universalist 
ideas. However, a close examination of the logic of dislocating policy aims from 
outcomes reveals a flaw. The French government’s strategy rested upon the assumption 
that Roma benefited from colour-blind ‘accompagnement’ measures. For example, a 
social housing initiative in Saint-Ouen was said to ‘prendre en charge les besoins de 
personnes, majoritairement des Roms, notamment en termes de scolarité et d’éducation, 
d’accès aux soins, aux activités économiques et au logement’.333 Yet, the strategy also 
argued that ‘les données ethniques objectives ne peuvent faire l’objet en France d’une 
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collecte à des fins statistiques’.334 If the collection of ethnic statistics was forbidden, how 
did French officials know that Roma had in fact benefited from the government’s 
universalist policies?   
 
Two possible explanations spring to mind. Perhaps the French authorities did possess 
some form of ethnic data. That is not to say the government collected ethnic data 
themselves – it may have been passed on from government contractors or NGOs. As 
chapter five of this thesis reveals, an assessment of a slum in the Alpes-Maritimes 
conducted by a contractor classed residents as Roma. Perhaps the French authorities did 
not possess ethnic data but assumed that a proportion of residents living in illegal camps 
affected by the government’s policies were members of the Roma community. This 
assumption may have been linked to several indicators, such as language, appearance, 
nationality, behaviour, the structure of the family unit, health conditions and illiteracy 
revealed in the ‘diagnostics sociaux’. Yet none of these indicators prove membership of 
an ethnic community, rather they demonstrated the perverse way in which French 
officials used the republican idea of universalism to justify the treatment of a group they 
framed in ethnic terms. An excerpt from SGAE’s application letter for European 
structural funds exemplified this point: 
 
‘La présence en France de populations issues de communautés marginalisées de pays 
d’Europe orientale, en particulier de Bulgarie et de Roumanie, amène des collectivités 
territoriales françaises à développer des partenariats avec les collectivités et territoires de 
ces pays, notamment pour y favoriser l’inclusion sociale et économique des communautés 
au niveau local. Conforment à la Recommandation du Conseil du 9 décembre 2013 
“relative à des mesures efficaces d’intégration des Roms dans les Etats membres”, les 
autorités françaises souhaitent développer cette coopération transnationale’.335 
 
Although these structural funds were reserved for the ‘intégration des Roms’, the French 
government did not overtly refer to the ethnic community in their application, noting only 
the nationality of marginalised communities as predominantly Bulgarian and Romanian. 
The inference was that nationality and ethnicity were related, drawing an implicit causal 
link between Bulgarians and Romanians in France and the Roma. Despite this allusion 
there was no evidence to prove whether the marginalised communities in question 
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identified as Roma. Without ethnic data, the French officials requesting the funds could 
only presume not confirm the ethnic identity of the communities. Thus, as this example 
demonstrates, the application of universalist principles led to the unintended production 
of unsubstantiated ethnic stereotypes. An official in the European Commission agreed 
with this observation, suggesting that ‘if the French government collected ethnic 
statistics, perhaps they would discover that France might not be as unified as they had 
assumed’.336 The French government’s strategic deployment of universalism in its 
communications with Brussels had therefore given way to a deeply entrenched, 
sometimes unconscious, perpetuation of ethnic discrimination.  
 
De Jure Universalism and De Facto Discrimination  
 
Officially, the Hollande government discourse remained committed to universalism, but 
unofficially discrimination against the Roma persisted. Evidence of it could be found in 
all levels of the French political system: from the discourse of local implementation of 
policies in French cities, to the national speeches of politicians diverting from the party 
line, through to the defence of French policies in communications to Brussels. A local 
government official admitted that ‘même si le mot “Rom” n’existe pas dans les titres, la 
plupart des habitants dans les camps sont d’origine Rom’.337 This sentiment was echoed 
by an adviser to President Hollande who conceded that ‘c’est vrai que parmi les citoyens 
européens qui peuvent s’installer en France, en collectivité, de manière nombreuse et 
visible, ce sont les Roms. Il n’y en a pas d’autres. On n’a pas d’italiens qui vont venir 
s’installer en France de manière illicite’.338 The official insistence on universalism 
seemed superficial in light of these off-the-record remarks, which confirmed collective 
stereotypes about an ethnic community’s way of life.  
 
Some officials were aware of the government’s discursive strategy. Some were conscious 
of the dichotomy between the use of universalism in official discourses and the often 
implicit discrimination of the Roma. One local official disclosed that ‘il n’y a pas de rejet 
national de la population Roms, il n’y a pas de racisme officiel. Vous avez un petit 
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racisme ambiant, qui ne se dit pas, ça ne se dit pas’.339 The comment implied that 
discrimination was permissible, or at least overlooked, as long as it remained outside the 
confines of formal public policy documents. In the words of a senior French official, 
‘même si on ne cible pas les Roms directement, il y a des Roms dans les campements. 
C’est juste une politique légale’.340 In an earlier interview, the same senior official 
highlighted the de facto discrimination of Roma in the corridors of l’Elysée, warning that 
‘il faut reconnaître que nous-mêmes aujourd’hui, au sein de l’Etat, il y a des gens qui 
parlent de campements Roms’.341 The influence of universalist ideas seemed to dissipate 
at the border between legal text and unofficial discourse.  
 
The French state appeared to systematically deploy universalist ideas in official 
discourses but did not apply it so rigorously to informal discussions and technical 
communications, revealing a double standard. One national official ridiculed this double 
standard: 
 
Souvent en abordant ce problème de campements illicites en France, moi cela me fait 
penser à un tableau de René Magritte, peintre surréaliste de la première moitié du 20ème 
siècle…Et alors il a fait un tableau où l’on voyait une pipe et il y a écrit ‘Ceci n’est pas 
une pipe’ et il a signé. Et le titre de ce tableau est ‘la trahison des images’. Au fond, alors 
on peut gloser dessus pendant des heures, mais ça dit vraiment qu’il faut se méfier des 
images et ne pas prendre la chose pour sa représentation. Et une fois j’avais montré une 
photo où l’on voyait la dame, les petits enfants, et puis le monsieur sur des matelas dans 








339 Interview with Municipal Official, Mairie de Villeurbanne, Lyon (10 June 2015). 
340 Interview with National Official 2, Dihal, Paris (1 June 2015).  
341 Interview with National Official 2, Dihal, Paris (9 December 2014).  
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Illustration 1. René Magritte, The Treachery of Images (1926). (Ceci n'est pas une pipe; 
"This is not a pipe"). Oil on canvas.  
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The French government’s refusal to recognise ‘Roms’ as an administrative category in 
official policy documents and political rhetoric did not prove that there were no Roma 
living in illegal camps in France. Presuming that camp inhabitants were Roma based on a 
set of unfounded stereotypes did not confirm their identity either. Instead, it revealed that 
the French government’s use of universalism served more to conceal than remove of 
structural discrimination against the Roma in France. Yet, despite their close relation to 
one another, it is important to make an analytical distinction between the aims of 
universalist and anti-discrimination approaches. Universalism aimed to stop the 
communautarisation of ethnic or religious groups, which threatened a désintegration of 
French society. If the French public sphere was preserved as an ethnically and religiously 
‘neutral’ environment, then universalism had succeeded. In contrast, anti-discrimination, 
the principle based on the recognition and protection of ethnic communities, intended to 
prevent the unfair treatment of individuals or groups because of their race. As such, anti-
discrimination explicitly targeted ethnic populations to promote their inclusion in society. 
It is thus not surprising that the French government’s strategic deployment of universalist 
ideas concealed racialised ideas, which facilitated a de facto discrimination of the Roma 




This chapter illustrates how the French state used the republican idea of universalism to 
communicate and justify policies that targeted the Roma. First, it reveals that the Sarkozy 
government’s universalist justification of evacuation policies was not originally employed 
to counter claims of anti-Roma discrimination. Instead, it began as a reluctant response to 
criticism from Brussels in an attempt to minimise the political and legal cost of a 
xenophobic policy. Only under the Hollande government did universalism become a 
proactive discursive strategy to demonstrate commitment to France’s republican 
philosophy despite intensified evacuations of illegal camps. Thus officials employed the 
same republican term but interpreted it in different ways. Second, the chapter exposes a 
gap between the Hollande government’s universalist discourse and the implementation of 
its policies, which tended to contain ethnic references to the Roma. Third, the chapter 
shows that despite the dexterity of French civil servants, who carefully constructed a 
national strategy of ‘Roma inclusion’ for the benefit of the European Commission 
without using language that explicitly targeted Roma, de facto discrimination persisted. A 
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tacit link between the Roma and peri-urban slums persisted in the discourse of French 
officials; it was especially present in candid conversations and in technical policy 
documents with limited readership. The next chapter turns to examine how consecutive 
French governments used the republican concept of a ‘neutral’ public sphere to 






REJECTION: PRESERVING THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
 
‘Je vous le dis: il n’y aura pas de bidonvilles dans notre pays. La France n’est pas un 
terrain vague.’342 




‘Il n’est pas acceptable de laisser s’installer des bidonvilles dans notre villes ou aux 
portes de nos villes.’343 
Jean-Marc Ayrault (9 July 2013) 
 
Eradicating ‘Roma’ slums was a priority for the Sarkozy and Hollande governments, 
often featuring in their political discourse. Yet, it is remarkable that a meagre 17,500 slum 
dwellers amidst France’s population of 66 million, became the target of national public 
debate.344 Why did successive French governments reject these slums? Many officials 
framed slums as illegal camps that violated the French constitutional right to property. 
Some questioned the security of slums, especially in relation to organised crime 
networks, or public health. Others lamented that slums represented a regression to the 
bidonvilles of postwar France. Although officials presented different rationales, their 
discourse was underpinned by a common conviction that ‘Roma’ slums were an 
unwelcome feature of the French public sphere. For them the republican concept of the 
public sphere was not simply an abstract realm in which individuals could freely exercise 
civic rights, it was also a physical place where individuals were required to leave behind 
particularistic attachments in exchange for the common good. Employing this 
conceptualisation, officials spoke of the public sphere as if it were a neutral place where 
all individuals could enjoy equal rights. But the public sphere was not neutral. Officials 
defined neutrality in normative terms, projecting their assumptions of what constituted 
normal or acceptable living situations and behaviour onto their conceptualisations of a 
neutral public sphere. In other words, the concept was open to bias that officials could 
exploit. This chapter examines how officials used the republican concept of a neutral 
public sphere to communicate and justify policies to eradicate slums in France. First, it 
																																																								
342 Brice Hortefeux, Ministre de l’intérieur, Conférence de presse sur la mise en oeuvre des mesures 
d'évacuation des campements illicites (30 August 2010). 
343 Jean-Marc Ayrault, Premier Ministre, Déclaration sur les priorités de l'Etat territorial (9 July 2013). 
344 For figures, see: Jean-Baptiste Daubeuf, Hervé Marchal and Thibaut Besozzi, Idées Reçues sur les 
Bidonvilles en France (Paris: Le Cavalier Bleu, 2016), p. 10.  
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explores the rationales behind their rejection of ‘Roma’ slums in political rhetoric. 
Second, it studies how this rejection materialised into evacuation policies. Third, it 
investigates how officials rationalised the state-led removal of some ‘Roma’ residents 
from France altogether.  
 
Rejecting Roma Slums 
 
The French state’s objection to slums transcended partisan divisions. The message was 
clear: neither the Sarkozy nor the Hollande government accepted slums on the grounds 
that they disrupted the neutrality of the public sphere. But what particular feature of slums 
made them unacceptable to French officials? Fundamentally, the fact that officials 
racialised slums as a ‘Roma’ problem meant they could position slums as communitarian 
clusters of ethnic ghettos that threatened the neutrality of the public sphere. This section 
takes a closer look at the rationale behind the Sarkozy and Hollande governments’ 
objection to slums. First, it focuses on the crucial role that visibility played in the state-led 
rejection of these slums, noting that officials did not frame all types of visibility as 
challenging the neutrality of the public sphere. Second, it untangles explanations officials 
used to justify the eradication of slums, distinguishing between those focused on 
protecting the Republic from Roma ghettos and those centred on rescuing these so-called 
Roma from their own condition.  
 
A Visible Ethnic Threat  
 
In English, the term ‘slum’ conjures up an image of overcrowded shantytowns, often 
associated with urban settlements in India, favelas in Brazil and townships in South 
Africa. Slums signal a crisis of housing, inequality and urbanisation. Yet, in French the 
word bidonville has additional connotations. Initially a reference to a makeshift camp of 
rural migrants in Casablanca called Gadoueville in the 1920s, bidonvilles became 
synonymous with informal settlements of migrant workers in France unable to find 
affordable housing in the 1950s and 1960s. These settlements were on the outskirts of 
French cities and their inhabitants were mainly of Algerian and Portuguese descent.345 
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The ‘suppression des bidonvilles’ outlined in the loi Debré de 1964, was one of France’s 
postwar reconstruction policies under the Fifth Republic.346  
 
Since at least 2010, officials have associated bidonvilles with ‘campements illicites’ in 
political discourse. As conservative Interior Minister Hortefeux stated, ‘il faut que les 
Français sachent: certains de ces campements illégaux étaient devenus de véritables 
bidonvilles.’347 The term ‘bidonvilles’ was a pejorative reference indicating that France 
was regressing back to its debilitated postwar state. This sentiment was echoed in local 
politics. In the words of a municipal official: ‘les campements étaient le long du 
périphérique, avec de la pollution, du bruit, des conditions indignes. Donc ça, la France 
ne l’accepte pas ce type d’installation, parce que ce serait un retour en arrière, pour 
revenir aux bidonvilles. Même si effectivement on a une pression avec la crise, il y a des 
nouveaux phénomènes de bidonvilles. Mais il faut y résister.’348 It also transcended the 
Left-Right divide. As a political adviser exclaimed ‘le fait que ces bidonvilles se 
reconstruisent, c’est une régression. C’est quelque chose qui ne va pas. Ça veut dire qu’on 
revient quelque part en arrière dans l’histoire du pays.’349 Thus, these new bidonvilles 
inherited the reputation of their postwar predecessors.  
 
Additionally, as the previous chapter revealed, despite efforts to present policies as 
universalist, the Sarkozy and Hollande governments tacitly regarded campements illicites 
as campements de Roms. This meant that officials did not just frame illegal camps as 
slums but also as Roma ghettos. The association of bidonvilles with the Roma racialised a 
particular type of living arrangement. Both the Sarkozy and Hollande governments drew 
this association in public statements, but the latter tended to emphasise it to justify the 
rejection of slums. For example, when asked ‘est-ce que les Roms ont des modes de vie 
extrêmement différent des nôtres?’ during a radio interview, Hollande’s Interior Minister 
Valls replied ‘mais ils vivent dans des campements et dans des situations tout à fait 
insupportables.’350 Reflecting on this comment, a political adviser to the minister claimed 
																																																								
346 Loi n° 64-1229 du 14 décembre 1964. 
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that ‘les bidonvilles des Roms, c’est un choc de culture pour la plupart des Français’.351 
These statements demonstrated that officials positioned slums as challenging to neutrality 
of the public sphere because they assumed the inhabitats were Roma. The racialisation of 
slums meant that officials could justify clearing slums because through this logic they 
were clearing ethnic ghettos. The implication was that slums were a part of being Roma, 
rather than a product of socio-economic circumstance.  
 
Socialist Minister for European Affairs, Thierry Repentin extended this argument in a 
radio interview with Radio France Inter, by referring to ‘Roms’ as ‘une population 
étrangère avec un mode de vie qui n’est pas celui choisi par la grande majorité de nos 
concitoyens.’352 This comment cast Roma as the other, excluding them from French 
society. It also suggested that this so-called Roma way of life exiled the ethnic 
community from French society. Regional officials expressed the same sentiment in their 
political discourse. For example, a regional official contended that ‘les Roms sont ici une 
population que l’on reconnaît surtout par le fait qu’elles s’installe en général de manière 
illicite dans la ville, avec souvent une concentration importante de personnes qui causent 
un trouble à l’ordre public’.353 By suggesting that it was possible to determine whether a 
person was Roma because they lived in an illegal slum, the regional official racialised 
both a specific type of living arrangement and illegal behaviour. This statement revealed 
a set of negative stereotypes underpinning the French state’s response to slums in France. 
Thus, at the core of French officials’ rejection of slums was an unfounded bias that 
residents were members of the Roma community. 
 
The visibility of slums further contributed to their rejection by the French state. Visibility 
made slums a public problem, which elicited a public response. Although slums were 
domestic residences, they were not private. The visibility of slums also magnified the 
differences between the slum residents and local community. As a regional official from 
Seine-Saint-Denis noted ‘les populations se déplacent de plus en plus sur l’espace public: 
les autoroutes, les lieux délaissés de route, les lieux un peu vacants, et donc ils deviennent 
visibles et la population locale les supporte de moins en moins.’354 A report published by 
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the Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’Homme in November 2014 stressed 
that ‘la visibilité de certains bidonvilles insalubres ou les cas de mendicité dans les 
espaces publics contribuent en effet à faciliter l’association systématique des Roms à la 
précarité et aux troubles de voisinage.’355 Objections from local communities placed 
pressure on local politicians. In parts of northern France, for example, officials used their 
policies on Roma slums as election platforms. One regional official said ‘on a très 
clairement vu qu’aux dernières élections municipales [en 2014], des élus ont perdu leur 
municipalité à cause justement des questions de populations Roms présentes sur le 
territoire. A Los, le Maire a perdu parce qu’il a accepté d’accompagner les Roms.’356 
Another added ‘inversement des maires se sont faits élire sur ce sujet-là en disant “si je 
viens, il n’y en aura plus”.’357  
 
The concentration of people living in slums was another factor adding to their rejection. 
A regional official noted ‘le problème de la visibilité c’est la concentration, le fait qu’ils 
soient tous au même endroit.’358 Similarly, a senior national bureaucrat contended ‘les 
bidonvilles cristallise tout ce qui ne va pas dans la société française. Les français ont 
beaucoup de difficultés à accepter le fait de vivre-ensemble. Les SDF Roms sont 
clairement identifiés. C’est une population physiquement identifiable. Ils sont visible.’359 
Adding to this, a municipal adviser claimed ‘ce n’est pas seulement la visibilité des 
bidonvilles qui pose un problème, mais aussi la vie communautaire.’360 This was echoed 
in the language of a report published by the Commission des Affaires Européennes, a 
French parliamentary committee, that maintained ‘le logement des Roms doit être inscrit 
au système de logement de la société dans son ensemble, la ghettoïsation devant être 
évitée.’361 These examples demonstrate that elected and administrative officials at all 
levels of government, across various geographic locations saw slums as Roma ghettos, 
and a shared concern of communitarianism underpinned official responses. ‘Je pense que 
la communautarisation est forte pour les Roms’ argued another regional official.362 Thus 
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officials did not simply consider Roma slums a nuisance, but a communitarian threat to 
the Republic’s laïque and ethnically neutral public sphere. It is important to note not all 
forms of visibility threatened the Sarkozy and Hollande Governments’ conceptualisation 
of a neutral public sphere. However, in the case of the Roma, it was the visibility of 
racialisation, poverty and a collective form of living that challenged the neutrality of the 
public sphere. This was because neutrality was in fact a heteronormative construct that 
officials could use to justify the rejection of slums. The neutrality of the public sphere 
was thus imbued with heteronormative bias.  
 
The perception of slums as ethnic ghettos rested on the assumption that residents chose to 
segregate themselves from French society. Interior Minister Valls stated in an interview 
with Le Figaro on 14 March 2013 ‘les occupants de campements ne souhaitent pas 
s'intégrer dans notre pays pour des raisons culturelles ou parce qu'ils sont entre les mains 
de réseaux versés dans la mendicité ou la prostitution’.363  The rejection of a community 
based on living arrangements revealed a bias against the Roma because of the spaces they 
occupied. Although these so-called Roma lived in relatively closed communities, often 
spoke the same languages and contributed to the same micro-economies, it is more likely 
that their living conditions were a product of socio-economic migration after the end of 
the Cold War than personal preference. This suggests that public officials projected ethnic 
characteristics onto assumptions about behaviour, language, lifestyle and poverty.   
 
The French state’s justification of preserving a neutral public sphere was not distinct to 
the Roma. Officials also used it to rationalise the 2004 law prohibiting ‘conspicuous’ 
religious symbols in state schools and the 2010 law banning the burqa. Yet in both cases, 
the community in question was religious rather than ethnic. Until the summer of 2010, 
when President Sarkozy officially began the national campaign to eradicate ‘campements 
des Roms’ an ethnic community had scarcely been the target of this type of public 
objection. By rejecting Roma on the basis that they challenged the neutrality of the public 
sphere, officials were able to use a republican idea to defend policies that targeted a 
specific ethnic community. A counterpoint to this claim was that the Sarkozy and 
Hollande governments targeted slums but not squats. While officials spoke of slums as a 
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communitarian threat, they rarely discussed squats, which often posed similar social, 
legal and economic risks. This further demonstrated how it was the visibility of this 
perceived ethnic community that allowed officials to frame them as challenging the 
neutrality of the public sphere. As a national political adviser said ‘le phénomène de squat 
existe également dans toutes les grandes villes mais ce n’est pas un problème qui heurte 
les valeurs républicaines.’364 
 
Another factor adding to the rejection of slums was location. Slums were often in poorer, 
marginalised urban areas with large migrant populations such as Seine-Saint-Denis. On 
the northern outskirts of Paris, Seine-Saint-Denis is home to over 130 different 
nationalities.365 In 2013 it also contained France’s largest concentration of bidonvilles. As 
a regional official stated:  
 
Quand je suis arrivé ici en juin 2013, nous avions à peu près 8000 personnes recensées 
dans des campements illicites dont la très grande majorité était issue de la population 
rom, principalement de Roumanie et quelques Roms de Bulgarie. Ça veut dire que la 
Seine-Saint-Denis avait quasiment le tiers de la population Rom recensée en France… en 
plus on n’a pas d’accès facile au logement ou à l’hébergement.366  
 
The arrival of these allegedly Roma migrants in Seine-Saint-Denis and other quartiers 
populaires across France placed strain on local budgets and social services, especially 
demand for subsidised housing. This deepened tensions between local communities and 
slum residents, competing for access to government support. According to a regional 
bureaucrat ‘il y a une concurrence des misères. Il y a toujours une hiérarchie. Les Roms 
sont les arabes des arabes. Les arabes ne vivent pas dans des bidonvilles. Ils vivent peut-
étre dans un habitat insalubre mais ils ont un toit’.367 This comment revealed the 
racialisation of exposed living conditions and suggested a connection between ethnicity 
and hygiene. It also demonstrated that in a private one-on-one interview, the public 
official did not hesitate to equate the ethnic community with slums. Prejudice against 
Roma based on the visibility of slums was not just political; it was embedded in the 
discourse of the French administration and French administrators.  
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Protecting the Republic or the Roma? 
 
Although the Sarkozy and Hollande governments’ language suggested they similarly 
supported the eradication of slums, two types of justifications emerged. Some officials 
argued it was a necessary means of protecting French society. The subtext was that slum 
residents were Roma and these officials saw Roma as outside the norms of French 
society. Others saw it as a way of rescuing the Roma from unacceptable living conditions. 
While the former approach framed the Roma as the problem, the latter positioned them as 
victims. This division was not partisan: it reflected internal tensions between hard-line 
and humanitarian approaches of how to manage migrants.  
Officials offered two reasons why eradicating slums would protect the French society 
from the Roma. First, they maintained that slums constituted an illegal occupation of 
land. ‘La communauté Rom, la communauté des gens du voyage: ils ne sont pas au-
dessus des lois’, stated conservative Interior Minister Hortefeux in July 2010.368 The 
following month, Benoist Apparu, the conservative Secretary of State for Housing added 
‘à partir du moment où il y a une situation illégale, l’Etat français en tire toutes les 
conséquences’.369 Similarly, in June 2015 an adviser to socialist Interior Minister Valls 
insisted ‘la situation des occupants des campements illicites est claire. Ce sont les 
occupants des campements illicites – ils doivent partir. C’est une question de légalité.’370 
Regional officials also rejected Roma slums as a violation of republican law. In 
December 2014 a regional official exclaimed ‘il y a des principes de respect de la loi, de 
l’ordre public, du droit de propriété. Ça fait partie de la Constitution.’371    
 
Framing slums as a legal problem allowed French officials to legitimate a national 
evacuation campaign as a duty bestowed upon the government to protect French citizens. 
As conservative Prime Minister, François Fillon, argued ‘il est du devoir de l’Etat 
d’assurer le respect de la légalité républicaine.’372 Similarly, the socialist junior education 
minister, George Pau-Langevin, noted: ‘il est de la responsabilité de la puissance 
publique de faire respecter la loi, y compris en démantelant des campements illicites et 
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dangereux.’373 Prefects were charged with implementing this ambitious task. ‘Le rôle de 
la Préfecture, c’était de faire cesser des situations illégales, qui étaient ces campements et 
ces présences illégales, il faut le bien le dire, [qu’elles sont] irrégulières sur le territoire 
français’ asserted a regional official.374  This argument allowed officials to defend their 
rejection of Roma slums as a republican imperative.  
 
Officials also used this legal argument to justify evacuations on the basis that all 
individuals have equal rights and responsibilities. Through this logic, allowing one 
population to illegally occupy land would mean the French state would effectively be 
treating one population differently to all others. Sarkozy’s Immigration Minister, Besson, 
summarised this clearly in a radio interview with Europe 1: ‘ce cap républicain, 
permettez-moi de le rappeler, il est très simple, deux principes: égalité devant la loi, 
article premier de la Constitution, respect de la propriété et égalité de tous devant la loi, 
ça veut dire qu'on n'a pas le droit, impunément, d'occuper des terrains privés ou publics, 
illicitement.’375 The suggestion was that republican law treats all French residents as 
equal. The fact that Romanian and Bulgarian migrants’ right to remain in France was 
restricted by EU transitional measures until 1 January 2014 undermined this claim. Yet 
since then Romanians and Bulgarians fall under the same droit commun as French 
citizens, which meant they were subject to equal treatment under French law.        
 
Another justification officials used to evacuate slums was security. The rationale was that 
slums brought crime into French neighbourhoods, compromising the safety of French 
citizens. In a speech to French Prefects, Conservative Interior Minister Hortefeux 
declared ‘notre mission c’est de protéger les Français de l’insécurité…vous le savez 
comme moi, ces campements sont, trop souvent, des foyers de délinquance.’376 Hortefeux 
used the terms ‘Roms’ and ‘Roumains’ interchangeably throughout the speech to quantify 
the link between Roma camps and delinquence: ‘j'observe que, sur l'année 2009, les actes 
de délinquance commis par des individus de nationalité roumaine ont augmenté de 
+138% pour la seule ville de Paris. Ils ont encore augmenté de 51% sur les six premiers 
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mois de l'année 2010 à Paris. En dix-huit mois, cela représente donc une augmentation de 
+259%.’377 Hortefeux’s use of statistics on Romanian nationals to prove a point about the 
ethnic Roma community is misguided, but it revealed the Minister’s prejudice towards 
Romanians in France.   
  
Regional and local officials also employed the security argument to frame Roma they 
considered to be living in slums as outside the heteronormative norms of French society. 
One regional official used the same words as Hortefeux, claiming ‘les bidonvilles sont 
quand meme des foyers de délinquance’.378 A local official also told me ‘il y avait des 
phénomènes de vol, de mendicité qui choquait la population, où les mamans faisaient la 
manche dans le métro, avec des petits bébés. Ce n’est pas possible au 21ème siècle qu’on 
fasse ça.’379 The focus on mendicité is significant because since September 2011, 
arresting a foreigner, including a EU citizen, for mendicité aggressive became grounds 
for deportation to their country of origin. Consequently, mendicité aggressive became one 
of the ways French officials could expel so-called Roma from France. The French 
government’s hard-line stance on security projected a public message: the French state 
rejected all crime, regardless of how petty. As committing a crime was a violation of 
French law, and the rule of law was one of the foundations upon which the French 
Republic was built, the French state could argue that illegal activities betrayed the 
republican tradition on which the French state was built. Another regional official echoed 
this argument : ‘la République est incapable d’accepter des zones de non-droit. Si vous 
regardez des camps de Roms, ils créent un camp fermé à l’intérieur duquel il y a des 
règles précises. Des règles ne sont pas celles de la République, donc on a quelque chose 
qui va à l’encontre de la République et des valeurs républicaines.’380 The official 
employed security-based ideas to protect the republican idea of a neutral public sphere. 
However, the official’s suggestion that the norms inside ‘Roma’ slums were different 
from the norms of French society revealed a heteronormative bias in the official’s 
interpretation of neutrality. 
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In contrast to arguments about protecting the public sphere, officials also justified slum 
evacuations as rescuing the Roma from their own plight. These arguments were not 
mutually exclusive. The same official could adopt a hard-line or humanitarian position 
depending on the circumstance. Indeed, the Hollande government overtly highlighted this 
‘double objectif de fermeté en matière de sécurité et d’humanité dans la prise en charge 
des personnes’ in their 26 August 2012 circular on illegal camps.381 The humanitarian 
position prioritised the wellbeing of Roma migrants and presented slums as dangerous 
domains unfit for human habitation. This was based on two principal issues: public health 
and exploitation.  
 
Regional and national officials also cited public health concerns as grounds for 
evacuating Roma slums during interview discussions. One regional official asserted ‘on 
avait affaire à des gens qui vivent dans des conditions extrêmement insalubres, avec des 
dangers de toutes natures pour les enfants, pour tous les occupants, les personnes âgées, 
enfin tout. De toutes manières, ce n’est pas une solution de laisser les campements en 
l’état.’382 A regional political appointee also affirmed ‘j’allais régulièrement visiter les 
camps et vous aviez la nuit des gros rats qui se baladaient. Il y a des risques de santé 
publique, il y a des petits enfants qui vivent là dans ces conditions. C’est 
insupportable.’383 These comments shed light on the experience of officials on the 
ground, especially given the role Prefects and their staff played in leading the 
implementation of slum evacuations. In their communications, regional officials framed 
the unhygienic condition of slums as a practical problem.  
 
National officials framed public health as a moral problem for French society. According 
to Sarkozy’s Interior Minister Hortefeux noted in August 2010 ‘au respect des lois 
s’ajoute un devoir moral: combattre l’insalubrité et la misère dans lesquelles ces 
campements illicites ont condamné ces populations entières.’384 Over two years latter, a 
press release on ‘campements illicites’ from socialist Interior Minister Valls stated ‘Les 
conditions de vie peuvent y être particulièrement dangereuses et représenter une menace 
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pour la sécurité et la santé, notamment des plus jeunes.’385 The Commission nationale 
consultative des droits de l’homme expanded on this argument: ‘Placées en situation de 
grande précarité, ces populations sont contraintes à survivre dans des lieux inadéquats et 
indignes, tels que des bidonvilles ou des squats insalubres, voire dans la rue, sans accès à 
l’eau ou à l’électricité, avec des conséquences néfastes pour leur santé et leur sécurité.’386 
Thus, from a national point of view, the health problems associated with Roma slums 
were unacceptable in modern France, which was another way of positioning the Roma as 
outside the norms of French society. 
 
The second issue officials used to substantiate humanitarian arguments for the evacuation 
of Roma slums was exploitation. Former conservative Secretary for European Affairs 
Lellouche raised this issue during a parliamentary question session in 2013: 
 
Depuis l’entrée de la Roumanie et de la Bulgarie dans l’Union européenne en 2007, la 
France connaît une immigration de population rom qui prend des proportions proprement 
intolérables d’abord pour ces personnes elles-mêmes…ces familles et, souvent, les 
enfants sont pris en main par des groupes mafieux qui gagnent des centaines de millions 
d’euros en exploitant ces enfants qui sont prostitués dans les gares parisiennes, qui volent 
devant les distributeurs de billets et qui détroussent les Français qui n’en peuvent plus, et, 
bien sûr, nos touristes.387 
 
In his response Minister Valls, conceded ‘là vous avez raison, il y a une exploitation des 
êtres humains qui est tout à fait insupportable.’388 This echoed a speech by his 
predecessor Ayrault who declared ‘le gouvernement entend également renforcer la lutte 
contre les filières d’exploitation de la misère et des personnes (prostitution, mendicité, 
utilisation d’enfants, etc.), dont sont notamment victimes les mineurs.’389 The emphasis 
on minors has republican significance. If minors were subject to exploitation, they were 
unlikely to attend school. As a local official complained ‘ces populations doivent aussi 
comprendre qu’il y a des règles en France, notamment on est très triste de voir que les 
enfants qui sont dans ces campements ne vont pas à l’école.’390 Since the Jules Ferry laws 
of 1881 and 1882, compulsory education has been a key component of republican 
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integration. Exploiting minors denied them the right to a republican education and 
consequently hindered their pathway to integration into French society. The ways in 
which the French state used the idea of integration to communicate and justify policies to 
assimilate Roma into French society is the subject of chapter six. But it is nonetheless 
important to note that French officials could position the exploitation of children as a 
barrier to integration. Following this logic, officials could justify evacuating slums not 
only because they protected Roma children from exploitation, but also because 
evacuations increased the likelihood their integration into French society. French officials 
rationalised policies of clearing slums as a necessary step in achieving republican 
integration. 
 
Neutralising the Public Sphere 
 
The French government’s rhetorical rejection of Roma slums materialised into a national 
evacuation policy. ‘Il faut que les campements illicites soient systématiquement évacués’ 
ordered the conservative President Sarkozy in July 2010.391 This policy continued under 
the Socialists with Interior Minister Valls as its strongest advocate. On national radio in 
September 2013, Valls insisted, ‘Il faut démanteler tous les campements’.392 Although 
both Sarkozy and Valls faced criticism from humanitarian advocates inside and outside 
their parties, the evacuation of Roma camps remained firmly on the agenda of both 
administrations. Reduced to its simplest form, this national evacuation policy consisted of 
evicting Roma residents and clearing their slums. Through this policy, officials aimed to 
restore an allegedly ‘neutral’ public sphere, free of ethnic and religious communities. 
This section examines discourses on the evacuation policy in detail. First, it studies the 
procedures outlined in official documents and legislation, arguing that despite a shift in 
emphasis towards a humanitarian approach, new measures only affected actions before 
and after evacuations, not the act of evacuation itself. Second, it explores the challenges 
officials cited regarding implementing evacuations, revealing the French state’s 
deployment of the concept of a neutral public sphere applied more rigorously to national 
political rhetoric and policy documents than local government discourse.  
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A National Policy of Evacuation 
 
On 26 August 2012, the Hollande government issued Prefects with a new circular 
specifying ‘le cadre de l’action de l’Etat dans le cas d’évacuations de campements 
illicites’.393 Contrary to this specification, the document did not refer to the act of 
evacuating illegal camps itself. Instead, it presented new measures governing state actions 
before and after evacuations ‘relative à l’anticipation et à l’accompagnement des 
opérations d’évacuation des campements illicites’.394 These new measures reflected a 
shift towards a more humanitarian approach, and likely allowed regional actors, and 
judges, to make more informed decisions, but they did not alter the evacuation procedure. 
Ironically, this new circular added new measures but did not reform existing ones. It is 
thus not surprising that the Hollande government’s policy rested upon principles similar 
to that of its predecessor.   
 
A policy report on the ‘application de circulaire interministérielle du 26 août 2012’ 
indicated the following principles:  
 
- Le droit de propriété, qui découle de normes internes (article 17 de la Déclaration des 
droits de l’homme et du citoyen de 1789 et jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel) 
et européennes (article 1er du 1 er protocole additionnel à la CEDH, article 17 de la 
Charte des droits fondamen- taux de l’Union européenne); 
- Les impératifs d’ordre public, qui commandent à l’autorité publique d’assurer, dans 
le respect des principes fondateurs de la République, la préservation de la sécurité 
des personnes et des biens; 
- La bonne utilisation du domaine public. Le domaine public constitue un outil 
permettant aux personnes publiques de s’acquitter des missions qui leur incombent, 
et notamment l’exécution des missions de service public. Il peut également être 
affecté à l’usage direct du public. L’occupation sans titre de biens appartenant au 
domaine public est susceptible de compromettre ces fonctions essentielles du 
domaine public.395 
 
The Sarkozy government outlined a similar list of principles on 24 June 2010 in a circular 
on the ‘Lutte contre les campements illicites’: 
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Le Gouvernement entend lutter contre le développement de campements illicites, 
notamment dans les grandes agglomérations. Ces campements, en effet, font naître une 
triple préoccupation : ils portent atteinte au droit de propriété ; les conditions de vie de 
leurs occupants sont inacceptables sur le plan de la sécurité et de la salubrité, et 
incompatibles avec tout projet crédible d’intégration ; enfin, ces campements peuvent 
abriter des activités délictuelles.396 
  
In their respective discourses, both administrations emphasised the right to property, the 
preservation of security and the wellbeing of camp residents. However, the Hollande 
government also drew attention to ‘la bonne utilisation du domaine public’. This added a 
normative dimension to the government’s policy because it suggested that in the eyes of 
the state the installation of illegal camps did not qualify as a satisfactory use of public 
land. Instead, it implied that camps were ethnic ghettos, compromising the function of the 
‘domaine public’. The Sarkozy government hinted at this argument insofar as it claimed 
illegal camps were ‘incompatible avec tout projet credible d’intégration’, but the 
Hollande government’s overt reference to the ‘domaine public’ cemented the idea of an 
ethnically neutral public sphere in official policy documents. 
 
Although each administration employed slightly different language, both followed the 
same legal procedure of evacuating illegal Roma camps. The key consistency was that all 
evacuations required a court order. Sarkozy attempted to bypass this step in July 2010 by 
proposing a legislative amendment to grant Prefects unrestricted authority to clear camps 
that they deemed unsafe or insalubrious, but it was not adopted.397 The legal procedure 
for evicting Roma thus remained unchanged. The specific course of legal action depended 
on three factors: whether the property was publicly or privately owned, the type of 
property occupied, and whether the plaintiff launched civil or criminal proceedings.  
 
If a property was publicly owned and classed as a ‘domaine public’, the state or a 
municipality could file a case in the administrative court under article L.531-3 of the code 
de justice administrative.398 This is because the competence of French courts is based on 
the status of the parties involved. Legal conflicts between public persons, and between 
public and private persons occupying public land is reserved for administrative courts. If 
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a property was privately owned, the landlord could file a case to evict illegal occupants in 
the civil court under articles L.221-6, R.221-5 or R.221-41 of the code de l'organisation 
judiciaire. 
 
In cases regarding a ‘domaine privée’, the type of property determined the level of civil 
court. The Tribunal d’Instance was responsible for matters concerning the illegal 
occupation of buildings and residential housing, whereas the Tribunal de Grande Instance 
dealt with conflicts on the occupation of land (terrain). Cases regarding the occupation of 
‘la voirie routière’ (e.g. car parks) were referred to the Tribunal de Grande Instance. If a 
judge granted an order, it normally included a two-month delay until the eviction could 
take place as specified under article L.412-1 of the code des procédures civiles 
d’exécution. However, if a judge did not explicitly state that a delay would occur or 
provide the date of evacuation, as was often the case for résidences de type bidonville, an 
eviction could proceed immediately.  
 
Additionally, both public and private landlords could file a complaint (plainte avec 
constitution de partie civile) against illegal occupants to the police or Procureur de la 
République under article 322-4-1 of the code penal. For Prefects, the advantages of 
treating the illegal occupation of land as a criminal matter was that it permitted urgent, 
expedited evictions in the event of a security or health risk. It also carried a penalty of six 
months imprisonment and a fine of €3750. This was particularly problematic for 
Bulgarian and Romanian nationals living in illegal camps because a criminal status could 
lead to their deportation under EU law.  
 
While both the Hollande and Sarkozy administrations used the criminal route of action, 
the latter overtly encouraged it in their policy documents:  
 
…cette incrimination pénale présente pourtant plusieurs avantages: un intérêt 
dissuasif, par la perspective de voir sanctionnné ce type de comportement par des 
peines d’amende et d’emprisonnement; un intérêt administratif: en vue de la 
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The ‘intérêt administratif’ was a nod to the Sarkozy government’s immigration quotas, 
which included Bulgarian and Romanian migrants. Although the Hollande government 
tried to differentiate itself from its predecessor’s hard-line stance on immigration, the 26 
August 2012 circular reminded Prefects of the criminal route of prosecution: ‘Il est 
rappelé au préalable que, dans certains cas, la situation au regard de la sécurité des 
personnes, y compris d’un point de vue sanitaire, peut imposer une action immédiate.’400 
This suggested that the new anticipation and accompagnement measures masked the 
continuation of an existing evacuation policy. Both the Sarkozy and Hollande 
governments thus drew upon the same assortment of legal tools to evacuate Roma camps. 
As a national adviser noted, ‘la loi ne change pas mais la jurisprudence évolue’.401  
 
Regardless of the type of legal procedure adopted, Prefects held a powerful position in the 
implementation of eviction policies. If the state owned the occupied property, the Prefect 
was responsible for launching legal proceedings. If a municipality owned the property, 
the Prefect played a supporting role. If the property was privately owned, the Prefect 
acted as a hustler, placing pressure on private landlords to take illegal occupants to court. 
Furthermore, once an eviction order was granted, Prefects decided when exactly to 
evacuate an illegal camp (if the judge had not specified a date). This meant that Prefects 
could time the evacuation around a specific event, such as an election to reduce conflict. 
Prefects could also choose how to evacuate a camp. For example, Prefects could consider 
how much warning to give residents before an eviction or whether to evacuate a camp 
incrementally or all at once. Following the 26 August 2012 circular, Prefects were also 
charged with managing the new anticipation and accompagnement measures. This gave 
Prefects the responsibility to select private contractors to conduct diagnostiques sociaux 
and consider alternative housing options, which afforded considerable scope for 
ingenuity. One Prefect told me that he found alternative housing for Roma residents in a 
neighbouring department through a private contractor but did not inform the Prefect of 
that department until the day of evacuation.402 His strategy, which ultimately succeeded, 
was to defer resistance to the plan until it was too late to undo.  
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These functions reveal the authority of Prefects but also the power of politics over law in 
the French system. The impetus for evacuations relied considerably on the will of 
Prefects, especially insofar as they could grant or reject local politicians’ requests for 
evacuation. Both the Sarkozy and Hollande governments recognised this as a potential 
opportunity to increase political power. Each attempted to boost the mandate of Prefects 
in different ways. The Sarkozy government tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to amend 
legislation requiring Prefects to obtain a court order before evacuating an illegal camp. 
The Hollande government left the law untouched but institutionalised the pivotal role of 
Prefects in the 26 August 2012 circular: ‘En premier lieu le respect des décisions de 
justice ne saurait être mis en question. Il revient au préfet d’exécuter celles-ci, lorsqu’il 
est ordonné par le juge qu’il soit mis fin, au besoin avec le concours de la force publique, 
aux occupations illicites de terrains.’403 The document did not specify the terms of 
execution, leaving much interpretation up to the Prefect. This is interesting because 
Prefects are appointed rather than democratically elected officials, rarely in the public 
eye. Prefects could therefore execute difficult decisions without shouldering the political 
cost. Conversely, some Prefects lamented their recently ratified position because it 
allowed municipalities to eschew responsibility. Nevertheless, the flexibility of the 
language in the 26 August 2012 circular meant that the national policy of evacuating 
illegal Roma camps was far from uniform.  
 
Challenges in Practice  
 
Although the Hollande government pledged to preserve ‘la bonne utilisation du domaine 
public’ in their policy documents, officials said that implementing the policy posed 
significant challenges in practice.404 As a national government official stated, ‘la politique 
[outlined in the 26 August 2012 circular] ne fonctionne pas. Ce n’est pas suivi à la lettre. 
Il faut être pragmatique’.405 In practice, and under certain circumstances, officials adopted 
pragmatic workarounds that did not necessarily reflect the republican ideas their 
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government had used to justify the policies in the first place. The idea of a laïque and 
ethnically neutral public sphere was no exception. The idea of a neutral public sphere was 
therefore an ideal that officials formulating policies used to communicate and justify 
policy proposals, while officials implementing policies on the ground did not deploy the 
idea to the same degree of rigour. Three key challenges emerged from their experience.  
 
First, evacuating illegal Roma camps was costly. A senior national official asserted ‘j’ai 
fait des évaluations sur le coût d’une évacuation qui étaient évaluées entre 200,000 et 
300,000 Euros. On en a fait plusieurs centaines depuis l’arrivée de la Gauche au pouvoir, 
c’était trois fois plus que sous la période de Sarkozy.’406 This cost included the 
‘mobilisation des forces de police, démolition, remise en état’ and cleaning expenses.407 It 
did not cover the anticipation and accompagnement measures. The principal recipients of 
these sums were private contractors, social workers and social housing associations. In 
some cases, the high price of evacuations led to disputes between municipalities and the 
national government over who would pay. ‘Quand il y a des endroits qui sont dans des 
situations d’insalubrité forte, nous permettons de retrouver un terrain qui fonctionne 
normalement. C’est en général le propriétaire qui prend cela à sa charge, mais pas 
toujours, et c’est assez coûteux’ noted a regional official.408  
 
As a consequence, officials sometimes deferred evacuations, occasionally even leaving 
slums in place. As one municipal advisor stated:  
 
On a choisi de ne pas demander l’expulsion d’un campement illicite parce qu’il y 
a 100 personnes qui sont là à un moment. Si on les expulse, ça va être très 
coûteux et désagréable pour tout le monde, et en plus on va se retrouver avec 100 
personnes qui vont se répanndre dans la ville et reconstituer un squat ailleurs.409  
 
According to this official, evacuating slums was too expensive to justify. The cost of 
evacuations also raised questions about the legitimacy of spending public money on non-
French citizens. This was a problem for Dihal, the national government body responsible 
for coordinating and managing the implementation of policies affecting ‘campements 
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illicites’, because it had a modest budget compared to most other national agencies. In 
July 2014 a report from la Haute Comité pour le Logement des Personnes Défavorisées 
underscored this point, arguing ‘Il faut également souligner que la Dihal ne dispose pas 
des moyens humains et budgétaires sufissants pour mener à bien sa mission’.410 The 
French government was spending too much money to justify, yet at the same time it was 
not spending enough to achieve even a small portion of its objectives.   
 
Linked to the problem of cost, officials on the ground who worked on implementing 
evacuation policies encountered a new problem of what to do with the evacuated 
residents afterwards. Finding alternative housing was not straightforward. In the 
immediate aftermath of an evacuation, the state provided evicted residents with hotel 
rooms. This was only temporary, lasting for a couple of nights, and it was expensive. A 
regional official complained that in one department ‘il y a 7500 personnes qui sont mises 
à l’hôtel toutes les nuits…le prix d’une chambre est entre 50 et 100 Euros par nuit’.411 
The Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’Homme claimed that putting 
evicted residents in hotels also created social problems because ‘il est souvent proposé de 
séparer les familles en hébergeant prioritairement les femmes et les enfants.’412 In general 
slum residents could not afford to pay for rent-controlled housing (logement) such as 
Habitation à Loyer Modéré (HLM). Even if they could, there were large waiting lists that 
did not prioritise evicted camp residents over other applicants already in the queue. In 
June 2015, a local official from the region Parisienne said the region had a waiting list of 
over 100,000 people.413 The remaining option was fully subsidised social housing 
(hébergement) that included a comprehensive package of accompagnement. The aim was 
to equip residents with the necessary skills for autonomous life in France, that is a life 
that was not dependent on state support. Yet, as the subsequent chapters expose, 
hébergement was not always available or appropriately set up for extended families, 
highlighting the official’s bias towards heteronormative values. More fundamentally, 
beneficiaries were subjected to a rigid selection procedure, which only accepted a very 
small minority.  
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These difficulties meant that some evacuations proceeded without alternative housing 
solutions, contrary to the instructions of the 26 August 2012 circular. For example, 
‘L'évacuation le 21 octobre 2014 du bidonville dit des Coquietiers, à Bobigny...s'est fait 
dans une précipitation qui a rendu inopérante les propositions de relogement faites à 
certaines familles et a laissé d'autres sans solution, au mépris du caractère inconditionnel 
du droit à l'hébergement.’414 Evacuation polices therefore took precedence over 
integration measures. This also included existing integration projects, such as the 
enrolment of children from illegal camps in local schools. Evacuations, during the school 
term, could disrupt the learning progress of Roma children. La Haute Comité pour le 
Logement des Personnes Défavorisées maintained that following an evacuation ‘[L]es 
lieux d’accueil peuvent être situés loin des sites de campements et des lieux de 
scolarisations des enfants.’415 The fact that evacuations took priority over education 
exposed a tension between two core French republican principles: the preservation of a 
laïque and ethnically neutral public sphere and the integration of foreigners into French 
society. Prefects were forced to weigh up these two principles each time a judge granted 
an evacuation order, juggling competing demands from mayors and discontented 
constituents with a responsibility to protect the wellbeing of illegal camp residents inside 
their jurisdiction.  
 
Officials on the ground also complained that evacuating one slum did not prevent another 
from developing. This was partially because the lack of alternative housing left some 
residents stranded, but also because other residents preempted government action by 
vacating the premises before an evacuation took place. The crux of the problem for 
French officials was that over the course of time the size of illegal Roma camps 
diminished but the total number of people living in such camps throughout France 
remained roughly the same. As a national official exclaimed, ‘aujourd’hui, on n’a 
malheureusement, en termes de chiffres et à travers ce recensement, pas d’évolution 
démographique, j’entends à la baisse, de personnes vivant en campements illicites et 
bidonvilles. On a vraiment une stagnation.’416 This implied that evacuations pushed 
																																																								
414 Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’Homme, Avis sur le respect des droits fondamenteaux 
des populations vivant en bidonvilles (20 November 2014). 
415 Haute Comité pour le Logement des Personnes Défavorisées, Avis sir la situation des populations des 
campements en France Métropolitain (July 2014). 
416 Interview with National Official 2, Dihal, Paris (9 December 2014).  
	 142 
residents from one jurisdiction to another. In Seine-Saint-Denis, for example, the 
population of illegal camp residents dropped by over a third within two years. A regional 
official recounted that ‘en juin 2013 nous avions à peu près 8000 personnes recensées 
dans des campements illicites dont la très grande majorité étaient issues de la population 
Rom. Aujourd’hui [en juin 2015] on est passés à moins de 2500.’417 Although Seine-
Saint-Denis no longer had to contend with France’s largest proportion of illegal camps, 
statistics suggested that the camps had reconfigured elsewhere, albeit not necessarily with 
the same residents. 
 
However the discourse of French officials suggested that the fragmentation of slums had 
administrative advantages. A joint ministerial report418 contended ‘une taille inférieure à 
cent personnes permet d’installer suffisamment en amont le travail de diagnostic demandé 
par la circulaire du 26 août 2012 et de prévoir des mesures relais qui facilitent, voire 
évitent l’évacuation (accord avec les collectivités pour une installation temporaire sur un 
autre terrain, prise en charge des enfants et des personnes vulnérables, accès aux soins et 
à l’école...).’419 The fact that illegal camps had dispersed across metropolitan France 
meant the costs associated with evacuation, anticipation and accompagnement measures 
were more evenly spread across départements and thus better aligned with the allocation 
of government resources. Yet, fragmentation did not dissolve illegal Roma camps 
altogether. Instead, it distributed camps into smaller clusters. Thus, in practice the French 
government’s national policy of evacuation was more of an exercise in reorganising 
slums rather than a means of removing slums from the public sphere.    
 
Removing the Public Threat from France  
 
As well as attempts to clear the public sphere through evacuations, the Sarkozy and 
Hollande governments sought to remove certain residents from France altogether. 
Responding to a question about France’s bidonvilles on national television the former 
Interior Minister to Sarkozy, Claude Guéant argued ‘il n’y a qu’une seule solution: 
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dissuader la venue de ces personnes et les renvoyer chez elles.’420 From this perspective, 
removing the Roma from France was the ultimate way of clearing slums from the public 
sphere. Indeed, it was the issue of collective deportation that catalysed the public dispute 
between European Commissioner Viviane Reding and President Sarkozy in 2010. 
However, collective deportation was not the only way French officials could remove the 
Roma from France. French and EU law enabled the expulsion of individuals from other 
EU member states based on criteria with which so-called Roma migrants often 
conformed. In addition, French officials introduced policy measures to incentivise exit, 
encouraging migrants to abandon their projects in France and return to their countries of 
origin. These measures offered different means to the same end. This section examines 
how French officials used strategies of coercion and inducement to remove the Roma 
from France.   
 
Coercion and Deportations 
 
For the Sarkozy government, evacuating camps was an opportunity to deport illegal 
migrants. The 24 June 2010 circular on the ‘lutte contre les campements illicites’ 
instructed Prefects,  to ‘prendre, chaque fois que cela vous paraît pertinent, des mesures 
d’éloignement des occupants des campements illicites, lorsque ceux-ci n’ont pas la 
nationalité française et qu’ils se trouvent en situation irrégulière sur notre 
territoire.’421Administratively, this measure allowed officials to include deportations of 
illegal camp residents in the government’s immigration quotas, which comprised both EU 
and non-EU citizens. Politically, it gave ministers and other elected officials the chance to 
instrumentalise the Roma question in their speeches and public addresses as a way of 
pandering to the far-right. On 30 August 2010, Interior Minister Hortefeux reported that 
‘977 Roms présents sur notre territoire ont été raccompagnés dans leur pays d’origine, 
essentiellement en Roumanie, sous la responsabilité du ministre de l’immigration, Eric 
Besson’.422 He added ‘pour une minorité de ces départs – 151 retours forcés – des 
procédures ont été diligentées, sous le contrôle du juge, dans le cadre de la lutte contre 
l’immigration irrégulière…La France poursuit, ainsi, ses efforts de maîtrise des flux 
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migratoires.’423 By citing the deportation of Roma as proof of effective law enforcement, 
Hortefeux framed ethnic communities as a threat to his heteronormative conceptualisation 
of a ‘neutral’ public sphere.   
 
The association of Roma with the disruption of l’ordre public was a prominent theme in 
public debate. In a radio interview on 29 July 2010, Hortefeux claimed ‘quand un Rom 
sera reconduit chez lui, il y aura – dans les cas naturellement où il est en situation illégale, 
qu’il y a trouble à l’ordre public et ainsi de suite – il y aura une prise d’empreintes 
digitales.’424 Although the minister sought to dispel fears about France’s porous borders, 
his comment implied that ethnicity posed a threat to public order rather than illegal 
behaviour. He also maintained that ‘je dis simplement pour les Roms, et ceux qui sont en 
situation illégale, ceux qui portent atteinte à l’ordre public: ils seront reconduits en 
Roumanie et Bulgarie’.425 This exposed the assumption that Roma were necessarily 
Romanian or Bulgarian citizens. Indeed, illegal camp residents may have been Romanian 
or Bulgarian nationals but without ethnic statistics, Hortefeux’s argument appeared 
conjectural. The comment thus revealed more about the prejudice and opportunism of the 
minister than the population to which he referred.  
 
The term l’ordre public had a legal significance as well. Under article L 511-1 of the code 
de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile (CESEDA), the act of being a 
‘menace à l’ordre public’ was grounds for an ‘arrêté de reconduite à la frontière’, more 
commonly known as an ‘obligation de quitter la France’ (OQTF). Exactly what 
constituted a ‘menace à l’ordre public’ was unclear. Nor was it the only foundation for an 
OQTF. On 16 June 2011, the French Senate and National Assembly passed a new law on 
immigration, integration and nationality, which addressed these two points.426 First, it 
defined a ‘menace à l’ordre public’ as ‘une menace réelle, actuelle et suffisamment grave 
pour un intérêt fondamental de la société française.427 The definition suggested that only 
serious criminal acts could be regarded as a ‘menace à l’ordre public’, but the distinction 
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between petty and serious crime remained ambiguous. Second, the new law combined the 
different grounds for deporting EU citizens under article 39. It stated three main reasons:  
 
1. Qu’il ne justifie plus d’aucun droit au séjour tel que prévu par les articles L. 121-1, L. 
121-3 ou L. 121-4-1; 
 
2. Ou que son séjour est constitutif d’un abus de droit. Constitue un abus de droit le fait de 
renouveler des séjours de moins de trois mois dans le but de se maintenir sur le territoire 
alors que les conditions requises pour un séjour d’une durée supérieure à trois mois ne 
sont pas remplies. Constitue également un abus de droit le séjour en France dans le but 
essentiel de bénéficier du système d’assistance sociale; 
 
3. Ou que, pendant la période de trois mois à compter de son entrée en France, son 
comportement personnel constitue une menace réelle, actuelle et suffisamment grave pour 
un intérêt fondamental de la société française.428 
 
The third reason presented the extended definition of ‘menace à l’ordre public’, but the 
second was also relevant to the case of the Roma because it indicated that poverty could 
be grounds for deportation. Under this logic, officials could deport slum inhabitants 
whom they considered an unreasonable burden on the French welfare system. In theory, 
this appeared to enable deportations of all inhabitants living under the poverty line. Yet, 
in practice this was not the case. Although slum residents were destitute, they often relied 
on support from informal avenues instead of government assistance, especially before an 
evacuation took place. Following an evacuation, only a select few received state support, 
which as the next chapter discusses was not unconditional. This meant that the French 
state could not deport a person for placing strain on the public purse if an official had 
already decided that the person in question qualified for government support. Despite this 
issue, a national official ensured me that French officials did issue OQTF to ‘Roms’ 
because they lacked the ‘moyens suffisants de vivre en France’.429 Thus, this new 
legislation highlighted how the French government’s deportation policies not only 
discriminated against an ethnic community but also a socio-economic one.  
 
Although the new legislation was in place well before 1 January 2014, the end of 
transitional restrictions on the free movement of Romanian and Bulgarian citizens did not 
have a significant impact on the French government’s deportation policies. It did however 
reduce the French government’s control over Romanian and Bulgarian migrants in 
France. For example, Romanians and Bulgarians no longer required work permits and the 
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types of jobs available to them were no longer circumscribed by the state. In fact, the 
Hollande government pre-emptively expanded the list of jobs on 22 August 2012, which 
reflected their shift towards a more humanitarian approach to the Roma.  
 
In spite of this change in tone, the Hollande government continued to deport these so-
called Roma using the same legislation as its predecessor. Yet, the emphasis on 
deportations in public discourses and policy documents diminished. This was in part 
because the Hollande government opposed EU migrant quotas, which meant that officials 
no longer used the deportations of Romanian and Bulgarian nationals to reduce their 
numbers. A national political adviser insisted that ‘il y a un volet de la politique qui a 
existé et qui n’existe plus, c’est que les citoyens roumains et bulgares ont été utilisés pour 
gonfler les chiffres matières d’éloignement.’430 A national civil servant confirmed the 
implementation of this change, stating that ‘depuis l’élection de François Hollande…on 
ne donne plus, c’est-à-dire le Ministère et la Direction, au Préfet d’objectif quantitatif, 
chiffré vis-à-vis des reconduites à la frontière. Or les Roms comptaient dans les chiffres 
de chaque Préfet. C’est assez récent, c’était assez précis et ça permettait au Préfet de faire 
du chiffre, pour parler vulgairement.’431 Furthermore, another national official said that ‘il 
y a beaucoup d’OQTF mais ils ne sont pas toujours exécutés. Ils ne sont pas appliqués. 
C’est un moyen de dire qu’on a fait quelque chose.’432 This was a revealing comment 
because it implied that, at least in the case of the Sarkozy government, deportation was 
not only a policy instrument to physically remove Roma from France but also a 
discursive strategy to give an impression of protecting the neutrality of the French public 
sphere and preserving the heteronormative norms implicit in the term ‘neutrality’.  
 
Inducement and Incentives for Exit 
 
In addition to removing Roma from the Republic, the Sarkozy and Hollande governments 
provided incentives for Roma to leave of their own accord. First, the Sarkozy government 
introduced an aide au retour policy, which was a financial inducement for Romanian and 
Bulgarian migrants to return to their countries of origin. This included the provision of 
administrative and physical support to prepare for the return journey, a reimbursement of 
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transport costs and an allowance of 300 euros per adult and 50 euros per child. The 
measure was outlined in a government circular on 7 December 2006 in anticipation of 
Romania and Bulgaria’s accession to the EU the following month. In an interview with 
radio station France Inter, Immigration Minister Eric Besson stated ‘c’est simple, les 
personnes signent un accord par lequel elles sont d’accord pour retourner dans leur pays 
d’origine, moyennant une compensation – l’aide au retour volontaire humanitaire’.433  
 
Yet, in practice the aide au retour was not as simple as the minister claimed. In fact, the 
policy was perverse: the allowance of 300 euros was far greater than 60-euro average 
price of a bus ticket from Bucharest to Paris, encouraging migrants to volunteer for 
repatriation with the knowledge that they could return the next day. Consequently, the 
aide au retour policy became excessively popular and costly. According to the French 
Immigration Office (OFII) Annual Report, 10,608 people including 8,567 adults and 
2,041 children were recipients of this policy. It also specified that ‘Les Roumains (7 284 
personnes) et les Bulgares (1 429 personnes) sont les principaux bénéficiaires de cette 
aide. Il s’agit principalement de personnes qui séjournent sur des sites ou campements 
illicites.’434 Underlying these figures was the assumption that Romanian and Bulgarian 
residents of illegal camps were Roma. A regional official confirmed this by exclaiming 
‘en 2011 il y a eu plus de 10,000 Roms qui ont pu bénécificer de l’aide au retour. C’est 
énorme!’435 A Senate report criticising the aide au retour policy added ‘La France 
dépenserait entre 5 millions et 10 millions d’euros par an pour ces rapatriements.’436  
 
Although Interior Minister Hortefeux insisted ‘cette aide financière n’est valable qu’une 
seule fois’,437 he failed to consider the logistical difficulties of prohibiting repatriated 
Romanian and Bulgarian migrants return to France. As the Senate report argued, ‘Même 
si un contrôle est désormais opéré sur la base du fichier OSCAR de manière à s’assurer 
que les bénéficiaires ne puissent se voir octroyés l’aide plus d’une fois, on constate que ce 
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dispositif d’aide au retour a créé un véritable appel d’air.’438 The fact that France was in 
the Schengen zone meant that its multiple land-locked borders were porous and mostly 
uncontrolled, allowing repatriated Roma to surreptitiously re-enter France. The aide au 
retour policy therefore led to une migration pendulaire instead of a one-directional 
removal of Roma from France.       
 
After the 2012 presidential election, the new Hollande government decided to reform the 
aide au retour policy. Yet, inertia prevailed until 16 January 2013 when Interior Minister 
Manuel Valls issued an ‘arrêté relatif à l’aide au retour’.439 The key change was a 
reduction in the financial allowance from 300 to 50 euros per adult, and 50 to 30 euros 
per child. Defending the reform during a press conference, Valls argued ‘Je le dis 
clairement : le problème des campements illicites a été amplifié par les aides au retour 
pour les ressortissants de l’Union européenne qui ont été attirés en France par cette prime 
inédite en Europe. Réduire ces aides, démanteler les campements illicites dans le respect 
de la loi et de la circulaire du 26 août 2012, comme je l’ai fait, c’est commencer à 
résoudre une partie du problème.’440 An adviser to Interior Minister Valls shared this 
view, claiming that ‘on a radicalement diminué cette aide pour que ce soit juste un petit 
pécule. La somme maintenant n’est plus du tout attractive.’441 Thus, although the 
socialists did not withdraw the policy, they removed the impetus behind the ‘allers-
retours’.  
 
The second incentive was the deepening of bilateral relations between France and 
Romanian and Bulgarian governments to improve for Roma integration in their countries 
of origin. On 25 August 2010, Interior Minister Hortefeux, Immigration Minister Besson 
and Secretary for European Affairs Pierre Lellouche, met with their Romanian 
counterparts to establish a ‘travail de cooperation’.442 Following the meeting, Lellouche 
said: 
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J’ai demandé à nos collègues roumains de mettre en place un plan d’urgence et un plan à 
moyen terme d’intégration de ces populations qui vivent en grande déshérence. Cela 
commence par la scolarisation, le logement, la santé et bien sûr la formation 
professionnelle, région par région, avec des objectifs en termes de dates. J’ai dit, au nom 
de la France que notre pays est prêt à apporter toute l’assistance pour la préparation de ce 
plan. J’ai demandé à Mme Reding de bien vouloir mobiliser l’ensemble des moyens de la 
Commission pour que nous ayons, nous les gouvernements concernés, à commencer par 
le gouvernement roumain, la possibilité de mettre au point ces plans, de sorte que cet 
argent, qui est là, aille aux populations qui en ont le plus besoin.443 
 
Although the Sarkozy government did not offer financial aid from the French purse, they 
lobbied the European Commission to allocate funds for Roma integration. The rationale 
was that by addressing the integration of Roma in their countries of origin, the French 
state could prevent them from leaving in the first place, thereby reducing the number of 
‘Roma’ slums in France. As Lellouche maintained ‘on considère que la solution à long 
terme est de traiter ce problème à la base, dans les pays d’origine, en se demandant 
comment les moyens de l’Union peuvent aider ces pays à intégrer ces personnes qui, 
parfois, comme en Roumanie, représentent 10% de la population.’444 
 
The Hollande government took this initiative one step further. On 12 September 2012 the 
OFII and the Romanian government signed a bilateral agreement dedicated to ‘la mise en 
place et au suivi de 80 projets concrets de réinsertion à destination des personnes rentrées 
de France’.445 Reflecting on the agreement, Interior Minister Valls said ‘je me suis rendu 
en Roumanie pour souligner combien il est important que les populations Roms soient 
mieux intégrées dans leur pays d’origine.’446 Prime Minister Ayrault relayed this 
sentiment in a speech to the Romanian Prime Minister in Bucharest the following year 
stating, ‘On a trop souvent voulu résumer ces derniers mois les relations entre la France et 
la Roumanie au problème rom. Bien sûr qu'il y a un problème rom et d'ailleurs vous êtes 
le premier chef de gouvernement, monsieur le Premier ministre, à l'avoir abordé aussi 
franchement et avoir dit : “La communauté Rom a vocation à vivre dans son pays et pour 
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ça il faut s'en donner les moyens”’.447 Although the aim of this initiative was to improve 
the ‘home’ from which Roma came, it assumed that Roma wanted to return ‘home’ and 
that their migration to France was a form of escaping. It also raised questions about how 
the Romanian government allocated the money and whether it improved the integration 
of Roma in practice. A sceptic might even argue that donating aid afforded the French 
government leverage over the Romanian government that they would not have otherwise 
had. Nevertheless, bilateral initiatives shifted the responsibility of integrating Roma back 
to the countries of origin in an effort to draw them away from France. The assumption 
embedded in the discourse of French officials was that Roma were not welcome in France 
because they threatened the neutrality of the public sphere. 
 
Alongside national incentive policies, municipalities led local projects to promote the 
inclusion of Roma called ‘villes jumelles’. These were distinct from the Hollande 
government’s bilateral co-operation with the Romanian government, sometimes 
preceding them. Similarly to national bilateral partnerships, the aim of local projects was 
to ‘favouriser la reintégration dans les pays d’origine avec l’aide du pays d’accueil’.448 
One example, which gathered considerable media attention, was the ‘coopération 
décentralisée’ between Le Grand Lyon and Tinca, a village in the north-western 
department of Bihor, Romania.449 In November 2011 the city of Lyon invested 300,000 
euros into the socio-economic development of Tinca to help reintegrate 60 Roma families 
living in Lyon into their hometown. The project aimed to: 
- mettre en œuvre un projet d’amélioration des conditions de vie des populations 
défavorisées et notamment des Roms sur le territoire roumain,  
- renforcer la solidarité entre le France et la Roumanie à travers la coopération 
décentralisée entre collectivités pour favoriser l’inclusion des Roms dans leur pays, 
- sensibiliser l’opinion roumaine aux possibilités d’inclusion de cette minorité, 
- sensibiliser la population lyonnaise à la situation de ces populations dans leur pays 
d’origine et lutter ainsi contre les discriminations dont elles sont victimes.450   
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The fact that the project was localised and tailored for a specific population from a 
designated village in Romania made it easy to track its results. Not only did it provide 
electricity to a proportion of the village populated by Roma, but in 2014, the project built 
a multifunctional centre with basic hygiene services, day care and after school activities. 
In 2015, it also established an employment-training scheme for young people with the 
help of the Fondation Abbé Pierre.  
 
Although the local project shared the same goal of encouraging Roma to leave France as 
national bilateral partnerships, the results indicated a genuine improvement the standard 
of living of Roma from Tinca. It appeared that la coopération décentralisée was a 
pragmatic, albeit localised, solution to a difficult political problem. As Olivier Brachet, 
Vice President of Le Grand Lyon in charge of social housing stated, ‘Nous sommes tous 
partagés entre la révolte de voir les conditions de vie des Roms en France et la réalité. On 
ne peut pas leur offrir des avantages sociaux qu'on arrive plus à fournir aux Français’.451 
His colleague Hubert Julien-Laferrière, the Vice President in charge of international 
cooperation and solidarity added, ‘le problème c’est qu’à Lyon comme à Tinca, les Roms 
restent une minorité très mal intégrée, voire ghettoïsée, n’ayant accès ni travail ni au 
minimum vital’.452 The reference to Roma ghettos highlighted the official’s framing of 
the ethnic community as a threat to the neutrality of the French public sphere. His 
language implied that the population living in slums were Roma, that each slum 
represented an ethnic cluster of segregated Roma, and their standard of living was both 
poor and visible to the public eye. This is what some officials referred to as the 
phenomène clanique. It was this type of visibility – of ethnic concentration and poverty – 
that the official framed as challenging to the neutrality of the French public sphere. But 
again, it is important to remember that neutrality was not objective; the term had an 
arguably hetero-normative, classist and crypto-Christain bias. In other words, by framing 
the Roma as challenging the neutrality of the public sphere, the official essentially 
positioned the Roma as a threat to heteronormative, classist and crypto-Christian norms. 
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Thus, even at a local level of politics, officials used the republican idea of a neutral public 




This chapter demonstrated how French officials used the republican idea of a neutral 
public sphere to communicate and justify evacuation and deportation policies targeting 
the Roma. Officials were able to exploit the heteronormative bias embedded in the 
concept of neutrality, and consequently frame ‘Roma’ slums as an unacceptable deviation 
from these heteronormative values. The chapter also illustrated how the visibility of 
slums made them a public problem that French officials felt compelled to resolve. This 
was apparent in the distinction officials drew between slums and squats. Although squats 
comprised similar populations, who faced similar socio-economic challenges and also 
illegally occupied property, the French state did not have a policy for evacuating squats 
nor did officials express strong concerns about squats in their political discourse. In 
contrast, for the Sarkozy and Hollande governments eradicating slums was a national 
priority. The French state’s objection to slums was so severe that evacuations tended to 
take precedence over finding alternative housing, displacing residents and leaving them 
homeless.  
 
The strategies of coercion and inducement officials used to remove the Roma from 
France altogether also exemplified the lengths the French state was willing to take to 
eradicate slums, even though French history suggests that aide au retour policies were 
futile. In the 1970s and 1980s President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing discovered in his 
efforts to reduce the number of Algerian migrants living in French slums by 500,000 over 
five years through his own aide au retour policy, slum residents were more enticed by a 
life in France than by financial incentives to leave. Between 1977 and 1981 roughly 
60,000 migrants accepted the aide au retour, but only 4% of them were Algerian.453 It is 
puzzling to think that the Sarkozy government believed that reproducing such a policy to 
draw Romanians and Bulgarians out of France would yield better results. Perhaps it 
suggests that stereotypes of the Roma were so deeply ingrained in official minds that they 
																																																								
453 Patrick Weil, La France et ses étrangers, l’aventure d’une politique d’immigration (1938-1991) (Paris: 
Calmann-Levy, 1991). 
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failed to recognise the perversion of their policies. And more fundamentally, perhaps it 
reveals that these stereotypes allowed officials to legitimise deportation and evacuation 








SELECTION: CHOOSING THE ‘WORTHY’ FEW 
 
 
‘Je ne reprendrai pas la célèbre phrase de Michel Rocard dans laquelle je me retrouve: 
“La France ne peut accueillir toute la misère du monde”. Je dis simplement, c'est un 
constat lucide.’454 




‘La France, comme d’autres pays d’Europe, doit prendre sa part – et nous prenons notre 
part – dans l’accueil de cette misère et de ces problèmes-là, mais nous n’avons pas 
vocation à accueillir toute la misère du monde.’455 
Manuel Valls (25 September 2013) 
 
The idea that France has an inherently inclusive immigration system is a great republican 
myth. Public intellectuals and politicians alike have praised the French Republic for 
integrating foreigners into a community of citizens.456 The case of the Roma in France is 
no exception. As an adviser to the Hollande government asserted in June 2015 ‘ce qui est 
républicain, c’est d’abord d’essayer d’intégrer tout le monde, y compris les Roms’.457 
Yet, even a cursory glance at France’s history of immigration, such as the internment of 
the harkis in the late twentieth century, reveals that in practice the French state considers 
some individuals as more equal than others.458 A logic of selection, rather than inclusion, 
has characterised the French state’s response to immigration. France was and remains an 
exclusive nation, the boundaries of which have shifted over time. The question is not so 
much whether the French state is selective, but whom it selects and on what basis. This 
chapter examines how the French state used a logic of selection to determine which 
evicted Roma to support. Focusing on the anticipation measures outlined in the Hollande 
government’s 26 August 2012 circular, it explores how officials justified their 
assessments of Roma for state support on the grounds that they were individualised 
assessments of slum residents rather than an exercise in ethnic profiling. Instead of 
																																																								
454 Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, Communiqué sur la situation des gens du voyage et des 
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455 Manuel Valls, Ministre de l’intérieur, Télévision Interview à BFMTV (25 September 2013).  
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457 Interview with Political Adviser, Cabinet du Ministre de l’Education, Paris (3 June 2015).  
458 For a study on the French government’s alienation of Harkis see Jeanette E. Miller, ‘A Camp or 
Foreigners and “Aliens”: The Harkis’ Exile at the Rivesaltes Camp (1962-1964), French Politics, Culture 
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fostering inclusion, these assessments allowed officials to select Roma ‘worthy’ of state 
support based on the subjective criteria of a volonté d’intégrer. As such, this chapter 
traces how the idea of selection became ingrained in national policy, analyses how the 
criteria of volonté d’intégrer determined which residents were worthy of state support, 
and asks who was responsible for making these decisions. In doing so, it reveals the 
extensive role of independent contractors and raises ethical concerns about outsourcing 
public policy.  
 
A National Policy of Selection 
 
On 26 August 2012, the Hollande government issued a circular ‘relative à l’anticipation 
et à l’accompagnement des opérations d’évacuation des campements illicites.’459 
Anticipation implied a desire for preparedness but it also highlighted a new consideration 
for those who stood to be evicted. The Hollande government’s policy was not solely 
geared towards deporting evicted Roma; it also accepted that some Roma could integrate 
into French society and offered these select few alternative social housing. This was a 
marked change from the previous administration. Under Sarkozy, there was no suggestion 
of integrating Roma in national policy documents or political rhetoric. Discrete villages 
d’insértion existed to assimilate select Roma but these were local initiatives, the first of 
which were established by communist mayors in the northern suburbs of Paris, known as 
the red belt. The Hollande government’s anticipation measures were evidence of a new 
institutionalisation of the idea of administrative selection in a national public policy 
document. This section dissects the policy of anticipation outlined in the 26 August 2012 
circular to demonstrate two points. First, although the Hollande government attempted to 
enforce the selection of Roma by requiring officials to establish diagnostics before an 
evacuation took place, they did not specify precisely what these should entail. This 
allowed for considerable scope for interpretation in practice, allowing officials to exploit 
bias about what constituted normal and acceptable behaviour. Second, although 
diagnostics were intended to deliver fair and individualised assessments of slum 
residents, more often than not they excluded Roma from state-support and sometimes 
provided evidence for deportations.   
																																																								
459 Ministère de l'éducation nationale, et. al., Circulaire interministérielle relative à l'anticipation et à 
l'accompagnement des opérations d'évacuation des campements illicites (26 August 2012), 
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Establishing Diagnostics  
 
The Hollande government’s 26 August 2012 circular ordered prefects, France’s chief 
regional officials, to establish a diagnostic of illegal camps in advance of an evacuation. 
It stated: 
 
Vous veillerez à faire établir aussi rapidement que possible un diagnostic de la situation 
de chacune des familles ou personnes isolées. Il devra être global pour prendre en compte 
l’ensemble des problématiques (situation administrative, état de santé, logement, emploi, 
scolarisation,...) et individualisé afin de prendre en compte les spécificités de chacune des 
familles et de leur projet.460 
 
This instruction designated diagnostics as the key policy instrument to select Roma for 
state support, termed in French as accompagnement. Diagnostics were essentially 
inventories to take stock of camp inhabitants as well as assessments to evaluate their 
suitability for accompagnement. The use of the word diagnostic was significant because it 
attributed connotations of sickness and disease to illegal camps, and implied that 
accompagnement was its treatment. But accompagnement was limited and therefore 
selective, only accepting some of the Roma living in illegal camps. The purpose of 
diagnostics was thus to help determine which Roma to take. A diagnostic of a camp in 
2013 given to me by a regional government official stated its objective as a 
‘determination des familles susceptibles d’être insérées et suivi individualisé de ces 
familles’.461 The implication was that a person needed to be capable of assimilating into 
French society in order to gain access to accompagnement. A government contractor 
working on a diagnostic reiterated this point, claiming that ‘ça [le diagnostic] c’est pour 
être à peu près sûr qu’on sélectionne des gens qui ont une volonté d’intégrer’.462 Yet, it 
was unclear what this ‘volonté d’intégrer’ was or how it would be measured.  
 
In fact, the Hollande government’s 26 August 2012 circular gave no indication of what a 
diagnostic should include. In particular, it did not specify any markers against which 
eligible Roma could be considered.  It was therefore up to government contractors, 
ranging from independently governed operateurs to charitable associations, to decide on 
																																																								
460 Ibid.  
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a methodology for the diagnostic and set the parameters of evaluation. As contractors 
often varied between regions and sometimes multiple contractors competed within the 
same region, there was large scope for variation. A centralised national policy of 
anticipation did not mean there was a national model of diagnostic. For example, a 
collection of diagnostics undertaken by the GIP Habitat et Interventions Sociales in May 
and June 2014 highlighted three indicateurs d’intégration of emploi, langue et scolarité 
and displayed the results in a bar graph.463 The values on the graph correspond to the 




Source: GIP Habitat et Interventions Sociales 
 
In contrast, Adoma, another government contractor, used different categories to measure 
the ‘degré d’intégration’: ‘personnes domiciliées administrativement, enfants scolarisés et 
personnes bénéficiant d’une couverture médicale’, rating these categories by 
percentage.464 For example, the ‘taux de domicilation’ in one camp was recorded as 
5.47%.465 Both contractors highlighted the scolarisation of children as an indicator of 
integration, which suggested that they regarded l’école républicain as the melting pot 
within which children could assimilate. However, while GIP emphasised employment 
and language skills, Adoma focused on domiciliation and registration in the French 
medical system. This divergence revealed that determining a person’s ‘volonté 
d’intégration’ was a highly subjective process, which placed great responsibility on the 
																																																								
463 GIP Habitat et Interventions Sociales, Opération de diagnostics sociaux mis en oeuvre par le GIP 
Habitat et interventions Sociales (May and June 2014).  
464 Adoma, Mission nationale d’appui à la résorption des bidonvilles, mars 2014 – décembre 2016 : 
Rapport d’activité 2014 (24 March 2015).  










0 = très faible   1 = faible 
2 = moyen        3 = bien 
4 = très bien 
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contractors undertaking the assessment. Hypothetically, if these two government 
contractors were to examine the same sample of people using their own method of 
assessment, it is likely that they would produce considerably different results.466  
 
Dihal, the central government agency responsible for overseeing and coordinating 
measures outlined in the 26 August 2012 circular, recognised this issue. In a report dated 
10 December 2013 Dihal provided a checklist of key factors that a diagnostic should 
cover: 467  
 
Le diagnostic comportera notamment des informations sur les éléments suivants:  
 
Concernant la cellule familiale:  
- Composition familiale  
- Evaluation du niveau de ressources  
- Conditions de vie dans le bidonville (type d’hébergement)  
- Accompagnement et suivi social 
  
Concernant chaque individu:  
- Parcours de scolarisation et niveau pour chaque enfant (6 à 16 ans)  
- Pour les mineurs isolés, leur situation au regard de l’Aide Sociale à l’Enfance  
- Emploi, expériences et savoirs professionnels, formation de chaque adulte  
- Niveau scolaire, langues parlées, niveau de français  
- Date d’installation dans le campement, temps de présence et parcours en France, titre 
d’identité, droit au séjour  
- Santé, couverture médicale 
 
This list provided regional officials with a basic framework for a diagnostic, but it did not 
offer any guidelines as to which elements could be used to determine a person’s level of 
assimilability. On 18 March 2014 Dihal published a report entitled ‘Etablir le diagnostic 
global et individualisé d’un campement illicite’.468 This report was a technical policy 
document, providing regional officials with a reference guide to help them carry out 
diagnostics. Based on an analysis of 92 different diagnostics, the report offered 
recommendations on how to assess five areas: ‘le parcours migratoire’, ‘le degré de 
scolarisation et les problèmes spécifiques aux mineurs vivant en campements’, ‘les 
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relative à l’anticipation et l’accompagnement des opérations d’évacuation des campements illicites 
(version 10 December 2013). 
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fragilités liées à la santé et à la couverture maladie’, ‘l’accès à l’emploi’ and ‘les 
capacités à intégrer un logement autonome et les besoins de mise à l’abri’.469 Although 
the final point appeared to offer recommendations about how to assess a ‘capacités à 
intégrer’, it did not specify what this meant or provide clear indicators for how to measure 
it. Instead the report gave the following advice: 470 
 
- Concevoir le diagnostic comme un instrument d’aide à la décision. Il doit, pour cela, 
comporter des propositions individualisées en termes de logement ou d’hébergement. 
- Approfondir les entretiens avec ceux qui expriment le souhait d’accéder à un 
logement autonome et proposer le cas échéant la mise en place un accompagnement 
social.  
 
The first suggestion reinforced the link between the principle of selection and public 
policy while the second revealed that the selection of Roma for state support depended on 
their propensity for autonomous living, a factor discussed in detail later in the chapter. 
Yet, although these suggestions offered a rough guideline around which regional officials 
could structure diagnostics, officials were not responsible for undertaking the assessments 
themselves. Instead they hired contractors to conduct the diagnostics, who were able to 
exercise a considerable amout of discretion to design their own format for assessing 
Roma so long as they included the list of elements in their evaluation. This meant that in 
practice, diagnostics were not standardised because they reflected each contractor’s style. 
Furthermore, as contractors had their own preconceived methodologies to measure the 
suitability of camp residents for state support, diagnostics were not individually tailored 
to each resident. Rather these preconceived methodologies tended to marginalise the 
majority of Roma rather than fostering their equal, individualised treatment. This revealed 
that in practice the Hollande government’s policy of anticipation was not as fair as the 26 




Despite the Hollande government’s focus on integration, not all Roma were eligible for 
state support in the first place. Some of these so-called Roma exhibited illegal behaviour, 
which jeopardised their residency in France. The French state could not logically offer 
evicted camp inhabitants medium to long-term accompagnement if they were not 
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permitted to remain in France. Conscious of this issue, government contractors 
considered the eligibility of inhabitants to reside in France before assessing their 
suitability for integration. Diagnostics were therefore not only a tool for selecting Roma 
but also an implicit instrument for disqualifying them. If a government contractor 
considered certain camp inhabitants as ineligible, they would notify regional officials of 
this development in their diagnostic report. Officials could then choose to use the 
information as grounds for deportation. This meant that – albeit indirectly – diagnostics 
allowed the Hollande government to continue a policy of deporting migrants they 
perceived as Roma from France without appearing as hard-line as its predecessor. A 
policy the Hollande government claimed was geared towards ‘une logique d’insertion et 
d’intégration’471 could in fact lead to the rejection of Roma.   
 
Three principal factors appeared to disqualify Roma from state support. The first of these 
was their immigration status. Although many residents living in illegal camps were 
nationals of EU member states, their citizenship did not grant them the unconditional 
right to reside in France indefinitely. For example, if a person had already been deported 
or had benefited from an ‘aide au retour’, their return into France was restricted. These 
people were essentially illegal aliens. As a regional official exclaimed, ‘les gens qui ne 
sont pas en situation regulière, vous devrez en tirer toutes les consequences’.472 This is 
why Dihal identified ‘Date d’installation dans le campement, temps de présence et 
parcours en France, titre d’identité, droit au séjour’ in their list of key information that a 
diagnostic should include.473 An excerpt from a diagnostic in the Alpes-Maritimes 





d'entrée en France 
Info DRLP Info OFII 
Urziceni, 
Roumanie 
2,5 mois OQT exécutée 19/05/2009 
OQT non placée 17/11/2010  
Possibilité établissement nouvelle OQT 
dès 3 mois de présence en France 




471 Ministère de l’Intérieur et. al., Evaluation des dispositifs d’accompagnement des personnes presents 
dans les campements (May 2013). 
472 Interview with Regional Official 1, Préfecture des Alpes-Maritimes, Nice (16 June 2015). 
473 Dihal, Vade-mecum à l’usage des correspondant ‘points de contact départementaux’ de la mission 
relative à l’anticipation et l’accompagnement des opérations d’évacuation des campements illicites 
(version 10 December 2013). 
474 Préfecture des Alpes-Maritimes, Recensement Antibes (14 January 2013).  
	 162 
The first column provided details of where the person was born, which was often, but not 
always, an indication of nationality. It also documented whether any children had been 
born in France. The second column recorded the date the person entered France, which 
allowed officials to determine whether they had overstayed the period of grace. As this 
diagnostic was carried out while transitional restrictions on Romanian and Bulgarian 
nationals were still in place, the period of grace was three months. The third column was 
a list of information from la Direction de la réglementation et des libertés publiques 
(DRLP). As a function of the Préfecture, the DRLP was responsible for managing 
immigration and residency disputes through its Bureau du contentieux du séjour et de 
l'éloignement. It could therefore provide records of whether the French state had 
previously issued a person with an Ordre de Quitter la Territoire (OQT), whether the 
order had been executed and whether the person was eligible for an OQT in the future. 
The fourth column included data from the Office Français de l'Immigration et de 
l'Intégration (OFII) specifying whether a person had benefited from the ‘aide au retour’ 
scheme (AR), prohibiting their long-term residence in France for up to three years.  
 
Together, these elements of information presented government officials with a 
comprehensive picture of a person’s immigration status. The reason this was so 
significant was that normally officials required a court order to conduct identity checks in 
the event of an evacuation. As participation in diagnostics was voluntary and required the 
consent of the Roma, government officials could sidestep this administrative hurdle and 
access the personal information necessary to verify their right to residency in France. By 
partaking in a diagnostic, a person wishing to gain accompagnement could consequently 
end up being deported instead.   
 
The second factor disqualifying Roma from state support was criminal history. This was 
because a person’s criminal history could be used as evidence of menace à l’ordre public 
to justify their deportation. A national official in Paris reflected this argument: 
 
Il y a une condition préalable, un critère négatif. C’est toutes les personnes qui ont été 
condamnés – les casiers judiciares. Il y en a beaucoup. Ces personnes-là, on ne leur 
propose pas de rester dans la société française. On peut comprendre que quelqu’un peut 
faire de la mendicité mais dès lors que vous avez des faits condamnés sérieux on ne rentre 
pas dans le processus d’insertion.475 
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Yet regional officials in Lyon argued that begging and other petty crime did in fact 
disqualify Roma from obtaining accompagnement. When talking about a regional 
insertion initiative in Lyon exclusively for Roma called Andatu, an official stated ‘dans le 
programme Andatu on n’admet pas ceux qui se livrent à la mendicité’.476 Another noted 
‘on a exclu des familles pour des vols effectivement et pour des délits pénaux aussi’.477 
This raised an interesting point. If Roma were excluded from accompagnement but their 
petty crime did not constitute grounds for deportation, an evacuation would render them 
homeless without any prospect of alternative housing. As a regional official from Nice 
admitted ‘il faut souligner qu’en règle générale les Roms ne posent pas de vraies 
difficultés en termes d’ordre public.’478 These Roma condemned of petty crime did not 
necessarily leave France, deciding to establish informal settlements elsewhere in the 
region or further afield. From this perspective, the disqualification of certain Roma from 
state support contributed to the fact that the total number of residents living in illegal 
camps in France remained relatively stable.  
 
The third disqualifying factor was a lack of financial resources. This was because the 
French state could cite insufficient resources as proof that a citizen from another EU 
member state posed an unnecessary burden on the French welfare state. Dihal clearly 
stated this point in a report on 10 December 2013: 
 
Le citoyen européen ou suisse peut venir en France pour y rechercher un emploi, pendant 
une période de 6 mois. Il doit s’inscrire dès son arrivée comme demandeur d’emploi. S’il 
n’a jamais exercé d’activité professionelle ou s’il ne peut plus bénéficer du maintien de 
droit en tant que travailleur, le citoyen bulgare ou roumain doit, comme tout autre citoyen 
de l’Union Européenne, justifier de la possession de ressources suffisantes et d’une 
assurance maladie. 479 
 
This meant that Romanian and Bulgarian citizens whom French officials considered to be 
Roma could be deported after six months if their reliance on the French welfare state was 
seen as disproportionate to their economic contribution. Before 1 January 2014 these 
Roma could be deported after three months in line with the EU’s transitional restrictions 
on the movement of Romanian and Bulgarian nationals. To test this phenomenon, 
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diagnostics assessed how Roma earned their living, whether they had registered for 
employment in France, whether they had benefited from medical assistance or social 
services. Below is an example of a diagnostic from an illegal camp in Ile-de-France 
conducted by GIP Habitat et Interventions Sociales on 15 May 2014: 480 
 
Resources Prestations (AME/CAF) 
oui/non/en cours Activité pro FR Inscription pôle emploi oui/non/freins 
Récuperation des déchets 
informels, récuperation des 
métaux 
non en cours  
  
The first column detailed how a person made their living, the second documented 
whether they had registered for work, and the third listed whether they had received 
benefits either in the form of an Aide Médicale de l’Etat (AME) or Caisse des Allocations 
Familiales (CAF). This information helped French officials to determine whether a Roma 
benefited more from the French welfare state than they contributed and decide whether 
they constituted an unreasonable burden on the French public purse. Once again, 
diagnostics could provide officials with evidence to support the deportation Roma as well 
as integrating a select few. As the next section of this chapter reveals, diagnostics also 
included the ability to secure a job or employability as a selection criteria.  
 
The message was clear: integration was conditional. As socialist Prime Minister Jean-
Marc Ayrault declared to the French National Assembly on 1 October 2013 ‘l’intégration 
est possible quand on respecte les lois de la République.’481 Laurent Fabius, the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs supported this comment during the same parliamentary debate, adding 
‘en ce qui concerne l’intégration...il faut que les Roms, comme tous ceux qui sont en 
France, respectent les règles. S’ils respectent les lois de la République, très bien. S’ils ne 
les respectent pas, ils doivent être sanctionnés’.482 The Finance Minister, Bernard 
Cazeneuve summed up his colleagues’ arguments in a radio interview that day, asserting 
‘la République, c’est un espace de droits et devoirs.’483 These assertions demonstrated 
that the Hollande government’s message was tightly aligned. To be eligible let alone 
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selected for accompagnement, Roma had to respect the laws of the Republic. Thus, Roma 
who applied for state support were not only subject to a process of selection – they also 




Having disqualified ineligible Roma from the race for accompagnement, government 
contractors then assessed the remaining applicants. Their decision hinged upon an 
evaluation of candidates’ ‘volonté d’intégrer’. 484 Although the Hollande government did 
not explicitly define what this term meant in the 26 August 2012 circular, two criteria 
against which to test the assimilability of Roma emerged in technical policy reports, 
diagnostics and my own interviews. The first was a demonstrated desire to immigrate to 
France on a long-term basis and build a projet de vie. The second was a willingness to 
live autonomously rather than as members of an extended Roma family, thereby leaving 
behind the communitarian clan. This section examines these two criteria in detail to 
expose how the French state selected the ‘worthy’ few deemed suitable for state support.  
 
Immigration versus Migration  
 
The perception of Roma as an inherently nomadic people is an ill-founded stereotype. 
Illegal camp residents tended to move pre-emptively or as a consequence of an eviction, 
and their arrival in France was more likely a product of economic and social aspirations 
rather than a longing for spontaneous movement. Nevertheless, not all camp residents 
wished to settle permanently in France. Those who were EU citizens could capitalise on 
their right to free movement by gathering resources in France to take home to their 
countries of origin. As accompagnment was a medium to long-term commitment, the 
French state did not accept camp residents who lacked prospects of establishing a life in 
France. An inter-departmental report led by the Interior Ministry limited ‘l’insertion des 
populations concernées’ to those ‘qui ont un projet de vie en France’.485 A local official 
reflected this view, claiming ‘on essaie d’accompagner ceux qui ont vraiment envie de 
s’intégrer. C’est quand-même important de pouvoir compter sur le fait qu’ils ont un projet 
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de vie en France’.486 A regional official also claimed ‘moi je sais qu’il y en a certains qui 
ne veulent pas s’intégrer, qui viennent en France pour profiter du système, mais il y en a 
aussi certains qui veulent s’intégrer, et dans la durée’.487 A long-term project in France 
was thus evidence of assimilability.  
 
The notion of a projet de vie rested upon four key indicators. The first, as a local official 
described, was a ‘volonté de sédentarisation’.488 This meant that Roma had to exhibit a 
desire for long-term settlement and justify this by having a relatively uninterrupted record 
of residency in France instead of a pattern of regular movement back and forth to their 
country of origin. A regional official from the Bouches-du-Rhône expressed this view: 
 
Une condition, c’est de ne pas faire d’aller-retour. Il faut avoir un projet de vie en France. 
Tout simplement. Après ils peuvent partir en Roumanie, comme les portugais qui 
retourne au Portugal, les Espagnols repartent en Espagne, les Italiens repartent chez eux 
pendant les vacances. Mais ce n’est pas choquant ça. Ce qui est choquant c’est les allers-
retours réguliers, tous les 15 jours.489  
 
A government contractor from Adoma adopted this logic of selection while undertaking 
diagnostics: 
 
Pour la plateforme Ile-de-France sur laquelle on a été missionnés, on a eu des personnes 
qui ont dit ‘ah c’est un accompagnement de 12 à 18 mois...il faut que je passe six mois en 
Roumanie cette année’ ou bien ‘je veux construire ma maison en Roumanie, ma 
migration a pour objectif essentiellement de gagner le maximum d’argent pour le 
renvoyer en Roumanie, dans trois ans je repars’. Donc, je ne les accepte pas. Enfin je ne 
les intègre pas dans le dispositif.490 
 
These comments revealed a paradox. Although the right to free movement allowed Roma 
from other EU member states to enter France, selection for accompagnement was 
contingent upon limited movement. Contrary to the EU’s vision of European integration, 
which promoted the fluid movement of citizens and goods, the French republican model 
of integration was based on immigration rather than migration. This restriction on 
movement continued once a Roma had been chosen for state support as well. As a 
regional official from the Rhône revealed, ‘on a eu le cas où la personne suivie par le 
dispositif Andatu est rentrée chez elle pendant quelques mois en Roumanie. C’est la 
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migration pendulaire. Elle a été exclue du dispositif Andatu.’491 Thus, both selection for 
and participation in accompagnement challenged the right of EU citizens to move freely. 
It appeared that a projet de vie in France could occlude opportunities for residency 
elsewhere.   
 
The second indicator of a projet de vie was the education of children in French schools. 
The focus on education is highly symbolic given the importance of l’école républicaine 
as the principal institution of integration in French republican mythology. As a local 
official maintained ‘le premier critère c’est la scolarisation des enfants qui est 
fondamentale. S’il n’y a pas de scolarisation des enfants, déjà on considère qu’il n’y a pas 
de volonté d’intégration’.492 A regional official echoed this view, arguing that ‘les critères 
d’insertion sont très clairs. D’abord la scolarisation des enfants est très claire. Il faut 
s’engager à scolariser son enfant et à suivre leur scolarité. C’est une règle de la 
République française, jusqu’au moins 16 ans. A mon avis, ça c’est le premier critère, le 
fait de suivre la scolarité des enfants’.493 Ensuring the consistent education of Roma 
children up to the age of 16 was both a condition of accompagnement and as well as a 
legal requirement.  
 
However, in practice scolarisation was not always easy to achieve. Sometimes 
administrative barriers hindered the enrolment of children from illegal camps in schools. 
Conscious of these difficulties, Dihal reported that ‘le manque de place dans les 
établissements, l’absence de domiciliation ou d’état-civil des enfants [et] l’absence de 
vaccination de l’enfant’ could prevent enrolment.494  Dihal highlighted four other 
obstacles to enrolment: 
 
- le fait de n’avoir jamais été scolarisé auparavant, 
- les évacuations des campements qui entraînent des ruptures de scolarisation, 
- les tests d’évaluation linguistique qui retardent l’entrée dans le processus scolaire 
- les refus explicites ou implicites d’inscription par certaines communes.495 
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The first and third obstacle revealed that although l’école républicaine was 
compulsory, in some cases prior education and French language skills were 
necessary prerequisites. The second obstacle shed light on the tension between the 
republican value of integration and the state-led evacuation of illegal camps. The 
final obstacle implied that in some cases, local French officials chose to betray the 
idea of scolarisation for bureaucratic or political purposes. Despite the emphasis 
French officials placed on the responsibility of Roma to ensure their children were 
educated in French schools, sometimes a lack of scolarisation was the fault of 
impediments inside the French system.  
 
The third indicator of a projet de vie was the employability of adult Roma. This 
did not mean that camp residents had to show evidence of a permanent 
employment contract, but it did require them to prove they had taken steps 
towards ‘une démarche d’insertion professionnelle’.496 As a regional official said, 
‘il faut avoir une certaine employabilité...même s’ils avaent un niveau 
d’instruction parfois très faible, ils pouvaient avoir des compétences en jardinage, 
métiers du bâtiment etc.’497 The official also claimed that in his experience ‘il y 
avait des problèmes d’alphabétisation mais pas pour les personnes d’un certain 
âge parce qu’en fait, ceux qui avaient été scolarisés sous Ceausescu savaient bien 
lire et écrire’.498 From this perspective, those educated under Romania’s 
Communist regime had a high level of literacy and therefore a better chance at 
securing employment than the younger generation. Dihal also drew attention to 
‘insertion professionnelle’ as an indicator of integration by specifying that 
‘l’employabilité des personnes doit être mesurée par: la connaissance du français, 
les savoir-faire [et] les expériences professionnelles, les compétences développées 
tant dans le pays d’origine qu’en France’.499 Thus, if illegal camp residents 
exhibited skills for a trade or profession, government contractors could count 
them as evidence of a capacity to integrate into French society.  
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Yet others were not so optimistic. A regional official argued that ‘le projet de vie 
des Roms est de survivre et de ramasser un peu d’argent. Peu d’entre eux 
formulent directement l’idée de dire: je veux travailler.’500 From the regional 
official’s point of view, the problem was not that Roma lacked the skills to work 
in France but that they had no desire to work at all. The official added ‘certains 
Roms étaient là depuis 8 ans, ils vivaient au même endroit, entre temps ils n’ont 
pas trouvé de travail ni de logement. Même en France où la situation est un peu 
difficile, il faut vraiment faire exprès de ne pas trouver un travail’.501  These 
comments exposed a prejudice that certain Roma did not want to integrate into 
French society that was independent from the information collected in 
diagnostics. Another regional official reflected this view, arguing ‘vous ne pouvez 
pas héberger tout le monde, c’est cher et quelques-uns ne sont pas vraiment 
insérables’.502 Even before a diagnostic was conducted, certain officials had 
already decided that some so-called Roma were not worthy of state support.  
 
The fourth indicator of a projet de vie in France was French language. This was 
linked to the scolarisation of Roma children and the employment prospects of 
their parents. A local official insisted ‘il faut qu’ils respectent nos règles et qu’ils 
maitrisent ou aient envie de maitriser les fondamentaux de notre langue pour 
entrer en interaction avec les autres, de faire société’.503 A regional official in 
Lyon claimed that French language skills were a condition of accompagmenent: 
‘le fait de chercher activement à apprendre le français est un critère qui détermine 
l’entrée d’une famille dans le programme Andatu’.504 Roma who demonstrated an 
ability or expressed a desire to learn French were deemed assimilable. A 
government contractor shared this logic, contending ‘Avec des diagnostics, on a 
des critères clairs et précis. Et on lance un message fort aux personnes: “si des 
efforts sont faits, il y a des possibilités d’intégration.’505 This implied that if Roma 
attempted to integrate on their own, the French state would help them achieve it. 
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Reflecting on the French government’s policy, an EU official stated ‘cette 
politique elle vise à donner une chance à des gens qui ne sont pas la majorité, qui 
ont une réelle volonté et une capacité d’intégration. Je pense que l’approche 
française aide l’intégration des Roms qui sont intégrables.’506 
 
Autonomous versus Communal Living  
 
In addition to a projet de vie in France, evidence of a desire to abandon the vie collective 
and adopt a vie autonome was another criteria government contractors employed to select 
assimilable Roma. A regional official from the Bouches-du Rhône endorsed this 
reasoning, arguing that ‘par contre sur d’autres critères, la décohabitation, c’est un critère 
important pour moi. En France on ne vit pas en famille élargie, sauf peut-être dans 
certains villages où ça peut se faire encore et où il y a une solidarité intergénérationnelle, 
mais en mode de vie urbain ça n’existe plus.’507 Underpinning this argument was the 
perception that the structure of a Roma family was different to the French norm. A local 
official maintained ‘les Roms sont les seuls à s’installer comme ça, en groupe, dans les 
bidonvilles et en ayant un positionnement qui a suscité un regard très specifique’.508 This 
critique echoed the accusations French civil servants made in relation to North Africans 
living in bidonvilles in the 1950s and 60s. In both cases case, the implicit message was 
that the idea of a vie collective was not acceptable in France because communal living 
was considered to hinder the integration of immigrants.  
 
A regional official from the Nord addressed the point directly, affirming that ‘ce n’est pas 
une famille nucléaire comme nous. C’est communautaire comme mode de 
fonctionnement. Donc quand vous vouliez déplacer quelqu’un vous aviez dix personnes. 
Par contre, nous on ne fabrique pas des habitations pour dix personnes’.509 Similarly, the 
government contractor, Adoma also reported that ‘la majorité des...ménages sont 
composés d’un couple avec deux enfants’, suggesting that their model of alternative 
housing was designed for nuclear families.510 From this perspective, the problem with a 
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vie collective was practical because French social housing was built for nuclear families 
rather than extended ones. A regional official from the Alpes-Maritimes extended this 
claim by stating that ‘la vie collective pose un problème parce que d’abord on est dans un 
système de prestations sociales qui est adossé à la notion de famille nucléaire, ou 
d’individu. Ensuite, on est dans une relation avec les services, qu’il s’agisse de l’Etat ou 
de l’assurance-maladie, ou des services quels qu’ils soient – qui gèrent leur relation avec 
une famille, avec des enfants, bien sûr – mais une famille ou avec des individus.’511 A 
regional official from Seine-Saint-Denis criticised communal living on different grounds, 
affirming that ‘les Roms n’ont pas le même concept de famille nucleaire. C’est compliqué 
de les mettre avec les autres’.512 Through this official’s eyes, la vie collective alienated 
Roma from the majority of French society, and was a barrier to integration.  
 
But not all of these so-called Roma were willing to give up extended family life for state 
support. A regional official from the Alpes-Maritimes asserted that some Roma opted out 
of the contest for accompagnement for this reason: ‘la plupart des Roms sont dans une 
logique de vouloir garder leur communautarisme. Ils ne sont pas désireux de s’inscrire 
dans un processus d’intégration’.513 A regional official from the Direction départementale 
de la cohésion sociale (DDCS) in the Nord echoed this view, recounting that ‘sur 
certaines évacuations de camps, on a des refus d’hébergement puisque les personnes sont 
mises sur des hébergements de 5 à 6 personnes ce qui est impossible. Souvent les familles 
refusent le logement qui leur est proposé pour ne pas qu’il y ait un éclatement de la 
famille’.514 The fact that only a minority of of camp residents were willing to abandon 
their extended families aided the selection process for government contractors because it 
helped to reduce the number of applicants.  
 
However, limited resources meant that selection was still necessary. Accordingly, 
government contractors employed two indicators to gauge whether the remaining camp 
residents were prepared to live autonomously. The first was a willingness to separate their 
immediate family from extended relatives and the broader community. This was because 
the French state and its contractors saw communal living as an obstacle of integration. 
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The government contractor GIP Habitat et Interventions Sociales noted that ‘la volonté de 
rester avec le groupe peut constituer un frein dans les démarches d’insertion via le 
logement’.515 Yet, conversely, for those who were happy to abandon their community, 
integration was possible. According to a local official ‘il y a une petite minorité de gens 
qui ont dit “nous on veut rompre avec la communauté Roms, on veut s’installer en France 
et s’intégrer” et on leur a proposé un accompagnement.’516 A regional official also 
exclaimed ‘dans les campements j’observe qu’il y a deux catégories: il y en a qui sont très 
contents d’être mis à l’écart et il y a ceux qui ne veulent pas quitter le clan’.517 The 
implication was that expressing a desire to leave behind the vie collective signified a 
rejection of communitarianism and an acceptance of the republican model of integration. 
Thus, agreeing to separate from one’s extended family was seen as evidence of detaching 
from the ethnic Roma community.  
 
The second indicator of a vie autonome was whether camp residents were willing to 
relocate. As Dihal noted ‘Concernant le logement ou l’hébergement des personnes, il 
faudrait tenir en compte...des désirs ou non de ces personnes de quitter la région où elles 
sont présentes’.518 Relocation was an important consideration for government contractors 
because it allowed them to sidestep the issue of housing and budgetary shortages in one 
region by offering accompagnment in another. For example, a diagnostic undertaken by 
the GIP Habitat et Interventions Sociales on 6 May 2014 stated in bold print ‘concernant 
la localisation des solutions qui pourraient être proposées 7 ménages sont prêts à accepter 
une solution hors Ile-de-France et 7 ménages se disent prêts à quitter le groupe.’519 
Relocation was disruptive, especially if it occurred in the middle of a school year. Yet the 
fact that government contractors considered it a measure of assimilability highlighted that 
the provision of accompagnement was at the mercy of elected local politicians.  
 
The Hollande government’s policy of anticipation therefore bred tensions between the 
administrative and political branches of the French government. An inter-ministerial 
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policy report raised this concern, stating ‘la réticence prégnante de certaines collectivités 
locales à travailler avec l’Etat sur la question d’hébergement ou du logement temporaire 
des occupants des campements’ as a challenge to the anticipation policy.520 It added that 
‘cette réticence va jusqu’au refus clairement exprimé en termes politiques par des 
interlocuteurs rencontrés par la mission qui déclarent que la population Rom est 
indésirable sur le territoire de leur commune’.521 The unwillingness of local politicians to 
accommodate evicted camp residents, especially in the run up to the 2014 municipal 
elections, demonstrated that barriers to integration did not necessarily stem from the 
residents themselves and their allegedly communitarian way of life. Local French elites 
could also block the integration of Roma for political purposes.  
 
Despite their differences, civil servants and politicians shared the assumption that la vie 
collective was an inherent component of Roma culture. An adviser to a local politician 
claimed ‘il ne faut pas vouloir à tout prix intégrer. Les Roms ont une manière de vivre 
communautaire et une culture différente, c’est compliqué de les mettre dans un moule’.522 
Similarly, a national civil servant exclaimed ‘il me semble que culturellement, les Roms 
sont beaucoup plus éloignés de l’intégration et l’insertion en France qu’un africain 
d’origine francophone, bien qu’ils soient européens.’523 These comments framed the vie 
collective – and by association the Roma – as culturally incompatible with the republican 
system of integration, which aimed to assimilate individuals and small families into 
French society. This meant that although government contractors and officials believed 
that some camp residents could break away from their vie collective, even before a 
diagnostic took place the odds were already prejudiced against them.  
 
Outsourcing Selection  
 
The selection of assimilable camp residents was a rigorous process, but the question of 
who was responsible for selecting residents deserves closer attention. Although regional 
government officials were in charge of establishing diagnostics, they did not carry out the 
assessment themselves. Instead, they outsourced this sensitive task to non-government 
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contractors, who presented them with a report of findings to guide the course of action for 
evacuating illegal camps and providing alternative housing to some of the evicted 
residents. As such, the duty of deciding which of the so-called Roma were worthy of state 
support relied heavily on the discretion of contractors rather than government officials. 
This section examines the role that these contractors played in selecting camp residents 
they deemed assimilable and therefore suitable for state support, and raises ethnical 
concerns about outsourcing public policy.  
 
From Prefects to Independent Contractors   
 
The Hollande government’s 26 August 2012 circular stated that:  
 
Pour établir ce diagnostic, vous vous appuierez sur les services de l’Etat et de ses 
opérateurs et rechercherez, en fonction des besoins et du contexte local, le concours des 
services de collectivités territoriales (conseil général, centre communal d’action social –
CCAS –, aide sociale à l’enfance –ASE...). Ce diagnostic pourra également être confié à 
une association.524 
 
The last sentence is particularly telling because it gave prefects direct authorisation to 
outsource diagnostics to associations.525 This highlighted that Prefects could hire both 
associations (charitable non-government organisations) and opérataeurs (social 
enterprises that received partial public funding but had independent governance 
structures). Although the circular suggested that Prefects could also rely on the ‘services 
de l’Etat’, this was supplementary at least and incidental at most. In practice, non-
government organisations implemented diagnostics at the request of the state. This meant 
that independent professionals assessed whether Roma were assimilable and consequently 
evaluated whether these Roma were worthy of the French government’s support. A local 
official explained to me that ‘une fois qu’on a la décision de justice et avant de décider la 
date d’évacuation, on appelle une association pour commencer le diagnostic social. Pour 
faire ce diagnostic, les associations vont passer une ou plusieurs journées différentes.’526 
This suggested that the act of undertaking a diagnostic was relatively swift, especially 
given that some camps could contain up to several thousand people. Yet, it demonstrated 
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that independent contractors – not government officials – led the assessment of Roma on 
the ground. 
 
A regional official reiterated this point, maintaining that ‘il y a un ensemble de critères 
qui sont examinés par l’association, elle sélectionne des familles’.527 But the official then 
recognised the ethical issues associated with outsourcing the decision of allocating public 
funds, let alone to non-French nationals, and subsequently tried to downplay the role of 
non-government organisations. The regional official added ‘une fois que l’association a 
fait une sélection, elle se tourne vers la Préfecture pour demander s’il n’y a pas 
d’opposition. Ensuite si les familles sont validées par la Préfecture, elle se retourne aussi 
vers les communes qui accueillent les villages d’insertion.’528 Despite the official’s 
insistence that the state validated independent contractors’ decisions, the fact remained 
that the state was not involved in the selection process itself and their level of oversight 
was also unclear. Additionally, a national official from Dihal clarified that with regards to 
diagnostics, the key responsibility of the French state was to hire contractors: ‘ce sont les 
préfets qui choisissent les associations soit par des appels à projet, des appels à 
opérateurs, soit dans le cadre de conventions souvent avec des associations.’529 It 
therefore appeared that the role of the French state could be reduced to providing a rubber 
stamp of approval on predetermined results rather actively evaluating who was suitable 
for government support.  
 
Some criticised the relationship between the French state and contractors as a way of 
shifting the ‘dirty work’ outside of government. In an article in the paper, Le Canard 
Social, an employee of the association Arta vs Om hyperbolised this relationship stating 
‘Nous assistons à un jeu de télé-réalité ou l’on sélectionne des candidats les plus 
résistants, les plus dociles, les plus photogéniques, les plus favorisés’ and claimed ‘Ce 
“racisme d’Etat”...les travailleurs sociaux le relaient sans s’interroger sur leurs 
pratiques’.530 However, in some cases contractors possessed skills that the French state 
lacked. As a regional official from la Gironde asserted ‘le principe c’est que l’association 
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a différents employés, chacun est spécialisé. Il y a notamment des personnes qui font un 
travail social. Il y en a deux qui sont de nationalité bulgare donc il n’y a pas la barrière de 
la langue justement pour faire les diagnostics.’531 This was significant because in la 
Gironde, the majority of so-called Roma living in illegal camps were Bulgarian, which 
suggests that contractors unlocked a channel of communication between the French state 
and the Roma that would not have otherwise existed.  
 
The relationship between the French state and independent contractors was 
institutionalised in ‘la mission nationale d'appui à la résorption des bidonvilles’ signed by 
Adoma and the French Ministry of Housing on 10 March 2014.532 This mission spanned 
three years and comprised two core functions:  
 
Une intervention en ingénierie sociale: il s’agit de coordonner l’action des acteurs 
locaux (services de l’État, collectivités territoriales, associations), afin d’actualiser les 
diagnostics sociaux et de mobiliser les différentes ressources d’hébergement et de 
logement existantes sur un territoire  : centres d’hébergement, logements familiaux dans 
le diffus (secteur du logement social dans les zones détendues), patrimoine immobilier de 
l’État, des collectivités territoriales ou de certains établissements publics (hôpitaux, La 
Poste, SNCF, RFF...), foncier public disponible à la construction, places en hôtel. Dans ce 
cadre, la société Adoma sera aussi chargée de s’assurer de l’accès effectif des personnes 
aux dispositifs de droit commun : couverture santé, prévention et soins, aides sociales, 
aide alimentaire, scolarisation des enfants. 
 
Une intervention en tant qu’opérateur de logement très social: autre volet sur lequel 
les préfets peuvent recourir à Adoma : la mobilisation de l’ensemble de son parc qui 
compte environ 70 000 logements, répartis sur tout le territoire et dont un certain nombre 
son vacants.533 
 
The first function, related to the Hollande government’s policy of anticipation discussed 
in this chapter, and the second referred to accompagnement measures, addressed in the 
next chapter. Part of the first function was the implementation of diagnostics. The fact 
that Adoma had a dual mission could benefit French officials. Employing the same 
contractor to conduct diagnostics of Roma and supply accompagnement could minimise 
duplication and help align the assessment with the end result. It also reinforced the 
positive link between diagnostics and integration that the Hollande government had tried 
to establish. Yet, the national mission did not mean that Adoma had a monopoly on the 
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French state’s business. Prefectures employed various other contractors – with local, 
regional and national footprints – to undertake diagnostics. As a municipal official 
exclaimed ‘il y a plusieurs associations qui sont mandatées par la préfecture pour faire les 
diagnostics’.534 What the mission did signify was that from March 2014 Adoma became 
the national contractor of choice to assist with anticipation measures.  
 
Yet, Adoma was by no means a novice at evaluating and integrating ‘foreigners’ in 
France. In fact, Adoma was created in 1956 under the name of Sonacotral (Société 
Nationale de Construction de logements pour les Travailleurs Algériens) to provide 
temporary social housing and support to Algerian workers in France, helping them 
transition out of bidonvilles and into autonomous housing. After the Algerian War, 
Sonacotral changed its name to Sonacotra. Perhaps most significantly, following the 1964 
loi Debré and the 1970 loi Vivien, the French state commissioned Sonacotra to ‘résorber 
les bidonvilles’, which consisted predominantly of Algerian workers helping to 
reconstruct postwar France.535 This meant contractors from Adoma could draw upon the 
organisation’s institutional memory of postwar experience to shape its contemporary 
mission. Although the population in question had shifted from Algerians to Roma, 
Adoma had a long history of working on the ‘resorption des bidonvilles’ and was familiar 
with the laws and types of policies the French state employed to select and integrate 
assimilable candidates eligible for state support. Thus, the 2014 ‘mission nationale 
d'appui à la résorption des bidonvilles’ was not a new creation; it revived a postwar 
legacy that shaped the Fifth Republic’s response to immigration. In line with Vivien 
Schmidt’s theory of discursive institutionalism, this revealed how the French state’s 
previous programmes of eradicating slums set precedents for contemporary practices.  
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The Challenges of Outsourcing Public Policy 
 
The fact that contractors decided which camp residents were eligible for state support 
raised ethical concerns. Not only were non-government agencies in charge of allocating 
public resources, but these resources were also directed towards non-French citizens. In 
addition, contractors were responsible for making critically sensitive choices that could 
dramatically alter the lives of illegal camp residents on a personal level but also on a legal 
and administrative level. As demonstrated above, a contractor’s assessment of illegal 
camp residents could disrupt education and employment through relocation and could 
even lead to the deportation of camp residents from the French territory altogether. 
Outsourcing the selection of camp reisdents also tested the boundaries of the French 
republican ideology government officials defended, which rested upon the foundation of 
political order through representative institutions.  
 
By transferring the responsibility of selecting assimilable residents from the state to non-
government agencies, three key issues emerged. The first related to legitimacy. Although 
hired by the state, contractors were not representatives of the state, which called into 
question the grounds upon which contractors were qualified to make sensitive decisions 
about public policy. For example, a diagnostic report of illegal camps in the Hauts-de-
Seine Department conducted by Adoma included a table outlining ‘les ménages 
“potentiellement insérables” rencontrés au départ de la mission’ and listed the number of 
‘ménages avec critères d’insertion’.536 It also highlighted that ‘les résultats des entretiens 
présentés dans ce rapport se basent sur les 13 ménages (parmi les 20 auparavant identifiés 
par le GIP) susceptibles d’entrer dans le champ de la circulaire du 26 août 2016.’537 This 
demonstrated two points: non-government associations such as GIP and Adoma 
sometimes worked together to provide complementary services for anticipation and 
accompagnement, and these non-government bodies were responsible for deciding which 
camp residents were capable of integrating into French society.  
 
Unsurprisingly, deciding which residents were assimilable was not straightforward. Dihal 
stated that ‘les diagnostics doivent conjuguer: des informations quantatives sur les 
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personnes présentes (tableaux de recensement) [et] des informations qualitatives sur leurs 
parcours (rapports et entretien détaillés)’.538 This qualitative aspect meant that conducting 
diagnostics required contractors to exercise their discretion to determine results. As a 
contractor exclaimed ‘c’est un travail très subjectif’.539 This raises questions about the 
potential bias of contractors. A regional official told me that NGOs criticised contractors 
for using a logic of rejection to validate evictions and deportations of Roma rather than 
supporting their integration. The regional official said that the NGO Rom Europe asked to 
‘laissez ces diagnostics. Ce sont des recensements de police qui servent au préfet pour 
s’assurer qu’il ne va pas y avoir de problème quand il va y avoir l’évacuation.’540 Thus, 
NGOs questioned the motives of non-government agencies and consequently disapproved 
of diagnostics. 
 
The second issue that outsourcing diagnostics raised was anonymity. In their guide for 
establishing diagnostics, Dihal stated ‘Les diagnostics posent la question de 
l’anonymisation et de la confidentialité des informations...les diagnostics communiqués 
au préfet qui est le maître d’ouvrage ne doivent comporter que les informations 
nominatives indispensables pour la recherche de solutions personnalisées. Les 
informations à caractère médical, cependant doivent rester confidentielles.’541 However, 
despite Dihal’s insistence on maintaining confidentiality of Roma participants, this was 
betrayed in practice. For example, a regional official presented me with a detailed 
spreadsheet, which displayed the results of three diagnostics undertaken in the Alpes-
Maritimes Department. In each case, the table listed the names of the participants 
involved as well as a column entitled ‘Info Sociale/Sanitaire’, which revealed key 
elements of medical history such as ‘problèmes de spasmophilie’.542 This example 
demonstrated that a non-government agency had done exactly what Dihal asked them not 
to do.  
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However, not all contractors exposed the identity of participants in their diagnostics. GIP, 
for instance, did not specify the names but did provide a brief health assessment of 
participants in their diagnostics for the Ile-de-France Region in May and June 2014.543 
Nevertheless, despite respecting the anonymity of participants, the inclusion of their 
medical information still undermined Dihal’s recommendations. The fact that contractors 
shared the confidential data of Roma with prefects exposed a lack of government 
oversight, which suggested that in practice French officials were passive recipients of 
diagnostics rather than active decision makers. It also reflected a disregard for the privacy 
of illegal camp residents in France. Hypothetically, if it were found out that prefects 
possessed an inventory of the names and medical history of French citizens in the 
Department, it would likely generate outrage. Perhaps, government officials and 
contractors assumed that privacy was not of particular value to illegal camp residents 
because of the conspicuous nature of the dwellings in which they lived. In any case, the 
lack of confidentiality indicated a double standard. 
 
The third issue associated with outsourcing diagnostics was resources. It is not 
uncommon for governments to subcontract work to independent bodies to save time and 
money. Yet, in the case of diagnostics, this had adverse effects. In September 2013, 
Amnesty International published a report criticising diagnostics, stating: 
 
One of the procedural safeguards intended to prevent forced evictions is that those 
affected should be genuinely consulted in advance so that they can inform themselves 
about the operation envisaged. Establishing a genuine dialogue with them is essential in 
order to respect the obligation to provide adequate alternative housing and to limit the use 
of force 40. The “social assessment” (“diagnostic social”) prescribed in the 26 August 
circular does not amount to the kind of genuine consultation laid down in international 
law and such assessments are not systematically carried out prior to evictions.544 
 
The implication was that diagnostics were not thorough or accurate enough to genuinely 
help to provide camp residents with alternative housing in the event of an evacuation. But 
this issue was not entirely the fault of contractors; it was compounded by the fact that 
some camp residents opted out of the process. According to a regional official, ‘souvent 
les associations ont des difficultés à faire les diagnostics car quand ils passent le 
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lendemain ce ne sont pas les mêmes occupants. Il y a beaucoup de mouvements, de gens 
qui repartent au pays, qui reviennent, et donc c’est très difficile de figer un diagnostic 
précis’.545  
 
The other part of the challenge was money. In 2013 the Hollande government dedicated 
four million euros to ‘des actions d’anticipation et d’accompagnement des évacuations de 
campements illicites. Parmi celles-ci figurait l’élaboration de diagnostics’.546 This was a 
large sum of money for what Amnesty International had argued was an impotent and 
superficial resource. Regional officials also criticised diagnostics but for quite different 
reasons from Amnesty International. A document given to me by an official in Seine-
Saint-Denis stated that ‘il est à noter que les échéances de plus en plus éloignées de 
réalisation de diagnostics conduisent d’une part à ralentir le rythme des évacuations et, 
d’autre part, à favoriser l’extension des campements’.547 From this perspective, 
diagnostics provided poor value for money. 
 
In a similar vein, another regional official confessed that ‘on a été des très bons élèves, 
pendant un an et demi on a respecté la circulaire à la lettre, mais maintenant on ne va plus 
faire des diagnostics parce qu’ils sont trop chers.’548 In spite of the Hollande 
government’s orders, regional officials came to view the outsourcing of diagnostics to 
non-government contractors as an unnecessary public expense. The fact that regional 
officials decided to discontinue this measure exemplified how issues associated with 
outsourcing diagnostics led regional officials to go against the national policy of 
anticipation outlined in the Hollande government’s 26 August 2012 circular. Thus, the 
process of selecting camp residents for state support generated internal rifts within 




545 Interview with Regional Official 2, Préfecture des Alpes-Maritimes, Nice (10 September 2015).  
546 Dihal, Etablir le diagnostic global et individualisé d’un campement illicite dans le cadre de la mission 
relative à l’anticipation et l’accompagnement des opérations d’évacuation des campements illicites (18 
March 2014), p. 11.  
547 Préfecture de la Seine-Saint-Denis, Direction de la sécurité et des services du Cabinet, Campements 
illicites dans la département de la Seine-Saint-Denis: Situation au 12 juin 2015 (12 June 2015).   




This chapter argued that despite the universalist language in the 26 August 2012 circular, 
the Hollande government employed a logic of selection to determine which Roma were 
worthy of state support. Although French officials prioritised the republican idea of 
universalism in their discourses justifying anticipation policies, their universalist 
language concealed a logic of selection based on a heteronormative conceptualisation of 
assimilability. By examining the assessment of these Roma living in slums in the 
diagnostic reports, this chapter revealed that the basis for choosing Roma depended on a 
subjective perception of their volonté d’intégrer in French society, which was contingent 
upon evidence of a projet de vie in France and a desire to detach from the alleged vie 
collective and communautaire of illegal camps. Additionally, this chapter exposed how 
the Hollande government were able to use diagnostics as grounds for deporting camp 
residents while maintaining an appearance of humanitarianism. This exemplified the 
ways in which officials could use the republican idea of preserving the neutrality of the 
public sphere to justify deportation policies. Perhaps most strikingly however, this 
chapter uncovered that non-government agencies were responsible for conducting 
diagnostics. It maintained that by outsourcing the selection of Roma to independent 
contractors, the French state stretched ethical boundaries, an issue of which French 
officials were well aware. In the words of a local official, ‘concernant les diagnostics, 








INTEGRATION: A MODERN CIVILISING MISSION 
 
 
‘Les solutions d’intégration ne sont pas toujours évidentes’.550 




‘Intégration est possible quand on respecte les lois de la République’.551 
Jean-Marc Ayrault (1 October 2013) 
 
The French state selected a minority of evicted Roma to remain in France and provided 
them with social and financial assistance to ease their integration into French society. Yet, 
government assistance was conditional. Evicted Roma were subject to a process of state-
led integration akin to a modern ‘civilising mission’. As a political adviser put it, 
‘l’intégration c’est la rencontre entre la capacité de la République à donner à des 
étrangers la possibilité de parler la langue française, de s’insérer dans l’emploi, de 
construire sa vie en France et le désir de quelqu’un de vivre en France dans le respect des 
valeurs de la République.’552  
 
For the Roma, integration had added conditions. According to an official from the Rhône, 
‘l’intégration pour les Roms c’est très particulier. On leur demande de se séparer du 
phénomène clanique. Le but est de les amener à entrer dans le droit commun, et à vivre en 
autonomie en appartement’.553 The assumption was that Roma were not sufficiently 
civilised to live autonomously and that the French state needed to intervene with 
accompagement policies to guide Roma towards financial and social independence. The 
discourse of this official was paternalistic and it contained classist, heteronormative and 
crypto-Christian bias. Like many others, the official assumed that the population living in 
slums were Roma, that their way of life was clanique and at odds with the middle-class, 
heteronormative and crypto-Christian idea of a nuclear family, and that their behaviour 
was uncivilised insofar as they were incapable of living autonomously without 
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accompagnement from the state. The official implied that Roma could not integrate into 
French society alone.  
 
Yet accompagnement did not begin as a top-down policy, designed by national officials. 
It first appeared in 2007 as part of the Mayor of Aubervilliers’ village d’insertion project 
and was reproduced in municipal and regional initiatives across France. Integration 
projects occurred under the Sarkozy and Hollande administrations but only materialised 
into national policy in the Hollande government’s 26 August 2012 circular and remained 
largely decentralised in practice. This chapter explores how French officials used the 
republican idea of integration to communicate and justify accompagnement policies 
tailored to the Roma in France. Yet, it is important to note that officials did not interpret 
integration uniformly. With this in mind, this chapter seeks to answer three questions. 
What different models of integration did officials employ? What did the process of 
integration entail? And did the accompagnement policies succeed in integrating Roma 
into French society?  
 
Models of Integration  
 
Since 2007, French officials have employed a range of solutions d’insertion to help 
evicted Roma integrate into French society.554 Each solution d’insertion provided a 
programme of accompagnement, including alternative subsidised housing. In doing so, 
they shared a common aim: to absorb evicted Roma and guide them towards autonomous 
life in France. As an inter-ministerial report in May 2013 stated ‘Qu’il s’agisse de terrains 
d’accueil temporaires viabilisés ou de “villages” d’insertion, les initiatives des 
collectivités locales et de l’Etat permettent de résoudre la question des campements en 
offrant une alternative à l’hébergement d’urgence...Différents dans leurs modalités, ces 
types d’expériences ont pour objectif l’insertion et la construction d’un projet de vie pour 
les personnes sorties des campements.’555 A regional official echoed this point two years 
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later, claiming that ‘l’objectif c’est de créer la capacité d’être autonome, donc de subvenir 
seul à ses besoins’.556  
 
The French state’s discourse of integration aimed to guide evicted Roma towards 
autonomous life in France. However, local and regional officials interpreted the idea of 
integration in different ways, which was reflected in their dispositifs. Two models of 
integration emerged. The first was to place evicted Roma in segregated communities 
often termed villages d’insertion, with targeted accompagnement programmes, to prepare 
them for self-sufficient life in France. These were meant to be temporary, ideally lasting 
between three to five years, and although the French state covered the cost of rent for that 
period (hébergement), it did not promise rent controlled social housing (logement) 
afterwards. Instead it expected Roma to use the skills gained through accompagnement to 
secure accommodation afterwards. In contrast, the second model was that of mixité rather 
than segregation. The main example was an initiative called Andatu in the Rhône. Instead 
of making Roma qualify for logement, the Prefecture of the Rhône came to an agreement 
with the association Forum Réfugiés and the local social housing organisation to pre-
emptively secure Roma direct access to rent controlled apartments scattered across Lyon. 
Andatu still included a period of intensive accompagnement, which housed participants in 
the same building, but this was transitional, lasting between six to twelve months. This 
section takes a closer look at the two models that underpinned the French state’s 
discourses on integrating Roma. 
 
Segregated Insertion  
 
The village d’insertion established in 2007 by Jacques Salvator, the socialist Mayor of 
Aubervilliers in Seine-Saint-Denis was the first of its kind. Yet, the model of integration 
was not new. Salvator drew inspiration from the cités de transit of the 1960s and 70s, 
which housed dislodged guest workers often of Algerian origin, who had previously 
occupied France’s postwar bidonvilles.557 Nevertheless, it was the first state-led solution 
d’insertion specifically designed to assimilate Roma and it provided a prototype for 
subsequent initiatives in the Seine-Saint-Denis Department and more broadly throughout 
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France. Villages d’insertions were confined physical structures that supplied residents 
with hébergement and accompagnement. As there was no official or legal definition of a 
village d’insertion, their composition varied. They ranged from repurposed buildings, to 
modular prefabs, bungalows and caravans. Most provided independent lodgings for 
nuclear families as well as communal areas and amenities, while a small number could 
accomodate extended relatives such as grandparents.558 Additionally, some sites belonged 
to local municipalities or préfectures, while others were the property of non-profit 
associations such as Adoma. In some cases, associations defined the programme of 
accompagnemnt, while others conformed to the guidelines of a maîtrise d’oeuvre urbaine 
et sociale (MOUS), a policy instrument for aiding the social and professional integration 
of disadvantaged populations in France.559 All villages d’insertion were secure 
compounds but some environments were more strict than others, with high walls, curfews 
and restricted visiting rights.  
 
A defining feature of villages d’insertion was their location. They were usually situated 
on the periphery of urban centres, with relatively low population density and few public 
transport links.560 As a regional official from the Alpes Maritimes said, ‘les villages 
d’insertion étaient relativement à l’écart, je ne dis pas éloigné mais en tout cas pas en 
plein cœur de la ville, pour permettre d’éviter de donner à la population de susciter 
éventuellement des réactions d’antagonisme.’561 This meant that villages d’insertion were 
essentially invisible. By segregating evicted Roma from French society in villages 
d’insertion, the French state shifted them out of the public eye and under public control. 
 
The isolation and firm restrictions on Roma in villages d’insertion generated considerable 
criticism from politicians, pundits and activists, who called for a more humanitarian 
approach to integration. A Senate report on the integration of Roma in 2012 stated that 
‘Le danger de ces villages est en effet de maintenir une forme de ségrégation entre leurs 
habitants et le reste de la société...En aucun cas, ils ne doivent être un moyen d’isoler “le 
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problème rom” du reste de la société.’562 A political adviser to the Hollande 
administration reflected this sentiment, arguing that ‘les villages d’insertion sont très 
communautaristes. C’était l’idée de recréer un campement illicite dans un cadre licite. 
Une caricature un peu. Ce n’est pas vraiment le cœur de notre politique.’563  
 
A regional official extended this argument, claiming ‘les villages d’insertion ne se 
conforment pas aux valeurs républicaines. Si on rassemble tous les membres d’une même 
communauté au même endroit, pour moi ça s’appelle un ghetto.’564 The official implied 
that all residents of villages d’insertion belonged to the same community and that the 
community’s behaviour challenged republican values. In doing so, the official framed 
villages d’insertion as a reproduction of communitarianism that isolated rather than 
integrated residents. Not all officials shared this view. For example, the Vice President of 
the Plaine Commune in Seine-Saint-Denis maintained that the French state did not intend 
villages d’insertion to be mono-ethnic. Ethnic uniformity, he argued, was unintentional, 
due to the fact that Roma had previously chosen to live together in illegal camps.565 
Through this logic, villages d’insertion simply absorbed evicted residents, irrespective of 
their ethnicity. Nevertheless, the official still assumed that slum residents were Roma, 
exposing an ethnic bias in the official’s discourse. 
 
Despite this attempt to rationalise villages d’insertion, the stigma lingered. Some officials 
tried to distance their projects from villages d’insertion by using different names such as 
‘sites aménagés gérés’ despite adopting the same basic approach. For example, in April 
2013 the Préfecture des Alpes Maritimes called their programme of segregated 
hébergement and accompagnement designated solely for evicted Roma from illegal 
camps an ‘opération de maîtrise d’ouvrage urbaine et sociale (MOUS) dans le cadre d’un 
programme d’accès au logement, à l’éducation, à l’insertion des familles très 
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précairisées’.566 The use of the term MOUS emphasised accompagnement, drawing 
attention away from the segregated nature of the project. Criticism of villages d’insertion 
also appeared at a national level. Although villages d’insertion were locally instigated and 
managed and the first of which was created by a Socialist mayor, Socialist politicians 
sought to intstrumentalise the fact that villages d’insertion emerged and proliferated 
under the watch of conservative President Nicolas Sarkozy. As a Socialist political 
adviser contended in June 2015 ‘On est plutôt sur l’idée de mixité que celle de village 
d’insertion.’567 The suggestion was that the idea of a village d’insertion was a 
conservative construct, when in fact it originated from the initiative of a socialist mayor.   
 
Not all officials were concerned by the title of village d’insertion, often employing it as a 
specific administrative term. In June 2015, a regional official from the Nord noted ‘on a 
encore sept villages d’insertion, dont six sont constitués de mobil home et un en dur dans 
un bâtiment. Nos villages d’insertion sont uniquement pour les Roms.’568 During this 
conversation, another regional official interjected to clarify that ‘les villages d’insertion 
ne sont pas permanent. L’insertion, c’est une étape. Avec la scolarisation des enfants, 
l’apprentissage de la langue français par les adultes, et l’accès à l’emploi pour les adultes, 
les Roms pourront éventuellement accéder à un logement lambda.’569 From this point of 
view, segregated insertion was a necessary step to propel Roma towards autonomous life 
in France. Paradoxically, these officials framed exclusion as a prerequisite of republican 
integration.  
 
Andatu and Mixité Sociale  
 
In autumn 2011, the Prefect of the Rhône, Jean-François Carenco, took a different 
approach to integrating evicted Roma by founding the programme ‘Andatu’ in 
partnership with the association, Forum Réfugiés.570 The name ‘Andatu’ was deliberate, 
which translated as ‘for you’ in Romani, signifying that the initiative was designed to 
																																																								
566 Préfecture des Alpes-Maritimes, Dossier de demande de subvention pour la mise en oevure de la 
circulaire du 26 août 2012 relative à l’anticipation et l’accompagnement des opérations d’évaciation des 
campements illicites dans le département des Alpes-Maritimes (9 April 2013). 
567 Interview with Political Adviser, Cabinet du Ministre de l’Intérieur, Paris (3 December 2014). 
568 Interview with Regional Official 3, Préfecture du Nord, Lille (8 June 2015).  
569 Interview with Regional Official 4, Préfecture du Nord, Lille (8 June 2015).  
570 Préfecture du Rhône, Bilan du dispositif ANDATU: l'insertion réussie pour des populations roms (12 
December 2014).  
	 189 
assist Roma rather than reject them. Notably, Andatu began before the election of a 
Socialist government, and therefore predated the 26 August 2012 circular. 571 
Nevertheless, Socialist officials endorsed Andatu as ‘un des programmes les plus 
développé et les plus républicain’ and ‘un dispositif positif qui est fondé sur les valeurs 
républicaines’.572 Andatu was explicitly communicated as a policy that embodied 
republican values. It was also striking that a Prefect – an appointed rather than elected 
official – took on the responsibility of integrating Roma as the task was previously the 
preserve of municipalities.  
 
Based on the programme ‘Accelair’ for assimilating refugees founded in 2002, Andatu 
aimed to accelerate integration based on the neo-republican idea of mixité sociale.573 That 
is, the idea of creating a social housing system in which families from diverse 
backgrounds could live side-by-side.574 As a regional official, who had previously 
managed Andatu, stated, ‘c’était un dispositif très ambitieux, vouloir comme ça amener 
un parcours d’intégration accéléré et global’.575 Andatu was an all-inclusive programme, 
but entry was selective. In fact, despite its emphasis on mixité sociale, a postwar urban 
planning scheme reflecting the republican model of integration, Andatu’s selection 
process was based on affirmative action, which was contrary to the republican idea of 
universalism discussed in chapter three of this thesis. Nevertheless, Andatu took roughly 
400 participants in three rounds: 100 people in autumn 2011, 150 people in winter 2012 
and another 150 people in spring 2013.576 This was a relatively large population, 
considering that residents incurred no costs.  
 
																																																								
571 Ministère de l'éducation nationale, et. al., Circulaire interministérielle relative à l'anticipation et à 
l'accompagnement des opérations d'évacuation des campements illicites (26 August 2012), 
INTK1233053C.  
572 Respectively, the citations were drawn from: Interview with Municipal Official, Mairie de Villeurbanne, 
Lyon (10 June 2015); and Interview with Senior Political Adviser, Cabinet du Ministre de l’Intérieur, Paris 
(3 December 2014).  
573 Forum Réfugiés, Mission: Programme d'intégration des réfugiés – Accelair (26 July 2015): 
http://www.forumrefugies.org/missions/missions-aupres-des-refugies/programme-d-integration-des-
refugies-accelair (accessed 20 August 2017).  
574 Beth Epstein, Collective Terms: Race, Culture and Community in a State-Planned City in France (New 
York: Berghahn Books, 2011), p. 13. 
575 Interview with Regional Official 5, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (11 June 2015).  
576 The number of Roma was not stable as over time some chose to leave the programme and a few 
individuals were expelled. Cerema provided an estimation of the residents, see: Rapport d’enquete sur 
l’application de la circulaire du 26 août 2012 en 4 cas et 6 questions (November 2016), p. 40.  
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Officials in the Rhône used ideas of mixité sociale and accelerated integration to 
communicate two key provisions. This distinguished Andatu from villages d’insertion. 
First, Andatu gave residents immediate access to droit commun, such as residency rights, 
health cover, and social services. The contract biding residents of Andatu specified the 
following points: 
 
Les Autorités de l’Etat et du Conseil général du Rhône ouvrent les droits suivants: 
  
- Attribution du titre de séjour d’un an, assorti de l’autorisation de travailler; 
- Attribution de la couverture santé (CMU); 
- Versement des allocations sociales (AF, RSA) sur présentation du titre du séjour; 
- Scolarisation des enfants.577 
 
By providing these rights, authorities of the Rhône granted evicted camp residents access 
to assistance they may not have otherwise received, and especially not so quickly. As a 
regional official from the Rhône noted: 
 
La différence, c’est très simple. Le village d’insertion vous mettez des personnes dans un 
hébergement provisoire et vous travaillez uniquement sur le droit commun à partir du 
moment où elles ont accès à l’emploi et éventuellement elles vont au logement. Les droits 
sont acquis petit à petit. Alors que dans Andatu les droits sont acquis tout de suite.578  
 
A regional official formerly responsible for Andatu added that ‘les personnes qui 
entraient dans le dispositif d’Andatu ont reçu une carte de séjour. Ils étaient donc soumis 
au code d’entrée de séjour des étrangers’.579 This was significant because the first intake 
of participants into Andatu predated the Hollande government’s measures to aid the 
employment of Romanian and Bulgarian migrants in France on 22 August 2012, as well 
as the end of transition restrictions on Romania and Bulgaria enacted on 1 January 2014. 
The fact that these participants were allowed to reside in France for one year meant that 
they were not subject to the same social and economic limitations as other Romanian and 
Bulgarian migrants in France.  
 
Second, Andatu guaranteed its members access to a rent-controlled apartment by pre-
emptively securing an agreement with Forum Réfugiés and the public housing association 
																																																								
577 Forum Réfugiés, ‘Contrat de parcours et d’engagement visant l’intégration en région lyonnaise’ in 
Deplhine Roucaute, ‘A Lyon, un contrat d'intégration réservé à quatre cents Roms’, Le Monde (23 May 
2013): http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2013/05/23/a-lyon-un-contrat-d-integration-reserve-a-quatre-
cents-roms_3414805_3224.html (accessed 20 August 2017). 
578 Interview with Regional Official 3, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (10 June 2015).  
579 Interview with Regional Official 5, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (11 June 2015).  
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ABC-HLM. This was linked to the first provision because under normal circumstances 
eligibility for obtaining a rent-controlled apartment depended upon proof of a residency 
permit and access to Revenu de solidarité active (RSA), which the conseil général had 
already granted. Notably, the apartments that Andatu offered were not clustered in the 
same building designated solely for Roma as villages d’insertion were. Instead they were 
dispersed throughout Lyon’s various suburbs in logement social diffus. As an 
interministerial report highlighted: 
 
Le dispositif “ANDATU” se différentie des approches des autres sites d’insertion par un 
objectif d’accès direct des bénéficiaires au logement social diffus. En accord avec les 
partenaires bailleurs sollicités pour l’opération, les familles sélectionnées se voient 
proposer des solutions de logement réparties sur l’ensemble du parc HLM mobilisable, 
sur différentes communes. Il n’y a donc pas, à proprement parler, de site “ANDATU”.580  
 
In a report commissioned by Dihal, the Centre d’études et d’expertise sur les risques, 
l’environment, la mobilité et l’aménagement (Cerema) also stated that ‘Le principe du 
dispositif s’appuie par ailleurs sur un travail en partenariat avec l’association des bailleurs 
sociaux du Rhône...d’autant plus nécessaire que la demande porte sur une typologie plus 
difficile à mobiliser (grands logements de type T3 à T5).’581 It added that ‘Des solutions 
d’hébergement transitoires ont aussi été proposées dans des foyers Adoma et Aralis, ainsi 
que dans des anciennes casernes appartenant à l’Etat’.582 This revealed that Andatu did in 
fact have some designated sites, but unlike villages d’insertion they were a much shorter 
transitional phase that accommodated Roma before they received their promised rent-
controlled apartment. Additionally, by securing an agreement in advance, Andatu 
permitted Roma to bypass the city’s waiting list for logement that comprised of French 
citizens and other EU and non-EU immigrants who had already registered their interest. 
As a regional official said ‘la population bénéficiait d’un avantage, c’est qu’elle avait un 
logement immédiatement, sans renter dans l’attente. On est sur un dispositif qui permet 
d’aller très vite’.583 As all of its entrants were Romanian or Bulgarian, Andatu thus placed 
the integration of non-French citizens ahead of the needs of French citizens.     
 
																																																								
580 Ministère de l’Intérieur et. al, Evaluation des dispositifs d’accompagnement des personnes presents dans 
les campements (May 2013). 
581 Cerema, l’environnement, la mobilité et l’aménagement (Cerema), Rapport d’enquete sur l’application 
de la circulaire du 26 août 2012 en 4 cas et 6 questions (November 2016), p. 40.  
582 Ibid. 
583 Interview with Regional Official 2, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (10 June 2015).  
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Andatu’s system of integrating Roma was a three-stage process. The first stage was 
stabilisation, where Roma were placed in transitional hébergement before receiving their 
guaranteed logement social en diffus. In the words of a national official from Dihal, ‘le 
dispositif de droit commun vers le logement n’a pas exclu des phases temporaires de 
stabilisation’.584 A regional official who previously managed Andatu maintained that 
stabilisation was a necessary phase of integration for Roma who had previously lived in 
bidonvilles: 
 
On a mis en place un dispositif pendant 6 mois. Les personnes étaient placées dans des 
appartements, qui étaient captées qu’ils ne payaient pas, c’était la période de stabilisation. 
Donc, elles apprenaient à vivre en appartement. Ce qui n’est pas forcément évident pour 
elles puisqu’à la base elles ne vivent pas du tout dans des structures fixes, donc il y a tout 
un apprentissage de la vie en appartement.585 
 
This comment implied that the regional official framed stabilisation as a means of 
civilising evicted camp residents on the grounds that these so-called Roma were primitive 
and unqualified for modern life in France. Responding to a question on the 
implementation of Andatu in practice, the official admitted that although stabilisation 
was temporary, the limit of six months was not always observed:  
 
La stabilisation de six mois, c’était ce qu’il y avait sur le papier. Mais parfois cela durait 
un peu plus longtemps parce qu’il y avait des difficultés à capter des appartements, des 
logements sur les bailleurs sociaux. Et la stabilisation durait donc un peu plus longtemps 
mais de toute façon les travailleurs sociaux avaient un énorme travail à faire.  
 
Although shorter than the duration of villages d’insertion, the stabilisation phase of 
Andatu still ran over its expected time frame. 
 
The second stage of integration was the placement of Roma families into rent-controlled 
apartments. As the regional official claimed ‘La phase trois c’était de capter des 
logements sur les bailleurs publics qui acceptaient qu’un certain pourcentage des 
logements mis à disposition pour des logements sociaux soient captés par le préfet pour 
permettre à ces populations de passer du stade de stabilisation au stade d’insertion.’ 586 
Yet, although Roma lived in these rent-controlled apartments, and were not segregated 
from the rest of society, they did not pay their own rent. ‘C’était du logement 
accompagné par l’association pour être sûr que les loyers sont payés. C’était Forum 
																																																								
584 Interview with National Official 1, Dihal, Paris (5 December 2014).  
585 Interview with Regional Official 5, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (11 June 2015).  
586 Interview with Regional Official 5, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (11 June 2015).  
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Réfugiés qui garantissait le paiement des loyers. C’est-à-dire, les personnes qui sont 
entrées en logement en mai 2013 ont été aidées jusqu’en mai 2014’ claimed another 
regional official from the Rhône.587 As the Prefecture du Rhône hired Forum Réfugiés to 
run Andatu, it was the state that indirectly covered the rent. This meant that logement 
social en diffus was really hébergement in disguise.   
 
The third and final stage of integration was independent logement, which shifted the 
responsibility of paying rent from Forum Réfugiés to the participants of Andatu 
themselves. As the regional official who formerly managed Andatu stated ‘la troisième 
phase, c’était l’entrée dans le droit commun. C’était la fin de l’insertion. Vous n’êtes plus 
identifié comme étant dans le dispositif Andatu et vous avez accès à l’emploi et au 
logement comme n’importe quel ressortissant français.’588 The official added that ‘le droit 
commun, c’est pouvoir en autonomie, assurer sa propre existence. Ça veut dire pouvoir 
dans le cadre des règles républicaines assurer son existence. C’est-à-dire le logement, la 
nourriture, et avoir un travail. Ça c’est le droit commun.’589 This comment highlighted 
how the official used the republican idea of integration to justify Andatu in spite of its 
overt process of ethnic selection. The rationale was that as long as participants became 
autonomous, it did not matter that the French state had selected them from the same 
community. In other words, the official used autonomy to rationalise racialised forms of 
selecting participants for Andatu. 
 
The Process of Integration 
 
Irrespective of whether officials employed a model of segregated insertion or mixité 
sociale, integration was a mutually constitutive process. As a senior national adviser 
asserted, ‘pour moi l’intégration est simplement la capacité de tout individu dans la 
société d’exercer ses droits et ses devoirs à l’égard des autres et donc de trouver une place 
légitime dans la société’.590 Integration entailed both rights and responsibilities for the 
select Roma in question. This meant that the French state provided accompagnement on 
the condition that these so-called Roma pulled their weight by satisfying the requirements 
																																																								
587 Interview with Regional Official 1, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (10 June 2015).  
588 Interview with Regional Official 5, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (11 June 2015). 
589 Ibid.  
590 Interview with Senior Political Adviser, Cabinet du Ministre de l’Education, Paris (3 June 2015).  
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of the project, often outlined in a contract of engagement. Participants were obliged to 
engage actively in integration; they were not simply passive recipients of government 
support. In addition to meeting selection criteria to gain access to state support, Roma had 
to adhere to a set of standards while they were receiving it. This section examines the 




To assimilate selected Roma into French society and guide them towards autonomy, local 
and regional initatives included a programme of accompagnement. The English 
translation of accompagnement is support, a nebulous word that has no precise political 
meaning.  Yet, in the context of immigration policy, the French term refers to the 
provision of social services. As a regional regional official explained, ‘accompagnement, 
c’est le fait d’avoir un suivi social qui puisse permettre de gérer progressivement une 
appropriation des codes de la population française’.591 The official’s definition associated 
accompagnement with integration, implying a link between the welfare state and the 
French republican public philosophy. The relationship between welfare state and 
republicanism was not a given as republicanism overwhelmingly focused on political 
rather than social rights. However, the two have become entangled in the last thirty years 
as officials have used (neo-)republican ideas to safeguard the modèle social français. 
 
As dispositifs were not nationally centralised, the social services officials offered varied. 
This depended on factors such as the methods used by the association employed to run 
the dispositif, the resources available, the sort of policy instrument adopted by the local or 
regional authority (e.g. whether the dispositif qualified as a MOUS), and the 
particularities of the recipient population (e.g. level of education and literacy, existing 
health conditions etc.). Nevertheless, most dispositifs provided participants with four 
types of support. The first was alternative housing to the bidonville from which the Roma 
had been evicted. As the first section of this chapter suggested, local and regional 
authorities offered different structures of accommodation, ranging from portable blocks 
and caravans to established buildings.  
 
																																																								
591 Interview with Regional Official 2, Préfecture des Alpes-Maritimes, Nice (10 September 2015).  
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In both villages d’insertion and the stabilisation phase of Andatu, the site of 
accommodation operated as a forum within which Roma could be socialised. With the 
exception of a ‘campement autorisé’ experiment in the Nord department, which afforded 
residents basic amenities and healthcare in exchange for their participation in professional 
training schemes, hébergement was the foundation of integration that preceded all other 
forms of assistance.592 In most cases, officials considered it essential to provide 
participants a legal and clean place of residence before extending any other type of 
support. Some even viewed hébergement as separate from accompagnement. As the 
socialist Junior Minister for Education George Pau-Langevin declared in a speech to 
parliamentarians on 27 September 2013, ‘à travers des "villages d’insertion" de véritables 
sites de transition ont été créés. En plus d’un logement, ils apportent un accompagnement 
social et professionnel aux familles’.593 
 
The second type of support was the scolarisation of Roma children. The fact that the 
French state insisted migrant children attend school may not seem especially linked to the 
neo-republican public philosophy; in 2016 at least 135 countries had compulsory 
schooling for children albeit with varying age limits.594 Yet, the public provision of 
education to all children residing in France through l’école républicaine is historically 
and ideologically significant. Whether alluding to the schooling of rural ‘peasants’ in the 
Third Republic or second-generation migrants in the postwar period, public officials have 
tended to depict the French school as the prime institution of republican integration. In 
the words of Minister Pau-Langevin, ‘la République doit [offrir] protection à tout enfant 
quelle que soit son mode de vie ou sa nationalité et qu'ils doivent, avec l'aide des recteurs 
assurer la scolarisation de tous les enfants et faire respecter la légalité républicaine dans 
toutes les municipalités.’595 Furthermore, the fact that Dihal estimated that ‘plus de 4300 
enfants vivant dans ces campements (environ 28% des personnes concernées)’ meant the 
education of Roma children in the French school system was a high priority of 
																																																								
592 A regional official shared the example of a ‘campement autorisé’ experiment in Dunkerque. Interview 
with Regional Official 4, Préfecture du Nord, Lille (8 June 2015).  
593 George Pau-Langevin, Ministre de la réussite éducative, Déclaration sur l'accompagnement des 
opérations d'évacuation des campements illicites (27 September 2013). 
594 UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Compulsory Education, Duration (24 October 2016): 
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=UNESCO&f=series%3ACEDUR_1 (accessed 17 December 2017).  
595 George Pau-Langevin, Ministre de la réussite éducative, Déclaration sur l'accompagnement des 
opérations d'évacuation des campements illicites (27 September 2013). 
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dispositifs.596 Accordingly, the dispositifs included various services to facilitate 
scolarisation, such as helping with enrolment, providing transport to school, subsidising 
children’s lunches at the canteen, and offering extra tutoring and French language classes. 
Associations also worked closely with the schools to monitor Roma children’s progress. 
For example, according to a report reviewing a MOUS in Montreuil: 
 
Un point est fait tous les deux mois par un travailleur social et une médiatrice de l’équipe 
avec chaque directeur d’école. Des rencontrées régulières organisées en 2012 par la 
Direction de l’éducation avec les différentes écoles concernées, les opérateurs et 
l’inspection académique ont permis un suivi régulier des résultats, des actions 
engagées.597 
 
In Bordeaux, local officials took the integration of Roma children in schools to another 
level. A local informed me that:  
 
On a travaillé avec l’inspection académique parce qu’il y avait des classes mais à un 
moment ils étaient tellement nombreux qu’ils se mettraient entres eux et que ça devenait, 
bon ils restaient entre eux au sein de l’école donc on a travaillé avec l’inspection 
académique pour voir comment ils pouvaient être dispersés dans plusieurs écoles et 
pouvoir aider les mamans à comprendre comment prendre le transport en commun pour 
échanger d’école. Le but c’était d’arrêter les effets de groupe.598 
 
This example demonstrates how officials used the idea of countering communitarianism 
to justify the implementation of integration policies inside the classroom. The school was 
not only the place where Roma were made to assimilate through education, it also 
actively ensured that their integration into French society was not impeded. At a national 
level, Minister Pau-Langevin introduced three new circulars to facilitate the integration of 
Roma children in French schools on 20 October 2012. These circulars related to la 
scolarité des élèves allophones nouvellement arrivés, scolarisation et scolarité des 
enfants issus de familles itinérantes et de voyageurs, and the organisation des Casnav.599 
As the minister put it, ‘le cas des enfants Roms est souvent à l’intersection de ces trois 
situations’. These measures helped local officials ensure the scolarisation of Roma. In 
Nantes for example, the Centre Académique pour la Scolarisation des élèves allophones 
																																																								
596 Dihal, Journée nationale d’échanges l’anticipation et l’accompagnement des opérations d’évacuation 
des campements illicites: point d’étape (27 September 2013). 
597 Ministère de l’Intérieur et. al., ‘Annexes III: Opérations d’insertion in Evaluation des dispositifs 
d’accompagnement des personnes présentes dans les campements’, Evaluation des dispositifs 
d’accompagnement des personnes presents dans les campements (May 2013). 
598 Interview with Municipal Official, Mairie de Bordeaux, Bordeaux (19 June 2015).  
599 Ministère de l'éducation nationale, Circulaire n° 2012-141 rélative à la scolarité des élèves allophones 
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Nouvellement Arrivés et des élèves issus de familles itinérantes et de Voyageurs 
(CASNAV) established measures specifically for Roma children:  
   
[E]lle coordonne les actions pédagogiques déployées par les enseignants, forme les 
enseignants, évalue les enfants, attribue des livrets d'évaluation des compétences... Les 
services académiques affectent les enfants en classe ordinaire ou en unités pédagogiques 
pour élèves allophones nouvellement arrivés (UPE2A), en fonction du degré de maîtrise 
du français et du niveau général des élèves.600 
 
The priority of schooling Roma children was thus upgraded from local and national 
dispositifs to national public policy.  
 
The third type of support was healthcare. This included access to medical assistance and 
insurance for children and adults. For instance, a MOUS in Montreuil offered a 
comprehensive programme of healthcare to its residents, affording la Protection	
maternelle et infantile (PMI) to 23 children and regular medical and dental care. Through 
PMI, it assisted 7 women through pregnancy and supplied 18 women with family 
planning support, such as ‘[séances d’]information, la prescription d’un mode de 
contraception, un suivi gynécologique’.601 The bilan report of the MOUS argued that 
stable housing allowed Roma to receive more demanding or longer-term care for chronic 
illnesses, including treatments for diabetes, cholesterol and heart disease.602 By partnering 
with the Ville de Montreuil, the dispositif also granted 33 Roma families with Aide 
Médicale d’Etat (AME).603 On 27 September 2013, Dihal also reported that ‘des 
campagnes de vaccination ont été mises en oeuvre par des associations dans plusieurs 
territoires’.604 Yet, despite these measures, barriers to healthcare provisions affected many 
Roma even when inside these dispositifs, due to difficulties of attaining domiciliation.   
 
																																																								
600 Prune Helfter-Noah, Stagiare ENA, Rapport à l’attention de Monsieur le préfet de la Seine-Saint-Denis: 
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602 Ibid. 
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des campements illicites: point d’étape (27 September 2013). 
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The fourth type of support was insertion professionnelle, comprising employment and 
language training. For example, the contract for Andatu, adopted in autumn 2011, 
stipulated that as part of the dispositif, the association Forum Réfugiés would run 
‘séances de formation à l’apprentissage du français’ and ‘Ateliers “emploi” et des 
passages en entreprise’.605 Similarly, A village d’insertion in Ile-de-France introduced a 
job dating scheme to facilitate employment opportunities for adult Roma. A regional 
official recounted that ‘pour ramener les Roms vers l’emploi, le Conseil général a 
convoqué tous les opérateurs et les gens du village d’insertion dans une salle. C’était un 
système de job dating. C’est-à-dire qu’ils avaient un quart d’heure, chacun tournait et 
après, au bout de la demi-journée, ils faisaient le point.’606  
 
Additionally, A MOUS in Montreuil, which opened in January 2010, offered three 
language workshops for adults: ‘un atelier recherche d’emploi, un atelier “prépa permis”, 
un atelier “les temps des femmes”’.607 These workshops aimed to equip participants with 
the key vocabulary to help them navigate day-to-day life and prepare them for work in 
France. The first of these, which focused on ‘recherche d’emploi, was tailored to each 
participant’s level of language, and helped participants to design a curriculum vitae.608 
The second workshop on ‘prépa permis’ prepared participants for the French driving 
examination. As a driving licence could be a job requirement, the skills gleaned from the 
workshop could ultimately help participants gain employment. The workshop on ‘les 
temps des femmes’ focused mainly on cooking to teach participants who had allegedly 
‘confirmer [un] choix de travailler en restauration’.609 Complementing the efforts of local 
and regional dispositifs, the measures outlined in the Hollande government’s explansion 
of the list of jobs available to Romanians and Bulgarians in France and removal taxes on 
employers hiring Romanian and Bulgarian workers on 22 August 2012, further enabled 
employment for Roma in France.  
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Echoing these four types of support that local and regional dispositifs provided, the 
Hollande government’s 26 August 2012 circular instructed Prefects to ‘mettre en place un 
accompagnement’: 
 
Après l’établissement du diagnostic, qui pourra être plus ou moins complet en fonction du 
temps et des ressources disponibles, vous identifierez les dispositifs d’insertion à 
organiser, en mobilisant prioritairement les moyens de droit commun. Vous veillerez 
également à la continuité de l’accès aux droits des personnes, notamment en matière de 
prise en charge scolaire et de parcours de soins, afin de maintenir, autant que possible, un 
suivi des actions collectives et individuelles d’insertion des personnes.610 
 




- Hébergement et d’accueil 
- insertion professionnelle611 
 
These areas not only reflected the types of support already incorporated into local and 
regional dispositifs, but they also aligned the Hollande government’s policy with the 
European Commission’s requirements for a national strategy of ‘Roma inclusion’.612 In a 
technical report dated 10 December 2010, Dihal also gave detailed recommendations as 
to what these areas of accompagnement outlined in the 26 August 2012 circular should 
contain.613 The list of advice was extensive, but it was not all that dissimilar from the 
sorts of services already provided by local and regional dispositifs.   
 
The 26 August 2012 circular and Dihal’s subsequent technical reports marked the 
institutionalisation of accompagnement in national public policy documents. Even so, it is 
important to recall that national policymakers did not create the types of support specified 
in the circular. National policymakers drew upon the experience of local and regional 
dispositifs to devise a framework for prefects and mayors to follow. In November 2016, a 
report published by Cerema acknowledged this point, claiming that the 26 August 2012 
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(version 10 December 2013). 
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circular was ‘une circulaire qui vient se greffer sur des pratiques existantes’ and ‘une 
circulaire qui légitime l’action de l’Etat’.614 Accompagnement was incorporated into 
national public policy, but its local and regional roots meant that its application remained 
largely decentralised and varied. As a tailor-made approach to integration appeared to 
result in the assimilation of more ‘Roma’, it is not surprising that the French state gave 
local and regional officials the responsibility to design and implement their own insertion 




Although the French state offered accompagnment to some evicted Roma, it was not 
unconditional. As a local official maintained, ‘avec le corollaire de cette politique 
d’acceuil, c’est aussi une fermeté à l’encontre de ceux qui ne respectent pas les règles. 
S’il n’y a pas de respect des lois et des valeurs républicaines, elles sortent du dispositif, et 
elles sont évacuées et reconduites dans leurs pays d’origine.’615 The message was clear: 
Roma had to conform to republican norms or they risked expulsion. These conditions 
turned into a contract that participants were obliged to sign upon entering a dispositif. As 
the former manager of Andatu declared, ‘c’est pour ça qu’on contractualisait avec les 
personnes un dispositif Andatu puisqu’elles s’engagaient à terme à respecter les valeurs 
républicaines et à intégrer dans la société française’.616 Indeed, the contract for Andatu 
included a section entitled ‘les obligations du bénéficiare contractant’, which detailed the 
following checklist: 
 
Dans le cadre du Contrat de parcours et d’engagement, le maintien dans le projet 
d’intégration dépend de la participation du bénéficiaire, à savoir : 
 
- Participer obligatoirement aux cours de français qui seront proposés, 
- Participer aux activités d’animation et d’information proposées par le service, 
- Veiller à la bonne application des comptes, budgets et droits concernés,  
- Se rendre aux rendez-vous fixés par les services publics, 
- Collaborer avec l’équipe de Forum réfugiés-Cosi et tenir informé le référent en temps 
utile de tout changement de situation, 
- Autoriser Forum réfugiés-Cosi à communiquer aux Autorités les informations 
relatives à votre situation administrative, 
- Tenir informé le référent avant toute absence.617   
																																																								
614 Cerema, Rapport d’enquete sur l’application de la circulaire du 26 août 2012 en 4 cas et 6 questions 
(November 2016). 
615 Interview with Municipal Official, Marie de Lille, Lille (2 June 2015).  
616 Interview with Regional Official 5, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (11 June 2015).  
617 Forum Réfugiés, ‘Contrat de parcours et d’engagement visant l’intégration en région lyonnaise’ in 
Deplhine Roucaute, ‘A Lyon, un contrat d'intégration réservé à quatre cents Roms’, Le Monde (23 May 
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Contracts were typically confidential, and the few I managed to locate varied. Yet, from 
these contracts and information gleaned from interviews with government officials, I 
identified six main conditions of accompagnement. The first was continued education of 
Roma children in French schools. While state assisted with scolarisation, it also obliged 
parents to ensure that it was maintained. As a regional official argued, l’engagement de 
l’état était de les aider à s’inserer, à trouver un logement, à donner les conditions 
juridiques pour trouver un emploi, la condition pour eux c’était de scolariser leurs 
enfants’.618 A MOUS in Nice had a basic contract, which explicitly highlighted 





Objet : application de la circulaire INT 1233053C du 26/08/2012 
 
          Je soussigné,  accepte l'offre d'hébergement provisoire de l'Etat, au 
          bénéfice de ma famille, soit : 
          - 
          - 
          - 
          et m'engage à maintenir la scolarisation de mes enfants jusqu' au terme de l'année scolaire. 
          L'hébergement sera offert à l'adresse suivante, au moins jusqu'au terme de l'année scolaire. 
 




A regional official shared a copy of this contract with me during an interview and insisted 
that ‘la scolarisation des enfants était une condition préalable et une obligation du 
dispositif’.619 
 
Second, the French state required adult Roma to actively seek employment and pursue 
French language training. As a regional official from the Gironde claimed, ‘il y a des 
devoirs qui nous engagent à les accompagner sur toutes les étapes de scolarisation, santé, 
formation professionnelle, accès à l'emploi et recherche de logement et il y a des 
obligations pour eux: obligation d'avoir une participation active dans la recherche 
d'emploi.’ The official added that ‘Lorsqu'une personne ne travaille pas, soit elle suit des 
																																																								
2013): http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2013/05/23/a-lyon-un-contrat-d-integration-reserve-a-quatre-
cents-roms_3414805_3224.html (accessed 20 August 2017).  
618 Interview with Regional Official 4, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (10 June 2015).  
619 Interview with Regional Official 1, Préfecture des Alpes-Maritimes, Nice (16 June 2015).  
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cours de français qui sont organisés par l'association, soit elle suit une formation 
professionnelle, soit une préparation à l'entretien d'embauche.’ The suggestion was that 
Roma had to demonstrate efforts to contribute to the French economy if they were to 
receive public assistance. The emphasis the French state placed on work also suggested 
that officials sought to marry republican ideals with neo-liberal ones. In this sense, 
contributing to the French economy was a form of assimilating into the melting pot of 
French society.   
 
Third, dispositifs required the evicted camp residents to abandon la vie collective. For 
example, a village d’insertion in Lille required residents to sign three contracts upon 
entry: ‘un contrat d’hébergement auquel sont ajoints un règlement de fonctionnement 
collectif et un projet individuel’.620  In doing so, participants agreed to accept ‘les 
obligations de scolariser les enfants, de séparation intra-groupe, d’apprentissage de la 
langue’. If residents did not respect these obligations ‘elles peuvent subir une éviction au 
bout d’un certain temps’.621 Similarly in Lyon, the contract for Andatu specified rules for 
‘vie en collectivité et visites autorisés’. It stated that ‘Il est formellement interdit 
d’héberger dans sa chambre ou son logement en sous location des personnes en dehors de 
la liste des bénéficiaires de l’opération. L’usage des locaux et l’utilisation des 
équipements sont exclusivement réservés aux résidents. Des contrôles d’occupation 
inopinés peuvent être organisés.’622  
 
The rules for ‘vie en collectivité et visites autorisés’ also included a statement regulating 
cultural and religious behaviour:  
 
La vie dans le lieu d’hébergement collectif est fondée sur le respect de l’autre et le respect 
des différences culturelles, politiques, religieuses et sociales, qui restent dans la sphère du 
privé. Afin de préserver la qualité de vie de chacun, chaque résident doit conserver en 
tout temps et tout lieu une attitude correcte et respectueuse des autres. Aucune 




620 Cerema, Rapport d’enquete sur l’application de la circulaire du 26 août 2012 en 4 cas et 6 questions 
(November 2016), p. 34.  
621 Ibid.  
622 Forum Réfugiés, ‘Contrat de parcours et d’engagement visant l’intégration en région lyonnaise’ in 
Deplhine Roucaute, ‘A Lyon, un contrat d'intégration réservé à quatre cents Roms’, Le Monde  (23 May 
2013): http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2013/05/23/a-lyon-un-contrat-d-integration-reserve-a-quatre-
cents-roms_3414805_3224.html (accessed 20 August 2017). 
623 Ibid.  
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Although evacuations removed Roma from the public sphere, the statement suggested 
that the alternative housing afforded to a select few was not considered part of the private 
domain. The suggestion was that not all residential sites were part of the private domain. 
If the state subsidised housing, it could enforce republican principles associated with the 
public sphere on its residents. In agreeing to the terms of accompagnement, Roma had to 
relinquish activities that French authorities and associations deemed to be of a cultural, 
political, religious and social nature, even inside their homes. As such, the process of 
integrating Roma through hébergement allowed the French state to redefine the 
boundaries between the public sphere and the private domain.  
 
Linked to this was a fourth condition of accompagnement: the respect for common areas. 
For instance, Andatu laid down the following rules governing the ‘[U]tilisation des 
parties communes’: 
 
- Les parties communes sont composées d’une cuisine (plaques de cuisson, éviers), 
d’une salle à manger (casiers, tables, chaises) et de sanitaires. 
- L’utilisation collective de ces équipements implique de la part de chaque hébergé une 
discipline rigoureuse. Chacun doit veiller à maintenir les lieux communs dans un état 
de propreté satisfaisante.  
- La cuisine est réservée aux occupants du foyer uniquement. 
- Il est interdit d’entreposer quelque objet que ce soit dans les parties communes, 
l’allée, les escaliers, l’immeuble… et d’abandonner les encombrants dans le quartier. 
624   
 
Failure to follow these instructions could have severe consequences:   
 
En cas de détériorations ou de négligences caractérisées, Forum réfugiés-Cosi sera dans 
l’obligation de facturer aux personnes hébergées les travaux de remise en l’état, voire de 
prononcer la fin de la prise en charge et l’exclusion de l’opération. Dans l’impossibilité 
de déterminer le responsable, le montant des réparations est partagé à parts égales entre 
les personnes hébergées sur le même palier. 625   
 
To most adults, the rules specified in the Antadu contract would appear rudimentary if not 
infantilising. This suggested that the French officials and members of Forum Réfugiés 
responsible for writing the contract viewed Roma as uneducated at best and primitive at 
worst. Though similar to the house rules of a boarding school or university college, it 
appeared that the French state and its contractors saw the upkeep of communal areas as a 
way of teaching Roma how to be civilised. The assumption was that if Roma were able to 
																																																								
624 Ibid.   
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conform to the rules governing shared living spaces they would be capable of respecting 
the norms of French society. This meant that the French state could establish rules in 
insertion initiatives to guide the socialisation of Roma towards autonomous living.   
 
Fifth, Roma had to justify leave from the dispositif, as most did not permit extended 
periods of absence. Adoma, the association responsible for the Hollande government’s 
national mission à la resorption des bidonvilles, reported that ‘3 ménages ont été exclus 
pour n’avoir pas respecté les dispositions de leur contrat de séjour (principalement pour 
absence prolongée et non justifiée).’626 Similarly, the dispositif Andatu cited prolonged 
absence as grounds for expulsion. The contract noted that ‘Toute absence prolongée non 
prévenue sera sanctionnée. Un entretien aura lieu et sera suivi d’un courrier 
d’avertissement. En cas de récidive, Forum réfugiés-Cosi pourra prononcer l’exclusion 
définitive.’ 627 A regional official from the Rhône confirmed this, stating that ‘on a eu le 
cas où la personne suivie par le dispostif Andatu est rentrée chez elle pendant quelques 
mois en Roumanie. C’est la migration pendulaire. Elle a été exclue du dispositif 
Andatu.’628 Thus similarly to selection, the process of integration restricted the right of 
EU citizens to move freely.  
 
The sixth condition of accompagnement was compliance with the law. This was because 
illegal activities constituted grounds for immediate expulsion. In Montreuil for example, 
French authorities expelled one family from the MOUS and extradited them to Romania 
‘suite à des problèmes avec les services de police’. Andatu shared this condition, stating 
that:   
 
L’exclusion peut, en outre, être prononcée par Forum réfugiés-Cosi pour les motifs 
suivants : 
 
- non respect du règlement intérieur ; 
- actes de violence à l’encontre des autres résidents ou d’un personnel ; 
- comportements délictueux et infraction à la législation française entraînant des 
poursuites judiciaires ; 
- fausses déclarations concernant l’identité ou la situation personnelle ;   
- refus de transfert vers une autre prise en charge ;   
																																																								
626 Adoma, Mission nationale d’appui à la résorption des bidonvilles, mars 2014 – décembre 2016 : 
Rapport d’activité 2014 (24 March 2015).  
627 Forum Réfugiés, ‘Contrat de parcours et d’engagement visant l’intégration en région lyonnaise’ in 
Deplhine Roucaute, ‘A Lyon, un contrat d'intégration réservé à quatre cents Roms’, Le Monde (23 May 
2013): http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2013/05/23/a-lyon-un-contrat-d-integration-reserve-a-quatre-
cents-roms_3414805_3224.html (accessed 20 August 2017). 
628 Interview with Regional Official 3, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (10 June 2015). 
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- refus d’une proposition d’hébergement ou de logement.629 
 
These requirements suggest that in order to be eligible for accompagnement and to retain 
their place in the dispositif, Roma were required to adhere to the French law. Thus, 
although villages d’insertion and Andtatu’s stablilisaiton phase isolated Roma from 
French society and restricted the right to free movement, they were not exempt from 
French law. The French government’s measures of integrating Roma tested the limits of 
EU law while remaining loyal to French law.   
 
Deploying the idea of integration to achieve segregation? 
 
Although officials used the republican idea of integration to communicate and justify 
insertion policies, integration was rarely achieved. Most examples of accompagnement 
excluded Roma from French society, and left them dependent on French government 
support. Inside the French administrations, officials tended to discuss Roma integration in 
a pessimistic way. A regional official lamented ‘il n’y a pas de réussite. Globalement 
c’est un échec...chaque fois qu’une petite chose fonctionne c’est comme si on vidait la 
mer avec une petite cuillère. Le sentiment d’échec est là et les réussites sont des réussites 
qui ne viennent pas compenser ce sentiment d’échec.’630 Participants were not necessarily 
responsible for the failure of insertion initiatives. Barriers from within the French system 
hampered the integration of evicted Roma into French society. This section examines 
which outcomes of dispositifs officials considered as successes and failures, and then 
investigates the political and financial barriers that impeded the integration of Roma in 
France.  
 
Successes and Failures 
 
Overwhelmingly, local and regional officials spoke of the results of dispositifs d’insertion 
as disappointing. The principal challenge cited was the inability to transition Roma from 
hébergement to logement. In other words, the justification of integration policies did not 
																																																								
629 Forum Réfugiés, ‘Contrat de parcours et d’engagement visant l’intégration en région lyonnaise’ in 
Deplhine Roucaute, ‘A Lyon, un contrat d'intégration réservé à quatre cents Roms’, Le Monde (23 May 
2013): http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2013/05/23/a-lyon-un-contrat-d-integration-reserve-a-quatre-
cents-roms_3414805_3224.html (accessed 20 August 2017). 
630 Interview with Regional Official 3, Préfecture du Nord, Lille (8 June 2015).  
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lead to autonomous living. For example, a regional official highlighted this as the basis 
for closing villages d’insertion in Seine-Saint-Denis: 
  
Nous sommes en train de fermer les villages d’insertion. Ces villages d'insertion sont un 
échec pour deux raisons : les personnes n'ont pas utilisé pour la plupart les villages 
d'insertion comme un moyen d'accéder vers l'autonomie, c'est à dire accepter de se 
former, d'apprendre la langue française, de répondre aux offres de formations 
professionnelles que nous leur faisions et ont utilisé ça de manière complètement 
consumériste et n'ont pas utilisé les offres. Nous avons aussi beaucoup de difficultés à 
avoir des foyers avec au moins un salaire et donc nous avons du mal à les placer en 
logement social. Nous n’avons réussi que pour une minorité à les orienter vers du 
logement social. 631 
 
Contrary to its aims, it appeared that villages d’insertion failed to guide participants 
towards autonomous life in France. A report written by an énarque during her internship 
at the Préfecture of Seine-Saint-Denis echoed this point. It stated that ‘Le département de 
la Seine-Saint-Denis a été pionnier dans les années 2000 avec la création de 4 villages 
d’insertion. Mais du fait des contraintes en termes de droit au séjour et d’accès au marché 
du travail, les villages d’insertion n’ont pu donner la preuve de leur efficacité en ce qui 
concerne l’insertion professionnelle et le relogement’.632 The difficulty of attaining 
logement was not only a problem for dispositifs in Seine-Saint-Denis. A MOUS in 
Yvelines reported that ‘aucune solution de logement n’avait pu être proposée, les 
bailleurs sociaux disposant très peu de logements adaptés aux ressources et à la 
composition familiale de cette population’.633 Even Andatu, a dispositif that guaranteed 
access to rent controlled apartments in Lyon, failed to lead participants to a state of 
complete autonomy. A regional official from the Rhône admitted that:  
 
On considère qu’il y a 1/3 des familles qui sont intégrés. Si on dit la vérité, c’est qu’elles 
respectent les lois de la république, et que les enfants sont scolarisés mais ça ne veut pas 
dire qu’elles ont un emploi elles vivent pratiquement toutes avec les minima sociaux. 
C’est donc assez difficile. Avec tous les efforts qui ont été faits, 1/3 des familles sont 
intégrées mais en vivant de l’aide publique.634 
 
Adding to this comment, another official from the Rhône noted that ‘si on enlève l’aide 
publique ces personnes-là ne peuvent pas subsister seules en France; elles ne sont pas 
parvenues à franchir ce cap.’635 Although Andatu’s participants were fortunate to receive 
																																																								
631 Interview with Regional Official 3, Préfecture de la Seine-Saint-Denis, Bobigny (7 September 2015).  
632 Prune Helfter-Noah, Stagiare ENA, Rapport à l’attention de Monsieur le préfet de la Seine-Saint-Denis: 
Experiences d’insertion menées à l’égard des occupants de campements illicites et propositions de 
politiques publiques (December 2014). 
633 Ibid.  
634 Interview with Regional Official 3, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (10 June 2015).  
635 Interview with Regional Official 2, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (10 June 2015).  
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logement without having to wait in line, they remained dependent on the state for rent, 
and therefore never reached the programme’s third and final phase of integration.  
 
French officials argued that the failure to attain logement was often linked to problems of 
insertion professionnelle. In writing about problems of ‘l’insertion professionnelle et le 
relogement’ the intern from Seine-Saint-Denis argued that problems of securing 
employment and poor language proficiency were inextricably linked.636 Similarly, Didier 
Leschi, the Préfet à l’Egalité des Chances of Seine-Saint-Denis, claimed that ‘Dans les 
faits, il est très difficile de trouver un logement social pour ces familles, même dans le 
contingent préfectoral. L'autre difficulté, c'est l'emploi. Une très faible minorité parvient à 
obtenir un emploi stable, et encore il s'agit la plupart du temps d'un emploi aidé’.637 The 
official formerly responsible for managing Andatu also maintained that ‘la grosse 
difficulté a été la maitrise de la langue française qui était un critère d’insertion 
professionnelle’ and argued that for some this was the reason ‘le travail n’était pas 
retenu’.638 One official from the Rhône put this argument in context, stating ‘Ce qui est 
d’autant plus compliqué c’est qu’en France, la crise de 2008 on n’en est clairement pas 
sortie. Les gens qui ont une qualification en France qui maitrisent le français ont des 
difficultés pour trouver un emploi, donc c’est d’autant plus handicapant pour de 
personnes nouvellement arrivées illettrées ou ne maitrisant pas parfaitement le français.’ 
Thus, while autonomy and in most cases logement (notwithstanding Andatu) depended on 
employment, the ability to speak and read French was a condition of employment.  
 
Furthermore, officials highlighted domiciliation as another obstacle to integration. In the 
case of Yvelines for example, ‘le refus provisoire du CCAS de domicilier les familles 
rendait très difficiles certaines démarches administratives’.639 Notably, access to 
healthcare, such as registering for a doctor, was contingent upon domiciliation. As a 
national official from the Ministry of Social Affairs claimed ‘c’est le même problème 
																																																								
636 Prune Helfter-Noah, Stagiare ENA, Rapport à l’attention de Monsieur le préfet de la Seine-Saint-Denis: 
Experiences d’insertion menées à l’égard des occupants de campements illicites et propositions de 
politiques publiques (December 2014). 
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villages d’insertion’, Le Parisien (21 September 2015): http://www.leparisien.fr/aubervilliers-93300/roms-
dans-le-93-la-fin-des-villages-d-insertion-21-09-2015-5113741.php (accessed 20 August 2017).  
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pour la couverture santé: le fait d’avoir une assurance maladie et l’accès aux soins. C’est 
la domiciliation ce que vous appelez la registration, nous on appelle ça domiciliation.’640 
Conversely, the provision of healthcare was sometimes viewed positively because some 
‘Roma’ did obtain domiciliation and were incorporated into the French health system. For 
instance, a bilan of a MOUS in Montreuil reported that ‘en ce qui concerne l’accès aux 
soins, le bilan de trois années est plutôt positif’.641 But others, such as the national official 
from the Ministry of Social Affairs, contended ‘il y a un énorme travail qui est encore à 
faire’.642 
 
However, alongside criticisms of accompagnment, scolarisation emerged as a beacon of 
optimism. A national official stated that ‘on a quand même des vrais résultats sur la 
scolarisation des enfants’.643 This view was reflected at a local level. According to a 
municipal official: 
 
La scolarisation c’est très important parce que les enfants sont facteurs d’intégration. 
Souvent on dit que ce sont les femmes qui sont facteur d’intégration mais chez les Roms 
ce sont les enfants. Ce sont les enfants qui apprennent le français, qui ensuite deviennent 
les médiateurs avec les administrations, même si on peut considérer que ce n’est pas leur 
rôle, dans la cellule familiale c’est comme ça que ça se passe.644 
 
The implication was that by gaining an education in l’école républicaine, Roma children 
were able to integrate into French society, even if adults could not. A regional official 
from the Rhône asserted this explicitly, claiming that ‘le grand point positif c’est les 
enfants. Je pense que c’est un pari vers la deuxième génération Andatu au final’.645 From 
this perspective, second-generation migrants were the key to integration, which explained 
why many local and regional officials spoke of scolarisation as the priority of their 
dispositifs. Adding to this assertion, another regional official from the Rhône claimed:  
 
Lorsque vous faites un programme comme Andatu vous savez très bien que les adultes 
qui entrent dans le programme, ils vont de toute façon toute leur vie avoir des difficultés. 
En revanche, les générations futures, elles vont s’intégrer dans la société, elles vont 
connaitre l’éducation, l’accès à tout ce qu’un français peut avoir comme droit et comme 
obligations et ils vont se fondre dans sa société comme n’importe quel migrant. C’est le 
																																																								
640 Interview with National Official 2, DAEI, Paris (29 February 2016).  
641 Ministère de l’Intérieur et. al., ‘Annexes III: Opérations d’insertion in Evaluation des dispositifs 
d’accompagnement des personnes présentes dans les campements’, Evaluation des dispositifs 
d’accompagnement des personnes presents dans les campements (May 2013). 
642 National Official 3, DAEI, Paris (29 February 2016).  
643 Interview with National Official 1, Dihal, Paris (5 December 2014).  
644 Interview with Municipal Official, Mairie de Villeurbanne, Lyon (10 June 2015).  
645 Interview with Regional Official 1, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (10 June 2015).  
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modèle républicain d’intégration.646 
 
This comment demonstrated the official’s reliance on the republican idea of integration to 
justify the ethnically selective Andatu initiative. Yet, it also revealed that the official 
framed the idea of integration as an ideal, which adult participants rarely realised in 
practice. The suggestion was that in the case of the Roma, adults tended to lack the 
capacity to absorb new customs, preventing their integration into French society. As well 
as its racialised undertones, the comment implied that the French state’s approach to 
integration was in fact ageist.     
 
Officials across all levels of government tended to communicate the scolarisation of 
Roma children as a success, but there were still challenges in practice. A municipal 
official maintained, ‘les réussites je vous l’ai dis tout à l’heure, c’est la scolarisation des 
enfants. Mais le plus grand défi c’est de poursuivre cette scolarisation. Le danger, c’est 
que dès qu’ils ne sont plus à l’école primaire, ils disparaient de l’école’.647 The 
difficulties in maintaining the attendance of Roma children after primary school was 
partly a product of the administrative structure of French schools. Although the school 
curriculum was nationally consistent, the management of the schools themselves, 
especially the task of enrolment, was divided among different levels of government. ‘La 
responsabilité appartient aux communes pour le niveau primaire, pour le collège c’est au 
département, et les lycées appartiennent à la région’ argued the municipal official.648 As 
such Roma had to overcome challenges of enrolment at each stage of education, which 
sometimes meant they slipped through the cracks of the system and did not progress to 
the next level of studies.  
 
Additionally, a national inter-ministerial report highlighted practical challenges related to 
the scolarisation of Roma children: 
 
Par ailleurs, la réalité des parcours scolaires se heurte à des obstacles importants. Il  
peut s’agir de difficultés dues à l’éloignement des écoles, au déséquilibre des capacités 
d’accueil, au manque de personnels disposant des compétences nécessaires à la prise en 
charge d’élèves non francophones. La mission a observé également le risque de blocage 
que pouvait entraîner la prise en charge de groupes importants et la nécessité de veiller à 
prévenir la tentation d’organiser des “classes à caractère ethnique” qui sont contraires aux 
																																																								
646 Interview with Regional Official 4, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (10 June 2015).  
647 Interview with Municipal Official, Mairie de Villeurbanne, Lyon (10 June 2015).  
648 Interview with Municipal Official, Mairie de Villeurbanne, Lyon (10 June 2015). 
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principes de l’École républicaine.649 
 
This excerpt exposes that although officials were largely optimistic about the potential 
Roma children could reach through scolarisation, challenges to their integration 
persisted. The republican idea of transforming ‘foreign’ children into ‘Frenchmen’ 
through l’école républicaine did not eliminate difficulties the French state experienced in 
their attempts to integrate Roma children in practice.  
 
Political and Financial Barriers 
 
Some officials argued the frequent failure of local and regional insertion dispositifs was a 
function of the participants’ characteristics, accusing Roma of lacking the capacity to 
fully integrate into French society. Reflecting on the poor results of a village d’insertion, 
a regional official stated that ‘la plupart des Roms ne sont pas capable de s’intégrer’.650 
The implication was that factors inherent to these so-called Roma prevented them from 
becoming civilised. This remark absolved the French state of responsibility for failing to 
achieve the objectives set out in dispositifs, but the implicit link between civilisation and 
ethnicity revealed more about the prejudices of the official than impediments to Roma 
integration. Political discourse on integration initiatives revealed that the French state had 
a significant part to play in preventing the realisation of integration through two principal 
barriers.   
 
The first barrier to integration was political will. Alternative housing to accommodate 
evicted camp residents depended upon elected local officials. Municipal governments 
often owned the sites on which villages d’insertion and other segregated insertion 
projects were built. This meant it was up to the local mayor to decide whether to grant 
Prefects and/or associations permission to use municipal land for this purpose or renew 
existing dispositifs. A national inter-ministeral report acknowledged this problem, 
highlighting that ‘les difficultés de montage de ces opérations tiennent généralement à des 
facteurs externes: négotiations complexes avec les partenaires publics pour la recherche 
des terrains disponibles [et] réticence des élus en raison du faible seuil d’acceptabilité 
																																																								
649 Ministère de l’Intérieur et. al., Evaluation des dispositifs d’accompagnement des personnes présentes 
dans les campements (May 2013). 
650 Interview with Regional Official 1, Préfecture de la Seine-Saint-Denis, Bobigny (12 June 2015).  
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sociale de leurs administrés’.651 Even Sarkozy’s Secretary for European Affairs, 
Lellouche conceded ‘Il faut la volonté politique d’intégrer ces personnes’.652 Cerema 
referenced a MOUS in Bordeaux to exemplify this point: 
Le pilotage de la MOUS est alors confié à la préfecture avec la collaboration de la ville de 
Bordeaux (le squat est situé sur la commune) et de la communaté urbaine de Bordeaux 
(propriétaire du batiment) qui co-financent le dispositif. Ce projet a pu voir le jour grâce 
au fort engagement des élus.653 
 
The integration of Roma was thus made possible through the will of local mayors. The 
example also illuminated the fact that insertion dispositifs depended on the co-ordination 
of multiple local and regional administrations with sometimes competing agendas, which 
was not always easy to accomplish.  
 
But insertion initiatives were not always popular among French politicians. A regional 
official from the Alpes-Maritimes noted that ‘dès qu’on parle de les installer sur un 
terrain, de mettre à disposition des mobil-homes pour pouvoir les acceuillir, il y a 
immédiatement un tir frontal des communes, un refus des élus, et en général des 
populations qui sont viscéralement hostiles à l’arrivée de ces Roms’.654 This comment 
made clear that the accompagnement of Roma was not only unpopular with local 
politicians but also with their constituents. A regional official from Ile-de-France shared 
the same concerns, stating that ‘les élus locaux ne veulent pas les villages d’insertion. 
C’est ultra impopulaire. Si vous allez voir un maire et vous lui dites “je vais vous installer 
un village d’insertion chez vous”, il n’y en a aucun qui veulent. Du moins très très 
peu’.655  
 
A regional official from the Nord noted that the issue of securing alternative housing for 
evicted Roma became more challenging after the 2014 municipal elections, claiming that 
‘depuis la montée du Front National, c’est beaucoup plus difficile d’obtenir des lieux 
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d’hébergement. Les portes se ferment’.656 This highlighted the role external political 
pressure played in inhibiting the integration of evicted Roma. A senior national official 
expanded on this argument, asserting that the accompagnement of Roma was a key issue 
in the 2014 municipal elections: 
 
Tout va dépendre de la volonté des élus locaux, de s’engager. Les dernières élections 
municipales en France ce printemps-là [2014] ont montrées que ceux qui se sont engagés 
dans la politique d’insertion ou de tentative de politique d’insertion, ont été battus. Ils 
étaient battus sur ce sujet-là. Et donc cette question était importante pour le basculement 
municipal parce qu’en réalité, même les personnes qui habitent dans les communes 
proche de Paris populaires qui ne vivent pas bien, s’expriment « pourquoi l’Etat fait 
quelque chose pour ces gens-là et pas pour nous ». Ils peuvent porter plainte parce qu’il y 
a aussi des réalités de délinquance. Ils peuvent avoir des problèmes…on a eu une 
manifestation dans le quartier nord de Marseille en décembre 2012. Les habitats sont 
descendus et qui ont expulsés eux-mêmes la petite communauté Rom, [les habitants] sont 
des immigrés eux-mêmes.657 
 
Local politicians’ objections to accompagnement initiatives appeared to correlate with 
public opinion. This revealed that in practice accompagnement measures were difficult to 
implement, even after they were incorporated into the Hollande government’s national 
circular of 26 August 2012, hindering the integration of Roma in France.  
 
Finance was a second barrier to integration. Insertion dispositifs were a considerable 
public expense. Dihal reported that ‘les expériences de villages d’insertion existant 
montrent qu’il faut mobiliser des moyens d’investissement initial pouvant aller de 
700,000 € à 1,200,000 €. Les coûts de fonctionnement annuel varient quant à eux de 
500,000 € à 1,000,000 € (Mous comprise)’.658 A compounding problem was that insertion 
projects overran their projected timeframes, draining the public purse for longer than 
officials had budgeted. As French officials were rarely satisfied with the results these 
dispositifs produced, it is not surprising that some believed the costs attendant to 
assimilating Roma were unjustifiable. In the words of a senior national official ‘les 
villages d’insertion, ça a concerné très peu de gens, ça a couté très cher. Ça n’a pas 
forcément été inefficace mais on ne peut pas dire que de mettre tout l’argent pour ce peu 
de personnes produise des bons résultats’.659 A regional official from the Alpes-
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Maritimes also maintained that ‘ce sont des expériences qui ne donnent pas forcément des 
résultats totalement encourageants, parce que leur coût est tel au niveau de 
l’accompagnement social, qu’on trouve rapidement les limites de l’exercise’.660 Similarly, 
a regional official from Seine-Saint-Denis complained, ‘nous avois dépensés ici trop 
d’argent dans les villages d’insertion qui sont un échec patent.’661 Across the country 
French officials considered the cost of villages d’insertion greater than its benefits.  
 
Yet, problems of cost were not confined to models of segregated insertion. Even though 
many officials championed the approach of integrating Roma based on mixité, the 
decision to close and avoid replicating Andatu was largely due to cost. The regional 
official who had previously managed Andatu stated ‘après la modélisation du système, 
Andatu n’a pas été dupliquée pour des raisons de coût. Je pense qu’il y a une grosse partie 
qui a bloqué et c’est le coût. Ça coutait excessivement cher.’662 To replace Andatu, in 
Autumn 2015 the Préfecture of the Rhône established an initiative that resembled a 
village d’insertion called ‘Insertion par l’Emploi et l’Ecole’ (I2E or IEE). Cerema noted 
that ‘Le principe repose sur la création deux villages d’insertion composés respectivement 
de 15 et 16 bungalows achétés par la préfecture, pouvant acceuillir au total 160 
personnes’.663 The total budget of I2E was estimated at three million euros for a period of 
three years, which was roughly equivalent to the final cost of Andatu at 2,650,000 euros 
excluding social benefits (these were a considerable expenses, for example the Conseil 
Général du Rhône spent an additional 814,000 euros on Revenu de solidarité active).664 
However, without paying for social benefits such as Revenu de solidarité active, I2E was 
considerably cheaper. It also used a different funding structure to Andatu. Whereas 
Andatu relied on EU structural funds (Feder and FSE) to cover about half of the cost, I2E 
gained EU financing for 70 to 80 percent of expenses.665 The replacement of Andatu, a 
dispositif based on mixité, with I2E, a dispositif based on segregated insertion, 
demonstrated that resources limited the state’s capacity to integrate participants into 
French society. The replacement of Andatu highlighted how in practice French officials 
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implementing policies were sometimes forced to abandon the republican idea of 




Despite the French state’s discourse of integration, insertion initiatives had the perverse 
effect of isolating Roma, leaving them dependent on public support. As a consequence, 
the outcomes produced by the insertion projects contradicted the republican idea of 
integration, which inspired them in the first place. By providing participants with a social, 
cultural and economic education, the French state’s insertion projects were similar to its 
treatment of post-colonial migrants living in bidonvilles in the 1950s and 1960s, and 
reflected the original mission civilisatrice pursued by the officials and politicians of the 
Third Republic. In each case the assumption was that foreign populations were 
underdeveloped and helpless, requiring public assistance to attain a level of civilisation 
commensurate with French society. However, the French state’s efforts to ‘civilise’ Roma 
stood out in one respect: its focus on autonomous living. In this context, the word 
‘autonomous’ not only meant independence from the state, it also meant the cutting of 
‘clan’ ties with extended family members. It is through this logic that French officials 
framed extended families as a mark of backwardness and sought to use the republican 
idea of integration to justify a social programme of transforming them into nuclear units. 
In so doing, French officials used the republican idea of integration to conceal housing 
and welfare policies based on the heteronormative idea of a nuclear family, which 
targeted ‘Roma’ communities living in slums. The republican idea of integration allowed 





In this thesis, I have examined how French officials used republican ideas to 
communicate and justify policies targeting the Roma. In so doing, I have analysed the 
discourse of political actors working on these policies at local, regional, national and EU 
levels of government, and contributed to a growing literature on the French state’s 
treatment of Europe’s Roma community, the limits of EU citizenship as a form of 
protection against racism, and the rise of neo-republicanism in French politics. My first 
empirical chapter (chapter three) explored how the French state’s insistence on 
universalism allowed officials to deny the existence of policies targeting the Roma. It 
revealed differences between the Sarkozy and Hollande governments’ approaches to 
universalism, arguing that universalism only became a discursive strategy to demonstrate 
commitment to France’s republican tradition under Hollande, in spite of the Hollande 
government’s intensified program of evacuations. Chapter four highlighted how officials 
deployed the idea of a ‘neutral’ public sphere to rationalise the eviction and deportation 
of Roma living in illegal camps. It argued that neutrality was a normative concept 
officials used to frame Roma camps as a communitarian threat to the French public 
sphere. Chapter five investigated the basis on which the French state chose to support or 
reject evicted Roma residents. It exposed a logic of administrative selection based on 
whether a resident possessed the willingness and capacity to integrate, and maintained 
that interpretations of what constituted such a willingness and capacity were highly 
subjective and suspect. It also raised ethical concerns about the outsourcing of public 
policy to non-government associations, who determined which Roma to support or reject. 
Chapter six scrutinised the process of integration that selected Roma undertook in 
exchange for state support. It found that despite the French state’s rigorous administrative 
selection and socialisation programmes, evicted Roma tended to remain segregated from 
rather than integrated in French society. In sum, my thesis demonstrated how the strategic 
deployment of republican ideas allowed the French state to target an ethnic community.  
 
My focus on the strategic deployment of republican ideas did not mean I viewed them as 
empty or entirely up for grabs. Rather, I recognised that republican ideas have evolved in 
response to certain events throughout French history and each time an official invoked a 
republican concept it had historical connotations. However, I also appreciated that 
republican ideas were polyvalent, and through this thesis I argued that French officials 
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exploited this polyvalence in their strategic deployment of republican ideas. It was 
precisely the flexibility, ambiguity and, at times, contradictions of republican ideas that 
allowed them to be used to communicate and justify ethnically targeted policies. In the 
case of universalism, for example, the Sarkozy and Hollande administrations insisted that 
their policies on illegal camps conformed to republican principles and they claimed that 
they did not target a single ethnic community. But references to the Roma slipped into 
their political discourses. This revealed that, behind a universalist defence, their policies 
were based on ethnic stereotypes.  
 
The flexibility of republican ideas hinged upon the different interpretations of the 
officials deploying them. This meant officials could use the same ideas, but their 
interpretations varied. Sometimes this reflected partisan divisions. The Sarkozy 
government deployed the republican concept of universalism reluctantly to respond to 
criticism from Brussels, in an attempt to minimise the political and legal cost of their 
policies that overtly referred to ‘Roma’ camps. In contrast, the Hollande government used 
universalist rhetoric proactively to disassociate itself from its predecessors by establishing 
a national policy document on the evacuation of illegal camps that did not mention the 
Roma. This shift was largely rhetorical as a number of Socialist officials continued to 
frame illegal camps as a Roma problem in their political discourses and evacuations 
intensified under Hollande. As the Hollande government could not provide alternative 
housing for the majority of persons it displaced, the national policy of evacuating illegal 
camps contributed to France’s housing crisis. 
 
Interpretations of republican ideas were not necessarily partisan. The discourse of 
regional and local officials, both elected politicians and appointed civil servants, offered 
different readings of the republican concept of integration. Some officials framed 
integration as an end that Roma could achieve once they had been segregated from 
French society in villages d’insertion and were taught the skills to subsist without support 
from the state. In this sense integration was synonymous with autonomy. Other officials, 
such as those working on the Andatu social housing project in the Rhône, framed 
integration as a process rather than a desired goal. They argued that integration should be 
built into insertion initiatives, which is why Andatu encouraged social mixing by proving 
rent controlled apartments to its participants dispersed throughout Lyon.  
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Even government contractors, hired to assess which evicted ‘Roma’ should receive state 
support, exhibited diverse readings of republican ideas. For example, the contractor GIP 
Habitat et Interventions Sociales specified employment, language and education as 
indicators of integration. Yet, a report produced by one of its competitors, Adoma, used 
different categories to assess the ‘degré d’intégration’: ‘personnes domiciliées 
administrativement, enfants scolarisés et personnes bénéficiant d’une couverture 
médicale’.666 The word integration was the same, but the interpretation differed. Thus, 
even contractors working on behalf of the French state, as well as those who were direct 
employees of it, exploited the polyvalence of republican ideas.  
 
Deploying Republican Ideas to Communicate and Justify a Roma Policy  
 
In my analysis of political discourse, I found three ways in which French officials can 
exploit the polyvalence of republican ideas to communicate and justify policies targeting 
the Roma.667 First, French officials can emphasise one republican idea, even if it 
conflicted with another republican idea. For example, they could prioritise the republican 
concept of a neutral public sphere over integration. As I discovered, officials tended to 
insist that evacuating ‘Roma’ camps was essential and justified this policy on the basis 
that it would preserve the neutrality of the French public sphere. They framed the 
integration of children as less important than addressing the threats that ‘Roma’ camps 
posed to the neutrality of the French public sphere. However, despite the emphasis 
officials placed on preserving the public sphere, they could not deny that evacuations 
were disruptive. This was especially the case for children. An evacuation at any time of 
year could interrupt the integration of children who could be displaced far from the 
schools in which they were enrolled, hindering their literacy, confidence and social 
development. Human rights activist groups such as Amnesty International argued that 
evacuating camps during the school term was even more problematic because it meant 
that evicted students struggled to complete the necessary assessments to pass the 
academic year, leading to high repeat rates. Although French officials devoted some 
energy to integrating Roma after they had been evicted, evacuations could be one of the 
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factors hindering Roma integration in the first place. This revealed that republican ideas 
were not always complementary. The strategic deployment of one republican idea could 
destabilise another.  
 
Second, I learned that French officials can use republican ideas to mask alternative, less 
politically credible ideas. In other words, republican language can communicate and 
justify policies based on racist, anti-gypsy, crypto-Christian, heteronormative, class-
based, security focused and/or multicultural assumptions. If a French official were to 
describe evacuations as expelling poor and unclean people from French neighbourhoods, 
the official would likely be criticised as being classist and, potentially, racist. But, by 
strategically deploying the republican idea of preserving the French public sphere, an 
official can justify evacuations as countering communitarianism. French officials did 
refer to ‘Roma’ camps as substandard and squalid, but the argument of countering 
communitarianism was more politically credible than an aversion to treating poverty. 
Perhaps the most fundamental example of this strategy was the French state’s denial of a 
Roma policy. Insisting that there was no such thing as a Roma policy, while framing 
illegal camps as a Roma problem, allowed officials to mask ethnic measures with 
universalist rhetoric. 
 
Third, I discovered that republican ideas can disguise ‘thicker’ conceptions of identity 
despite their supposed neutrality, thereby allowing officials to structurally favour a 
particular set of norms over others. For example, French officials were able to exploit the 
heteronormative and crypto-Christian bias embedded in the concept of a neutral public 
sphere. Neutrality was not objective; it was a normative benchmark that officials 
constructed to categorise ‘Roma’ camps as challenging the heteronormative and crypto-
Christian norms of French society. These included the idea that families should be small 
nuclear units with two parents of the opposite sex, and that nuclear units should live in 
their own self-contained accommodation. By exploiting this bias, French officials were 
able to frame large extended Roma families who often lived in communal dwellings as 
clans that challenged the neutrality of the French public sphere and could use this 
argument to justify systematic evacuations. Another example was the loaded republican 
concept of integration. The term integration had particularly strong historical 
connotations of France’s colonial mission civilisatrice in the Third Republic When 
deploying the idea of integration in relation to the Roma, French officials were able to 
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exploit its historical bias to communicate and justify their ethnically targeted insertion 
initiatives. In their political discourse, officials could frame the Roma as underdeveloped 
and helpless, requiring the assistance of the state to attain a level of autonomy 
commensurate with French society. Using the term integration implied that the Roma 
were incapable of assimilating on their own, which allowed French officials to rationalise 
their intervention. As such, the republican ideas created an opportunity for French 
officials to exploit pre-conceptions to rationalise their policies targeting the Roma. 
 
These three strategies shed light on the ways in which the strategic deployment of 
republican ideas facilitated discrimination of the Roma. It is important to note that the 
French state’s focus on the Roma has often been emphatically ethnic. This may sound 
self-evident, but it is an analytically significant factor differentiating my work from 
existing scholarship on republicanism. Scholars have tended to explore the link between 
republican ideas and the French state’s policies targeting religious communities, 
particularly Muslims. My focus on an ethnic question – the French state’s targeting of the 
Roma – explains a key omission from my thesis: the republican concept of laïcité. 
Despite the prevalence of laïcité in public debate in France, it was not present in political 
discourses on the Roma. As such, my thesis demonstrates that republican ideas can be 
strategically deployed independently of debates about religion in contemporary France. 
My thesis also illuminates how French officials used republican ideas other than laïcité to 
communicate and justify policies that often discriminated against a European ethnic 
community, many of whom were EU citizens. The French state’s strategic deployment of 
republican ideas to other ethnic questions merits further exploration and is beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  
 
A Futile Policy 
 
In practice, the strategic deployment of republican ideas often led to ineffective policies. 
Paradoxically, the policies officials designed did not resolve the Roma problem they 
constructed. As my empirical chapters demonstrate, there were discrepancies between the 
language of policy proposals and the discourse of French officials implementing the 
policies on the ground. First, the strategic deployment of universalism did not ensure the 
equal treatment of all individuals. Instead, universalist rhetoric concealed racist ideas. 
Denying the existence of a Roma policy marginalised a population that officials framed 
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as Roma and allowed them to argue that the disproportionate impact on the Roma was an 
unintended consequence of a colour-blind policy. Universalism also stimulated 
xenophobia, since French officials were unable to identify and protect vulnerable 
populations who were victims of ethnic discrimination.  
 
Second, the discourse on neutralising the French public sphere by evacuating ‘Roma’ 
slums did not dissolve communitarianism. Instead, evacuations fragmented slums into 
smaller clusters. This fragmentation also suggested that the Hollande government’s 
national mission à la résorption des bidonvilles did not in fact achieve its goal of 
eradicating slums as the French state had accomplished in the 1960s. Additionally, 
policies designed to incentivise exit and facilitate deportations did not reduce the total 
number of people living in slums. These policies did not prevent Romanian and Bulgarian 
migrants from returning to France via its porous and unmanned borders, nor did they 
deter new migrants from choosing to settle in France.  
 
Third, individualised diagnostic assessments of illegal camp residents excluded Roma on 
the basis of collective stereotypes. The fact that regional officials subcontracted the task 
of undertaking diagnostics to associations raised ethical and financial concerns. 
Associations did not always respect the anonymity of participants and sometimes they 
included a category of ethnicity in their assessments, which reproduced the collective 
ethnic discrimination that the policy of individualised diagnostic assessments aimed to 
avoid. Reflecting on diagnostics, officials also complained that the cost of hiring 
associations was not commensurate with the quality of product they delivered. This meant 
diagnostics were too expensive to justify and yet not sufficiently well financed to yield 
results that could help officials make informed decisions.  
 
Fourth, regional and local insertion projects designed to integrate Roma and guide them 
towards autonomy tended to isolate Roma from the rest of French society and left them 
dependent on government support. This meant that the strategic deployment of the 
republican idea of integration led to segregation, rendering the policy an unjustified 
public expense. Moreover, although insertion initiatives came to be included in the 
Hollande government’s policy of accompagnement, centralising the oversight of 
integration did not help. The fact that insertion projects were largely ineffective 
highlighted that integration of foreigners into a new society is always a gradual process 
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and cannot easily be accelerated. The failure of insertion also raised questions about why 
French officials assumed that Roma could not integrate on their own. I would argue that 
the republican idea of integration was a frequently a veil for reinforcing prejudices 
against the Roma.    
 
The fact that the strategic deployment of republican ideas resulted in ineffective policies 
was not simply because French officials were out of touch with the problems of modern 
society. As Emile Chabal has pointed out, the argument that French politics is removed 
from empirical reality rests upon caricatures of French politicians and policymakers as 
tempestuous people, seduced by abstract, anachronistic ideas.668 Instead, the dislocation 
between the language of policy proposals and the discourse of officials implementing the 
policies on the ground was underpinned by a common dilemma: officials sought to design 
policies devoid of ethnic distinctions to resolve a problem they framed in ethnic terms. 
Given the contradictions contained in this dilemma, it is not surprising that the political 
discourse of officials was inconsistent. Despite removing ethnic references in national 
circulars, policies targeting the Roma persisted at a local and regional level, and officials 
often referenced the Roma candidly during interview discussions. Additionally, 
government reports, and policy documents intended for French and EU technocrats 
explicitly used the term Roma, albeit in different ways. In many of my interviews, 
officials both denied the existence of the Roma community and simultaneously referred 
to the Roma explicitly in relation to their policies  
 
The Legitimacy of French Republicanism  
 
If French Roma policy was ineffective, why did public officials continue to use 
republican ideas to communicate and justify their policies? I would suggest that the 
French state’s discursive attachment to republican ideas is linked to the revival of 
republicanism as the imprimatur of French policy and political action following the 
golden years of the trente glorieuses. Since then, France has experienced at least two 
significant economic crises, the most recent of which stemmed from fractures in the 
European project that France had worked so hard to build, placing tremendous strain on 
the French welfare state and propelling more of its citizens towards poverty. Alongside 
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internal instability the French state experienced international insecurity, typified by the 
rise of Islamist terrorism that affected France directly since the Charlie Hebdo shooting in 
January 2015, ongoing war in the Middle East, and mass migration of refugees escaping 
humanitarian disaster for a better life in Europe. Consequently, France, in common with 
other western democracies, has seen the partial collapse of the Left-Right political divide 
and growing tensions between liberalism and populism. As the 2017 presidential 
elections confirmed, Emmanuel Macron’s En Marche movement and Marine Le Pen’s 
revitalised Front National sidelined mainstream Socialist and Conservative parties that 
had governed France without interruption since the 1980s.  
 
Amidst the backdrop of instability, the flexibility and polyvalence of republicanism has 
made it one of the only durable cluster of ideas officials have been able to mobilise. This 
perhaps explains why politicians from different factions have sought to rebrand their 
parties and policies in republican rhetoric. For example, in May 2015 the Centre-Right 
Union Pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP) adopted the new title ‘Les Républicains’, 
led by former President Sarkozy, and, after winning the French presidential election in 
May 2017, Macron’s En Marche party changed its name to ‘La République en Marche’. 
Even Marine Le Pen, who came second, referred to the Front National as ‘l’Alliance 
patriote et républicaine’.669 Today, republican language has truly transcended political 
divisions, even though interpretations of republican ideas remain highly contested. The 
republican public philosophy and its core ideas have become a symbol of certainty that 
officials can deploy to persuade French citizens that France will survive this period of 
uncertainty.  
 
It is possible that this preoccupation with public philosophies is a French eccentricity. 
French officials do seem unusually concerned with anchoring their policy proposals in 
overarching republican rhetoric. To substantiate this claim, however, would require 
further study of how officials in other countries have used comparable public 
philosophies to communicate and justify their policies.670 Nevertheless, the case of the 
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Roma illustrates how French officials could use a public philosophy to legitimise even the 
most discriminatory, ineffective and unjustifiably expensive policies. In doing so, it 
draws attention to the politically untouchable status that public philosophies can carry, 
making it difficult for officials to challenge them. For example, if a French official was to 
criticise the republican idea of universalism in a public forum, other officials and political 
commentators could accuse the official of having racist inclinations. Although 
generalising about the influence of all public philosophies is outside the scope of this 
thesis, inferences can be drawn about the ways in which the French state deployed similar 
republican ideas to communicate and justify other vulnerable and exposed migrant 
communities beyond the Roma.     
 
Beyond the Roma in France   
 
The recent phenomenon of slums in France is not confined to the Roma. Since at least 
2002 migrants, mainly from East Africa and the Middle East, have constructed informal 
settlements in France. The largest and most well-known of these was the ‘Jungle’ in 
Calais, which at its peak capacity in 2016 housed over 6,500 people. Of course, there 
were clear differences between migrants living in slums such as Calais and those the 
French state framed as Roma. Most were not EU citizens and did not want to remain in 
France. Instead, many hoped to settle in the United Kingdom and saw France as a transit 
stop to their final destination. This was in part due to a predominance of English as a first 
or second language in these migrant settlements, but it was also based on a perception of 
Britain as a country with greater economic prospects and a reaction to the fact that France 
had one of the lowest rates of granting asylum in Europe. Despite their preference for 
Britain, the Touquet border control treaty often obstructed these migrants from taking the 
final leg of their journey because it allowed British officials to conduct immigration 
controls in France, shifting the border across the channel from Kent to Calais. 
Consequently, many migrants were turned away. If migrants had relatives in Britain they 
could apply for a family reunification claim, but difficulties navigating administrative 
requirements and an oversaturation of the UK Border Agency led to long and sometimes 
apparently indefinite delays. Additionally, these migrants tended to travel alone or in 
small families, which stood in contrast to the extended family structure officials 
associated with Roma. This meant that public criticism of these migrant camps did not 
raise the phenomène clanique as an issue.  
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Still, the French state’s treatment of migrant communities living in informal settlements 
was often similar to the case of the Roma. First, French officials framed evacuations as 
imperative, and justified them as humanitarian operations. This reflected the tendencies of 
humanisme et fermeté within republican philosophy. As President Hollande stated in a 
speech on the Calais camp in September 2016, France ‘est capable d'être digne, d'être 
humaine et en même temps d'être responsable, parce que nous avons des règles 
claires’.671 After the evacuation of Calais the following month, a journalist asked 
Hollande whether ‘ces déplacements aujourd’hui ont-ils une portée symbolique?’ and the 
President replied ‘oui le symbole, c’est qu’il y a des valeurs en France qui doivent être 
toujours rappelées. Ces valeurs sont la solidarité, la fraternité, l’humanisme’.672 Second, 
the French state’s handling of evicted or soon-to-be evicted residents rested on the idea 
that foreigners had to conform to French society through a process of integration or face 
deportation. As Hollande exclaimed, ‘nous faisons en sorte d'accueillir humainement, 
dignement des personnes qui vont faire leur demande de droit d'asile. Celles et ceux qui 
pourront faire valoir ce droit seront dans donc dans une démarche d'intégration. Celles et 
ceux qui ne pourront pas faire valoir ce droit, parce que relevant d'autres conditions, 
seront raccompagnés.’673 The strategic deployment of the republican idea of integration in 
Hollande’s speech was unmistakable. 
 
Evacuations of migrant settlements also had comparable consequences to the case of the 
Roma, leading to the fragmentation of slums rather than their eradication, which in turn 
provoked further evacuations. The migrants from Calais and other evicted slums tended 
to erect informal settlements elsewhere or join other existing camps. For example, an 
evacuation of a settlement in Porte de la Chapelle in Paris in July 2017 contained over 
2700 migrants from Sudan, Afghanistan, Cameroon, Nigeria and elsewhere. Many of 
these migrants were evicted from Calais, and the evacuation was the thirty-fourth of its 
kind since June 2015. Additionally, following the demolition of the Calais ‘jungle’, a 
number of migrants joined the neighbouring settlement in Dunkirk, which primarily 
consisted of Iraqi Kurds. Responding to the insalubrious conditions of the slum, the 
																																																								
671 François Hollande, Président de la République, Déclaration sur les centres d'accueil et d'orientation et 
les demandeurs d'asile à Tours (24 September 2016).  
672 Ibid., Déclaration à Doué-La-Fontaine (29 October 2016).  
673 Ibid., Déclaration sur les centres d'accueil et d'orientation et les demandeurs d'asile à Tours (24 
September 2016). 
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Mayor of Dunkirk Damien Careme, used local authority funds to build a refugee camp for 
2500 residents in March 2016. Equipped with basic amenities and wooden cabins as well 
as a principle of temporary accommodation, the Dunkirk refugee camp bore a striking 
resemblance to the villages d’insertion for Roma. Dunkirk was also the first 
internationally recognised refugee camp in France. Unfortunately, in April 2017, a large 
fire destroyed the facility, rendering it uninhabitable.  
 
Despite its international acclaim, Dunkirk was an anomaly. In most cases the French state 
relied on orientation centres to house evicted migrants until they decided to register their 
asylum in France or return to their country of origin.674 If a migrant was granted asylum, 
they were eligible for accommodation in one of France’s asylum reception centres. 
However, a number of problems arose. Not only was there a shortage of alternative 
housing relative to the number of refugees, but most refugees were refused asylum, 
leaving them homeless and effectively stateless. This was similar to the plight of evicted 
Roma who the French state framed as unassimilable, and thus unsuitable for state support. 
Additionally, many migrants were reluctant to register for asylum in France because, if 
they managed to cross the channel, they risked being sent back to France. This is because, 
under the Dublin agreement, the first country an asylum seeker enters is responsible for 
processing their application. Instead of living in state accommodation, these migrants 
preferred to remain irregular to maximise their prospects of reaching the United 
Kingdom. This was analogous to the situation of Roma who preferred to live in informal 
settlements rather than the French state’s insertion projects, affording them the freedom 
to enter and exit France of their own accord.  
 
The comparison between migrant and Roma settlements in France exposes the inability of 
the French welfare state to meet the demands of vulnerable communities and highlights 
the housing crisis that governments of the Fifth Republic have struggled to manage. 
Perhaps more fundamentally, however, it draws attention to the dominance of 
republicanism as the public philosophy of choice for French officials when they need to 
communicate and justify their policies on informal settlements in France. In doing so, it 
																																																								
674 These took the form of Centres d'accueil et d'orientation (CAO), which were state-owned buildings 
offering hebérgement to evicted migrants while they contemplated the decision to return to their countries 
of origin or register their asylum in France. Once the French state had officially granted asylum to a 
migrant, they were offered a place in a Centre d'Accueil de Demandeurs d'Asile (CADA). 
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helps to explain why the French state is so firmly opposed to bidonvilles and campements 
illicites, and why it continues to pursue evacuations in the absence of alternative 
arrangements. In the words of President Hollande, ‘La France ce n'est pas une France où 
on trouvera des campements…Il ne peut pas y avoir en France de camps’.675 As long as 
the French state fails to address its social housing shortage and continues to associate the 
provision of social housing with permanent settlement in France, the phenomène des 
bidonvilles will persist. Until then, it is likely that public officials will continue to frame 
informal migrant settlements as an ethnic problem, while also using a colour-blind 
republican public philosophy to justify their policy response.  
  
																																																								
675 François Hollande, Président de la République, Déclaration sur les centres d'accueil et d'orientation et 





Sample Interview Questions 
 
1. Pouvez-vous me dire un mot sur votre rôle en tant que…?  
2. Quel est l’objectif principal du gouvernement Français dans le domaine de la 
politique à l’égard des Roms? 
3. Quelle est votre perspective sur la politique poursuivie à l’égard des campements 
illicites? 
4. La présence des campements illicites représente-elle un défi pour l’état? 
5. Quelle est la différence entre un campement autorisé et un campement illicite ? 
o S’agit-il d’une problématique sanitaire, de sécurité ou encore d’une 
violation de propriété privée?  
6. Pouvez-vous me dire un mot sur les projets d’intégration et d’insertion ? 
7. Par	quels	biais	les	projets	d’intégration	sont-ils	mise	en	œuvre?	
8. Qu’entendez vous par la notion d’intégration ? 
9. En général, les habitants des campements illicites veulent-ils s’intégrer à la société 
française ou vont-ils davantage vers une communautarisation et un éloignement 
de la société française ?  
10. Pouvez-vous me parler de la politique d’évacuation et de démantèlement des 
campements illicites ? 
11. L’Etat propose-t-il une solution de logement pour les expulsés ? 
12. Il me semble qu’un individu peut être expulsé du territoire français s’il représente 
une menace pour l’ordre public. Que signifie ‘l’ordre public’ ? Quelle serait pour 
vous la solution idéale ?  
o Pourquoi ces individus sont-ils considérés comme « dangereux » ? 
13. Quelles mesures avez-vous prises pour empêcher l’installation de nouveaux 
campements illicites en France ? 
14. La politique suivie à l’égard des Roms a-t-elle changé depuis l’élection de 
François Hollande et encore depuis la nomination du Premier Ministre Manuel 
Valls?  
15. La politique suivie à l’égard des Roms a été critiquée pour son caractère 
« antirépublicain ». Que pensez vous de cette affirmation ? 
16. Y a-t-il des similitudes entre la politique suivie à l’égard des Roms et d’autre 
politiques d’immigration en France (par exemple, les populations étrangères issue 
de Maghreb ou les populations de l’ex-empire colonial français) ? 
17. Une politique envers les Roms doit-elle incarner certaines valeurs ? si oui, 
lesquelles ? 
18. En ce qui concerne la politique suivie à l’égard des Roms, quelles sont les plus 









2 Dec. 2014 Municipal Official, Mairie du 18e Arrondissement, Paris 
3    “        “ Senior Political Adviser, Cabinet du Ministre de l’Intérieur, Paris 
3    “        “ Political Adviser, Cabinet du Ministre de l’Intérieur, Paris 
4    “        “ Regional Official, Préfecture de Paris, Paris 
5    “        “ National Official, Ministère de l’Intérieur, Paris 
5    “        “ National Official 1, Dihal, Paris  
8    “        “ National Official 1, Ministère des Affairs Etrangères, Paris  
8    “        “ National Official 2, Ministère des Affairs Etrangères, Paris 
9    “        “ National Official 2, Dihal, Paris 
  
1 Jun. 2015 Municipal Official, Mairie de Paris, Paris  
1    “        “ National Official 2, Dihal, Paris 
1    “        “ National Official 3, Dihal, Paris 
2    “        “ Municipal Official, Marie de Lille, Lille 
2    “        “ Government Consultant 1, Adoma, Paris 
2    “        “ Government Consultant 2, Adoma, Paris 
3    “        “ Political Adviser, Cabinet du Ministre de l’Education, Paris 
3    “        “ Senior Political Adviser, Cabinet du Ministre de l’Education, Paris 
3    “        “ Regional Official 1, Préfecture du Nord, Lille   
4    “        “ Political Adviser, Cabinet du Ministre du Logement, Paris 
5    “        “ Political Adviser, Cabinet du Premier Ministre, Paris 
8    “        “ Regional Official, DDCS, Lille 
8    “        “ Regional Official 2, Préfecture du Nord, Lille 
8    “        “ Regional Official 3, Préfecture du Nord, Lille 
8    “        “ Regional Official 4, Préfecture du Nord, Lille 
10  “        “ Regional Official 1, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon 
10  “        “ Regional Official 2, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon 
10  “        “ Regional Official 3, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon 
10  “        “ Regional Official 4, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon 
10  “        “ Municipal Official, Mairie de Villeurbanne, Lyon 
11  “        “ Regional Official 5, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon 
12  “        “ Regional Official 1, Préfecture de la Seine-Saint-Denis, Bobigny 
16  “        “ Regional Official 1, Préfecture des Alpes-Maritimes, Nice 
17  “        “ Regional Official 2, Préfecture de la Seine-Saint-Denis, Bobigny 
18  “        “ Regional Official, Préfecture de la Gironde, Bordeaux 
19  “        “ Municipal Official, Mairie de Bordeaux, Bordeaux  
22  “        “ Muncipal Official, Mairie de Nice, Nice 
26  “        “ Regional Official, Préfecture des Bouches-du-Rhône, Marseille 
 
7 Sep. 2016 Regional Official 3, Préfecture de la Seine-Saint-Denis, Bobigny 
7    “        “ National Official 1, SGAE, Paris 
7    “        “ National Official 2, SGAE, Paris   
8    “        “ Anti-Discrimination Representative, Amnesty International, Paris 
8    “        “ Representative for Roma Rights, La Voix des Rroms, Paris 
10 Sep. 2016 Regional Official 2, Préfecture des Alpes-Maritimes, Nice 
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29 Feb. 2016 Political Adviser, Elysée, Paris 
29  “        “ National Official 1, DAEI, Paris 
29  “        “ National Official 2, DAEI, Paris  
29  “        “ National Official 3, DAEI, Paris 
  
14 Mar. 2016 European Commission Official, DG REGIO, Brussels 
14  “        “ European Commission Official, DG EMPL, Brussels 
14  “        “ European Commission Official, DG JUST, Brussels 
 
Preliminary Interviews  
 
In 2013 I undertook seven telephone interviews for my masters dissertation. I did not cite 
from them directly in my doctoral thesis but they served as useful background material.  
 
22 Mar. 2013 Regional Official, Préfecture de la Dordogne, Périgueux 
22  “        “ Regional Official, Préfecture de la Charente, Angoulême 
28  “        “ Regional Official, Préfecture des Bouches-du-Rhône, Marseille 
  
9 Apr. 2013 Regional Official, Préfecture de l’Ain, Bourg-en-Bresse 
9    “        “ Regional Official, Préfecture du Loir-et-Cher, Blois 
12  “        “ National Official, Dihal, Paris 
16  “        “ Municipal Official, Mairie de Saint-Denis, Saint Denis 
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Délégation interministérielle à l’hébergement et à l’accès au logement, Journée nationale 
d’échanges l’anticipation et l’accompagnement des opérations d’évacuation des 
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